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This thesis examines the foundations of individual human rights. The general thought that 
informs the discussion is that rights and values ar two different kinds of moral discourse. 
Hence, any attempt to simply state rights in value terms will be problematic because the 
agent-relative character of values does not lend itself o grounding/ explaining 
interpersonal rules, like rights. The thesis outlines agent-relative values, showing their 
plausibility, and then proceeds to show how rights perform a different function. The 
attempt to move from talk about what is right to what rights we have is termed the 
‘moralist fallacy’. Rights are kinds of restrictions that others face on their actions when 
they are promoting their own good. Axiology is about how best to achieve one’s objective 
agent-relative good; so values involve trade offs and calculations agents can perform about 
what is in their best interest, while rights are not open to trade offs and calculations because 
they are restrictions that agents face when they ar pu suing their own good. The main 
problem the thesis discerns is how rights can be concerned with protecting the concerns of 
others when what people legitimately care about are heir own concerns. Two different 
views of the motivational legitimacy of rights are examined—the agent well being view 
and the agent-recipient view. On the former, rights are motivationally appealing and 
justified because abiding by them can be shown to be part of what constitutes an agent’s 
(who is subject to abiding by rights) well being; on the latter view, abiding by rights 
constitutes part of the recipient’s (who has the rights) well being. Taken separately these 
two views are problematic. Rights legitimacy would seem to require something from both 
views. But since these views are contraries they do not seem open to combination either. 
The thesis will attempt to provide a solution to reconciling the agent well being and agent 
recipient views while trying to retain the nature of rights as restrictions not open to trade 
offs or reducible to value talk.  
Rights function as restrictions, but why do they function this way and how are they 
justified when what people are mostly concerned with is their own agent-relative good? 
Rights must be a separate kind of moral claim, not reducible to talk about what values we 
have in order for rights to have the motivational and justificatory strength they need for 
interpersonal validity and to resist paternalist interferences. Rights will have this strength if 
they are based on something that all value pursuers require—such as recognition of one’s 
legitimate claim to possess oneself. First possession based on first come, first serve will 
provide legitimacy for a system of rights because it will appeal to and motivate agents by 
relating rights-respect to their well being. I will argue that abiding by others’ rights is in 
one’s best interest because doing so is a wise choice—while one might believe that not 
abiding by others’ rights might give one the best outc me, one cannot be sure about this 
and so ought to choose to abide by rights as a general policy. Also, agents ought to make 
sure that they voice their concerns over rights violati ns of others. Even though this may 
not be to their immediate benefit, it is rational for agents to speak out on this issue and 
reinforce rights–respecting behaviour because making the system effective will ultimately 
be in their own long-term self-interest. The thesis also tries to make sense of how rights are 
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 It might be thought that since the idea of human rights is enshrined in international 
law and lip service is paid to it in most countries, arguments attempting to explain the 
foundations of rights are superfluous. It is just a fact that we have rights and no amount of 
meta-ethical discourse will change this fact. Some might try to give a better explanation for 
the law of causation, but it is just a fact that causation exists and we take it for granted that 
the same thing under the same circumstances will produce the same effect. So just as 
scientists take causation for granted when they do what they do, the rest of us can take 
rights for granted when we engage in analyzing current events. If this line of thought is true 
then we could simply rely upon the UN declaration of human rights as having some 
foundation. But there are times when some seem to offer good arguments that they or their 
country do not fall under the UN’s definition of rights. China, for instance, often claims 
that the UN definition of rights is ‘Western’ and its mplementation in China would 
diminish diversity by constraining the rules of theCommunist Party (Sen 1999). What 
rights are has great significance since the definitions we use will put limits and constraints 
on what can count as a right, and thereby, what sort of actions can be classified as ones we 
have a right to or not. The definition and understanding of ‘right’ has great practical 
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significance not just for those who practice law, but for all of us who wish to have a way to 
protect what is rightfully our own. So, getting the concept of rights right is important in 
order for us to have a better understanding of how we can treat others and they us. 
It should not be thought that the philosopher just wi hes to defend the status quo as 
a kind of apologist for the present system; but nor does he necessarily wish, unless he is a 
Pyrronist, to poke holes in the system simply in order to produce doubt about it. Philosophy 
should poke holes in the system—but when the system ee s worthy of defense, this 
procedure is to strengthen the system, not demolish it. T is thesis attempts to poke some 
holes in the idea of rights, but only in order to better strengthen the concept of rights.  
So far much of history has the following story line: The attempt of some to better 
their own lot at the expense of others. The following thesis derives part of its motivation 
from the idea that rights are historical accidents accompanying revolutions based on power 
relations. If rights are just political favours governments grant citizens in order to keep the 
peace then there might not seem to be much of a morl reason for them. Recently, Mancur 
Olson (2000) has suggested that a kind of invisible hand that appeals to the self interest of 
those in control can show why they have powerful interests to institute a system of 
individual rights. It is not due to the benevolence of rulers that we have democracies, but to 
the fact that tyrants have encompassing and superencompassing interests that make it in 
their interests to secure property rights and allow more freedom. Eventually this process 
leads to elections and to a balance of power and the extinction of the tyrant. This is all 
probably true and important as an explanation of how is it was that self-interested groups 
gave up their power to create the equal systems of rights we have today; but what we are 
bereft of is an explanation for what sort of system of rights we ought to have—that is, why 
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these powerful interests give us a system of rights that looks like a system we ought to 
have. Without the normative take on rights, all we can say is that we are the beneficiaries 
of the political flotsam and jetsam of history. This thesis will endeavour to consider why 
self-interested persons will have reason to abide by a system of rights, have reason to 
accept the moral separateness of others, and also why adopting obligations towards others 
is the proper response to take.     
 Every day we see people proclaiming that their rights have been violated. Recently, 
we have seen riots erupt over cartoon portrayals of the prophet Mohammed.  It has been 
claimed by many Muslims that their religious rights were violated by the portrayal of 
Mohammed with a turban in the shape of a bomb. Others assert that just the physical 
representation of the Prophet is enough to violate their religious rights. In either case, when 
it is said that their religious rights have been violated there is the presumption that the rest 
of us face a constraint or duty on how we can portray heir religion; failure to recognize 
this constraint or duty means that we have seriously harmed them or their religion in some 
way and that they have the power to demand we make reparations and/or to show 
deference to their religion. For many people there is no difference between something’s 
being the right thing to do and one’s having a right. If it is right to pay deference to Allah, 
then how could one have a right to do anything different?    
Clearly there is a relation between having a right and doing what is right. At the 
very least the relation is simply the use of the word ‘right’—as a noun or an adjective. But 




If man is to live on earth, it is right for him to use his mind, it is right to act on his 
own judgment, it is right to work for his values and to keep the product of his work. 
If life on earth is his purpose, he has a right to live as a rational being (Rand 1964, 
111).  
  
This might be a tempting move to make but it seems like a fallacy of reasoning. The fact 
that something can be described as the right thing to do does not mean that it imposes a 
duty on others not to interfere with us and that we have a right to do it. There is often a 
wide gulf between having a right and doing what is right—for instance it might be right for 
a person to live rationally but this does not mean that one has a right to take any actions 
that would make one rational. Nor does one’s having a ri ht to do x make doing x right—
perhaps smoking is one’s right, but smoking may not be he right thing for one to do.   
Another reason for holding rights at arms length from the good is based on the 
function of the two ideas. When we describe something as good we think of it as something 
that could be maximized, or had in various degrees; when we say that we have a right to 
something we mean to say that we have control over it, a control that one can either 
exercise or not. We usually say we have a right to something when we think that its 
importance must be protected from being subject to becoming part of the ends of others.  
Traditional expositions of rights have often adopted the prisoner’s dilemma as a 
way of showing the difficulties inherent in how a theory of rights can reconcile the problem 
of why we will find it rational to forego some of the things we desire in order to get a 
system of rights or rules. The traditional prisoner’s dilemma situation supposedly shows 
how it’s hard to find the trust we need amongst self-concerned persons in order to have a 
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system of rules we all will abide by. Agents will set out to abide by rules of cooperation 
they find rational because those rules will give thm at least their second best option; but 
this option will not be chosen in practice because the situation is set up to makes agents 
believe that since others will seek to get a better deal by double crossing them, their best 
option is not to cooperate but to try to double cross the other first. This means that both 
agents double cross each other and both get less than they could have had. The solution is 
thought to require a bit of coercion that gets everyone to sacrifice some of their freedom to 
win a system of rights that protects their other fredoms. But my concern is more than the 
worry that trust is missing in order for agents to co perate with each other; for even if we 
could get a regime of stable rights this way, this explanation leaves out an important aspect 
that any theory of rights must explain—why violations of rights are wrong not just because 
it is a failure on the part of the rationality of the duty-bearer, but also because it is a failure 
to recognize the moral status of the person harmed.  
It seems that if rights are to be fully explained they need to be based on more than 
how they serve the interests of those subject to rights, or just how they benefit an agent 
who is a rights-holder. On an interest- based view, rights are simply sought by agents for 
how they function in promoting one’s own good. This does the job of tying a right securely 
to an interest an agent has and thereby protects him against claims by others that he should 
pursue their version of the good life. But the reason why the interest –based view is 
problematic is as follows:  
Take A who is robbed by B. A doesn’t like being robbed of course and so she complains to 
B that he really should stop engaging in this sort of behaviour. When B asks why he should 
not rob her she says that she has been harmed, since without her money she can no longer 
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buy food for herself, her children,etc. B responds by asking why he should care about all 
that stuff? And so she appeals to the only thing that is left—the fact that B might be risking 
his own well being in doing this act if he is caught. What sort of a life will he have in jail? 
B thinks about it for awhile and says good point. The example might be thought to show 
that agents will respect each others rights when thy (a) look out for their interests and (b) 
retaliate when their interests are illegitimately set back. But even assuming that we can say 
that their interests are legitimate and would warrant them retaliating, it does not seem to 
follow that we have a good theory of rights because the reasons why agents have rights are 
explained solely in terms of the interests of the ag nt who is the duty-holder. There is 
something strange in seeing A pleading with B by appe ling to his values and his good life 
and not her own life that has been harmed by his act ons. Surely what is wrong here is not 
so much that B’s life will go downhill because of his act, but that he has harmed A and 
made her life worse. A theory of rights should be ale to explain why harming another is 
wrong not simply for prudential reasons that the agnt subject to them has, but because 
something wrong has been done to the rights holder. 
Yet, we would also be wrong to think that a theory f rights could succeed if it tried 
to show that the agent subject to rights must abide y them solely because they are a way of 
recognizing the moral status of others. The reason for this is as follows. There are two 
theses of practical reason that each agent abides by (Mack 1999). The first states that one 
has reason and is motivated to pursue one’s own good. The second is the claim that one 
does not have similar reason to be motivated to pursue someone else’s good. This means 
that someone else’s reasons for pursuing their own good do not necessarily transfer to me 
and become reasons for me to pursue or help him pursue his good. I need a reason to show 
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why such transference should occur. And if the justifica ion for rights depends upon us 
having to do what benefits the rights-holder then we will have the problem of showing why 
what would benefit him gives us reason to help him benefit himself. This justification for 
rights must lead agents to sacrifice their own good in order to make sure that the rights of 
others are respected. So in arguing that agents need to abide by rights because doing so is a 
way of recognizing the moral separateness of others, we neglect to account for why agents 
would be motivated to do this and, also, what would happen to an agent’s own rights that 
protect him against being made to sacrifice himself for the good of others.   
The idea of reasonable pluralism is the belief thatagents see their values as related 
to them in an agent-relative way, as personal and vluable for them, but also as objective in 
some way. Agents can understand what constitutes a hum n value, why agents value the 
things they do, but also see that their values are related to themselves in a way that makes 
them their own, not substitutable with anyone else’s. If this way of looking at value best 
captures how agents hold their values, then we havethe additional problem of showing 
these agents why they should respect other’s rights w en doing so may interfere with their 
achievement of their own objective values. The facttha  values are always related to 
individuals does not simply mean that agents are nec ssarily selfish, but it does mean that 
any theory that attempts to show them why they ought to abide by a system of rights needs 
to appeal to their good lives. The objectivity of value lies not in the scope of how many 
agents are covered by it, but in how the value can be established as being a worthy human 
value. While agents want to feel that their values are important to others, this does not 
mean that their values’ importance comes from being valuable from the point of view of 
the universe, so that the value’s importance can be transferred from agent to agent simply 
 8 
because the value has an objective quality that allows for such transference. In order to 
convince agents why they ought to accept our values we cannot simply appeal to the 
transmissibility of agent-neutral practical reasons; rather we will need to show them why 
they have reason to accept our reasons—which of course means that others may have quite 
difference reasons to value what we value than we do. We will need to convince these 
agents why their agent-relative and objective goods will often need to be compromised in 
order to have a system of rights that endeavours to protect all agents’ lives. 
Of course having recognized this point, we can alsosee that a critical aspect of a 
system of rights is that it recognize the fact when an agent is harmed it is he who has had 
his rights interfered with. So while in showing the reasons agents have for abiding by a 
system of rights means showing agent-relative reasons for abiding by rights, these sort of 
AR reasons will not do the explanatory work of explaining why harming others is a harm 
done to them, not a harm one does to oneself by not acting rationally or in one’s own best 
interest. 
The following thesis will show how a theory of rights can be reconciled with a 
theory of reasonable value pluralism. The idea of value pluralism will be spelled out in 
Chapters Two and Three. Briefly value pluralism is the belief that there is no single end 
that all other ends are ordered to—so there may be many reasonable varieties of the good 
life. As Larmore (1996, 122) says: “Over the past four centuries, the nature of the good life 
in a great many of its aspects has come to seem a topic on which agreement among 
reasonable people is not accidental, but to be expected. Being reasonable—that is, thinking 
and conversing in good faith and applying, as best one can, the general capacities of reason 
that belong to every domain of inquiry—has ceased to seem a guarantee of unanimity”. I 
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will argue that we can interpret value pluralism in an agent-relative fashion by observing 
that it is the variety of individual goals related to persons that gives us the pluralism of 
different forms of life. Rather than the idea that different lives are only valuable if they 
partake of some cultural form of the good, or of some agent-neutral good, I claim that lives 
are pluralistic because each of us just has different goals to pursue. The idea of agent-
relative value pluralism gives us a way to explain the great variety of values that exist in 
the world and how they are related to persons. Agents’ values are not open to being easily 
interpersonally compared in value in order to make decisions about whose values are to be 
promoted and whose are to be sacrificed.  
This gives us a framework for starting a discussion over how a theory of rights 
could work and its usefulness to agents. Rights is a domain of its own because of its role as 
a way of solving disputes between plural values. Because of the agent-relative nature of 
value we cannot rely on using values to solve conflicts of values. Agent one says that he 
needs my time to help him accomplish something that is very important to him; while I 
need his time to accomplish something that is very d ar to me. He further claims that the 
reason that I ought to help him is that his need is more important than my need. So his need 
to (e.g.) learn English is more important for him than my need to learn French because, he 
says, we are living in an English country that requires one to speak English. But given the 
nature of value, what he must mean here is that his need to learn English is for him more 
important than my need to learn French is for me. Yet while I can understand that since we 
live in a predominantly English speaking country knowing English would be a very useful 
skill to have, relatively more useful than French, I do not have reason to also believe that 
his knowing English is as important to me as my own desire to learn French is for me. The 
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problem that enters here is when his learning English means that I am to give up learning 
French either because his actions will conflict with mine, or his needs require the use of my 
resources that I would put into learning French. He would like to think that his appeal to 
the valuableness of learning English proves that I should contribute to his endeavour; of 
course I would like to think the same duty falls on him because of how valuable French 
would be in my life. The role of rights is to provide a way of resolving this dispute—a 
dispute that seems intractable on value grounds alone. 
We can see how rights capture an aspect of morality that is not captured in agent-
neutral or agent-relative reasoning about values. For instance, if one did business in a 
another country and violated some of the rights of its citizens it might be thought that one 
could make up for the rights that have been violated by trying to give back something good 
to those who have been harmed, or to try to make things better for those who have not had 
their rights yet violated. But it seems that a rights violation cannot be made up for once it 
has happened. The reason for this is that the choice that has been taken away from these 
citizens when their rights have been violated is not replaceable with some other good. It 
might seem to be ‘replaceable’ if the person accepts your gift in return for the harm that he 
has done, but what makes up for this is the harmed person’s choice to allow the gift to 
make up for his harm. Choice is central to rights and explaining why people have been 
harmed and why attempts to replace what has been tak cannot work because people are 
harmed when their choice is taken away. This means that a theory of rights will need to 
explain how the value to everyone of their choices grounds rights, although as we will see 
in Chapter Four this does not mean that the value of ch ice need be reduced to the value of 
the object of rights. Everyone will be interested in having their choices protected, so the 
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feature that needs to be protected is the one that can account for person’s ability to make 
choices over their lives and live a good life.     
Since rights are reasons or rules for conflict resolution, their justification mirrors 
what has been called the search for public reasons. While I argue that agent-relative values 
will not provide interpersonally valid ‘public’ reasons for all to abide by rights, there are 
substantive meta-norms that allow us to argue that a system of rights will be an institution 
that is just and one that agents can depend upon to produce ‘good’ outcomes. If one were to 
accept Hobbes’ search for a modus vivendi then one might only wish to have a system that 
produced good conflict resolving outcomes, and not care about whether those outcomes 
depended on ‘right’ reason (Gaus 2003, 78). This subordinates our epistemic rationality to 
our practical rationality since we mainly care about having a ruling that allows us to get 
what we want, not whether those rulings are true. But as Gaus notes we are unlikely to be 
satisfied with such a system (2003, ibid). We want our moral beliefs to be true because we 
want them to be worthy to pursue. A solution to this problem of public justification—not 
the central challenge of this thesis—is also similar to the problem of justifying rights in a 
pluralist context because we are looking for a theory of rights that can be publicly justified 
in a world of plural values. This thesis will try to show how rights can be reasons that are 
procedural, or neutral, by specifying domains of freedom that prevent agent’s lives from 
being in constant conflict; but it also attempts to pr vide reasons that are substantive by 
showing how there is a basis for rights that appeals to agent’s moral beliefs about how the 
world ought to be by appealing to a meta-norm that all agents share qua moral agents 
seeking a good life.  
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  Arguments for rights tend to be called deontic, or anti-consequentialist.1 The reason 
for this is that these arguments claim that there are reasons agents have to reject calls to 
sacrifice their own good, or the good of others, in order to promote an overall good state of 
affairs. Robert Nozick has argued that the fact that we are individuals who live separate 
existences shows that there “is no moral outweighing of one of our lives by others so as to 
lead to a greater overall social good” (Nozick 1974, 33). People have a prerogative against 
the requirements of impersonal optimality. The prerogative that allows us to pursue our 
own good in the fact of agent-neutral good is also what makes us think there are restrictions 
against forcing us to pursue the overall Good. But does the ability to choose the promotion 
of our own good over that of impersonal good truly give us a promising basis for rights? 
Some, like Samuel Scheffler, have argued that the priority given to the personal point of 
view is sufficient “to insulate the personal point of view against external 
demands”(Scheffler 1982, 94). The protection of personal good that both Nozick and 
Scheffler give as a test for deciding who has the right and who the corresponding duty 
depends upon restrictions (rights) protecting only personal good in the face of impersonal 
maximization. But if value conflicts will consist of agent-relative values, then we need to 
explain how it is that our prerogatives and restrictions, which are legitimized by their 
protecting our personal values, can compose a coherent theory of restrictions when their 
purpose is to protect us from each other when we promote our values. If the hard task of 
                                                
1 Consequentialists assert that it is wrong to commit some act because of its bad effects—for a person or for 
society. Deontologists claim that what matters is not so much the end that is to be achieved but the way in 
which one goes about it. Some ways of achieving an end are intrinsically bad; the rightness or wrongness of 
achieving an end can be ascertained apart from the consequences of the choice itself. Rights then are like this 
in that they are kinds of restraints or constraints on how one can pursue some end. It seems to me (and others) 
that there cannot be a purely deontological or consequentialist theory of morality or rights. Rights seem to 
have more in common with deontic theories, but as I rgue, rights need to somehow coordinate both a 
seemingly deontic aspect and a consequentialist aspect into a single coherent view. This means rights mu t 
explain a rights violation in terms of both the harm that is done to the character of the person who has t e 
rights and also the consequential harm done to the person who did not abide by the right.    
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rights is to protect our values not so much against external maximization (that people 
organize their good according to some canon of impersonal good), but against the pressure 
for agents to organize their values according to other’s canons of agent-relative good, then 
since the justification of restrictions is based on protection of agent-relative good, we need 
to explain how when these restrictions protecting personal good conflict we can decide 
who has the right and who the corresponding duty. We need a way to see how protection of 
agent-relative maximization can be a basis for rights because they protect our ability to 
promote our values in the face of agent-neutral good, but also how agent-centred 
perspectives can be judged to be adequate to delineate a coherent and just set of rights and 
duties when two or more agent-centred perspectives conflict.  
Mack has argued that any theory that wishes to provide a justification for rights will 
need to show why we have a prerogative to pursue our own good but not a further 
prerogative to have the pursuit of our good protected. It seems that one cannot assert a 
prerogative to pursue our own good without a further pr rogative that protects the first 
prerogative without entertaining a contradiction (Mack 2005, 361). My thesis will attempt 
to show how we can derive rights from the claim that ere is indeed a second prerogative 
that obtains to protect agents’ first prerogative to pursue their own good. First, I will show 
reasons why we need to identify a prerogative agents have against sacrificing their own 
values to others or some overall state of The Good. Chapter 2 will identify and explain why 
agents values are best thought to be agent-relative; the agent-relativity of value puts serious 
constraints on how much transmissibility practical reasons have. Chapter 3 will show why 
a form of value pluralism is a reasonable belief for agents to hold; but the chapter also 
shows why reasonable pluralism exacerbates the problem of moving from a theory of value 
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to a theory of rights. Chapter 4 will show why the rejection of restrictions as a distinct form 
of moral domain do not work. The chapter will also show some of the problems facing 
theorists who wish to justify rights or restrictions in terms of either the benefit to the rights-
holder or the interests of the subject of rights, fail to provide a satisfactory account of 
rights. But since what motivates agents is agent-rela iv  value, we will need to somehow 
show that there can be a very broad agent-relative reason all agents have to concede the 
rights of others. 
In Chapter Five I present a positive account of why agents have rights and a need to 
recognize the rights of others. Following Eric Mack, I argue that if one accepts the 
prerogative to pursue one’s own good, one must also accept that there is a second 
prerogative one has for others to allow one to pursue one’s good; this latter prerogative 
gives rise to the idea that it is rational to expect others to constrain their behaviour when 
they deal with you. If they do not then they have failed to respect one’s prerogatives. Yet, 
this only tells us why we have reason to accept a system of rights for ourselves. The idea 
why we will have reason to recognize others’ rights depends on being able to recognize the 
moral status of others—Mack calls it the rational encumbency thesis (1998). Mack defends 
the idea that the proper response towards others is to recognize them as ends in 
themselves—a status they have apart from any obligation that we may have towards 
ourselves—because we can recognize that we are each moral with incommensurable 
values. For Mack, only if the strong moral status of a person is not dependent in any way 
upon the duty-bearer’s obligations to himself will it give others rights that are not open to 
violations. But I argue that we will not be able to defend the idea that others have this 
strong status because any argument will depend in some respect upon an agent-relative 
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reason that motivates us to concede others’ rights—even Mack’s argument depends upon 
the claim that duty-bearers must recognize the moral status of others because to fail to do 
so is to fail in a duty to oneself to be rational by paying proper heed to moral reality. I 
argue that while we ought to keep the idea of the rational encumbency thesis as a way of 
showing why we recognize the moral status of others, we do not need to worry that 
appealing to an obligation to self will mean that we do not recognize the moral status of 
others; the reason is that rather than appealing to value incommensurability itself, we 
should appeal to some common feature that underlies all of our good lives. I argue that first 
possession is such a feature that is needed by all agents who wish to live a good life. But 
the reason why we will be motivated to abide by others’ rights to be possessors of 
themselves is that doing so is to benefit ourselves. We will be benefiting ourselves because, 
since others can affect our well being for the worse, by conceding them rights to pursue 
their own good, we will be avoiding conflict.    
In Chapter Six I discuss the issue of the compossibility of rights and thresholds. 
While the main focus of my thesis is why we have reason to concede others’ rights, this 
issue is important because there is debate over whether rights must conflict by their nature, 
or if they can be laid out in a way in which they are open-ended but also not inherently 
conflicting. I argue that it might be possible that rights conflict, but that in order top avoid 
and solve such conflicts we ought to pay heed to the idea of first possession. First come 
first served should help us to solve disputes over rights. Finally, we will examine if our 
rights require us to engage in calculations of weighin  one life against many others, so that 
we would have to say that one life could be sacrificed to protect the lives of many others. I 
will argue that our rights resist such maximizing calculations up to a point; so rights will 
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recognize and demand respect for the moral separateness of others up to a certain point, but 
beyond this point the emergency situation may demand the abandonment of rights in 
favour of some rule that seeks to protect the greatest number of lives (rights-holders).  
Finally, Chapter Seven will first summarize the argument that rights are kinds of 
strong prerogatives then proceed to address some implications of the theory. I will briefly 
look at what sort of polity the theory might seem to support—basically a liberal one—and 
whether this theory can help to solve liberalism’s problem of reconciling its legitimacy 
with its claim that there are many good lives, even no -liberal ones, that are legitimate.    
Rights are meant to protect the fact that we each hve lives of our own to live. The 
agent-relative aspect of value shows why our values ar  incommensurable and how they 
are resistant to attempts to show that we all must follow the same agent–neutral good life 
and accept whatever trade offs may occur in the attemp  to rank all lives according to that 
goal. Agent-relative values reflect how rights are resistant to trade offs and so they, rather 
than agent-neutral values, will be the starting point for grounding rights. The thesis shows 
why attempts to ground rights directly on values of either sort can be problematic because 
when we base rights on the goal of certain values we might make them less resistant to 
paternalistic interferences. Rights must be grounded on the aspect of agent-relative values 
that reflects their ability to be resistant to trade offs, but also on some kind of valuable 
feature that does not directly call for their maximization; the feature of first possession is 
common enough to all good lives that we can all agree that that is what needs to be 
protected by a system of rights, but also that its protection only requires that we recognize 
that others need space to pursue their own good lives, not that we need to directly help to 
promote other’s achieving their good lives. In this way the protection and promotion of 
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first possession is not a way of directly promoting other’s good lives, but only does what 












Chapter Two:  





§2.1 Definitions of agent-neutral and agent-relative value. 
§2.2 Agent-neutral value as external value and transmissibility of practical reason. 






§2.0 Introduction. The following chapter seeks to show what a coherent theory of value 
looks like from a liberal perspective. But it would be question-begging to start with a 
liberal prejudice, or conclusion, to the effect that there are different good ways of life and 
then try to construct a liberal theory of value to shore it up. The belief that liberals just take 
unresolvable conflict from mere difference of opinio  as basic and sufficient for pluralism 
is certainly one of the many criticisms leveled against liberalism by anti-liberals. 
Historically, of course, it was intractable religious conflicts, not resolvable by further 
appeals to the Bible, which led to the hope that a modus vivendi would provide peace, if not 
the correct understanding of scripture. Of course this difference of opinion has not stopped 
any one from thinking his own interpretation is theone everyone should accept. The case 
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for liberalism will be strengthened if we can provide a justification for, and not just a 
historical explanation of, why values are plural and i dividuated apart from liberal 
presuppositions. So we start rather with a conceptual, not just historical, understanding how 
values are plural in order to understand how values exist and why those who have held 
them are so often at odds. 
 Of course in starting out with the individual and looking at the relation of value to 
him, we may be said to be prejudicing the inquiry in favour of the liberal view that the 
individual is the basic unit of society by not considering views that start with the group, or 
at least with how value might have some sort of social existence, say the way that 
meanings of words do. In regard to the first point it seems that only individual persons can 
have values; while I cannot extend the discussion much here, it should become clear that if 
the agent-relative theory of value is correct in making a description of value contain 
reference to an individual, then groups as such cannot be said to have values apart from the 
individuals who make them up. I will argue that value should either be defined as agent-
relative, in which the description of value contains as essential reference to the person who 
has it, or as agent-neutral, where the value need not have an essential reference to the agent 
who holds it. It will be shown that agent-relative value is more plausible account of value 
because the agent-neutral view needs to implausibly make values’ goodness external to an 
agent in order to account for their internally motiva ng features.  
This chapter, in defending the agent-relativity of value, defends the two ‘theses’ of 
practical reason outlined in the introduction: (1) “that it is reasonable for each rational and 
purposive agent to seek his own well-being and to evaluate his natural and social 
environment in terms of its impact upon his well-being”; and (2) that attempts to move 
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beyond this to the further idea that practical rationality also requires A to promote B’s well-
being and the conditions for it, fail (Mack 1999, 8-90). The chapter will explicate the first 
thesis by explaining why values are dependent on age ts, but also thereby defend the 
second by showing why the transmissibility of practical reason requires the implausible 
notion that values are agent-neutral. But also it will show that agent-relative values need 
not imply their subjectivity—that things become valu ble just by being objects of our 
preferences—because even though things are chosen by people this may not be sufficient 
to make them objectively good. But the theory of agent–relative value also provides an 
explanation of the plurality of values, different as we will see next chapter in important 
respects from Isaiah Berlin-style ‘objective value pluralism’, that is central to liberalism. 
Finally I will note the problem that pluralism from the agent-relative perspective creates for 
constraints on the pursuit of one’s values: if the ag nt-relative account of value is correct 
then the reason why an agent will abide by a constraint is if it is conducive to his own well-
being or to another’s. If the reason one has to be motivated to treat another with respect or 
to be under a moral obligation to them in general is because the other’s ends transmit that 
reason to one, then if value turns out to be agent-rela ive such transmission cannot take 
place; hence, neither can this be part of a foundation used by rights-theorists to explain how 
agents are obligated to abide by others’ rights.  
   
§2.1. Definitions of Agent-neutral and Agent-relative Value. Suppose someone you don’t 
know approaches you on the street with the wonderful news that she has just fulfilled some 
goal that she wanted to accomplish ever since she was young. She finds it strange that you 
don’t seem to care, although you can agree that accomplishing some good goal that one has 
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always wanted to achieve is in fact good, for her. Had the person that who approached you 
been your friend then you could have agreed that it was in fact good for your friend but 
also because your friend’s goals mean something to you, it was good for you as well. Why 
do we think about values as related to us in such a way? Is it merely some moral deficiency 
that makes our own ends valuable to us but the ends of others—even if they are indeed 
good—not valuable for us? Or is there some other explanation that can show why we need 
not be morally deficient if we fail to find (and promote) others’ values as if they are our 
own?   
I will be following Den Uyl (1991), Mack (1989 and 1993) and Long (2000, 36-7) 
in defining agent-relative values as: values, rankings, or reasons, essentially tied to how an 
agent would choose between alternative states of the world. If an agent (A1) values a bit of 
sensory pleasure, S1, then this gives him a reason to promote a world (W1) with S1 over 
another world, W2, which lacks S1. As Mack states, the ranking of W1 over W2 provides a 
reason of value for promoting W1 rather than W2 (1993, 213). But the ranking of W1 over 
W2 by an agent need not provide any other agent with a reason also to do so; so, a state of 
affairs S1 “is valuable relative to an agent A1 if and only if S1’s distinctive presence in W1 
is a basis for ranking W1 over W2, even though S1 may not be a basis for any other agent 
ranking W1 over W2” (Mack 1989, 84). For another agent, A2, the very absence of what A1
values, namely S1, may be good reason for him not to promote W1, but instead choose the 
world lacking S1, namely W2. So, the agent-relativity of value allows A1 to rank W1 over 
W2, but also for A2 to rank W2 over W1, depending on how each would rank worlds with 
S1. So, reasons, values or rankings are agent-relativ if their descriptions contain “essential 
references to an agent who has that value, prefers that ranking, or has that reason” (Mack 
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1989, 84). On the agent-relative theory to say that W is valuable is to implicitly hold the 
following: W is valuable(in relation to A) or W is valuable(in relation to B) etc. 
 Agent-neutral values are values which everyone has re on to promote apart from 
how the valuable thing stands to them. We could say th t a state of affairs has agent-neutral 
value “if and only if its presence in W2 is a basis for each agent to rank W2 over an 
otherwise identical W1 which lacks S2” (Mack 1989, 84). If one world possesses some 
agent-neutral value that another does not then this world is better---not better in relation to 
anyone in particular but just better. So, even if W1 was a world in which more individual 
preferences could be had, it is not as good as W2 if it lacks some agent-neutral good which 
W2 has. W2 is the world that each agent ought to promote since t possesses the agent-
neutral value. So, we could say that a “value, ranking or reason is agent-neutral if its 
description does not include an essential reference to a person who has that value, prefers 
that ranking, or has that reason” (Mack 1989, 84).  
 Notice that according to the agent-neutral view an agent cannot weight one world 
more than another simply because it is one’s own value. The value of W2 on the agent-
neutral view is impersonal; which is to say that if all value is agent-neutral, then moral 
reasons will not include an essential reference to the agent who has them. So, as Den Uyl 
notes, this would allow for a substitution principle to the effect that if A1 has the value, 
reason or ranking to prefer W2, then so too does A2 to An. One could add a clause to the 
substitution principle, making a necessary condition of the agent-neutrality of value that it 
stand in relation to someone, somewhere, sometime; but such a condition of making values 
describable in part by reference to an agent would make value relative, not agent-neutral. 
So the agent-neutrality of value implies that we could keep the same truth-value regarding 
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an agent-neutrally good state of affairs even if we substitute different agents in relation to 
that state of affairs. So if ‘pain is bad’ is agent-neutrally true, then ‘pain is bad for Joe’ is 
true, or ‘pain is bad for Jan’ is true, etc.  
Next we will examine a couple of classical arguments which claim that the agent-
relative theory of value is not coherent. These objctions, usually aimed at a substantive 
adherent to ARV, ethical egoism, are: 1. The claim that the relation of something valuable 
to one’s self makes no difference in the ascription of that something as valuable. 2. Agent-
relative value seems to be like egoism, which is contradictory because it holds that agents 
must each claim that his own view of the good is what each agent should aim at. 
 The first argument is the claim that there is no need to make any reference to an 
agent who ‘possesses’ a good. G. E. Moore has argued: 
 
What, then, is meant by ‘my own good’? In what sense can a thing be good 
for me? It is obvious, if we reflect, that the only thing which can belong to 
me, which can be mine, is something which is good; an  not the fact that it 
is good. When, therefore, I talk of anything I get as ‘my own good’, I must 
mean either that the thing I get is good, or that my possessing it is good. In 
both cases it is only the thing or the possession of it which is mine, and not 
the goodness of that thing or that possession (Moore 1960, 68).
 
Moore is claiming that when one speaks of one’s owngood one can only mean that one has 
something which is good, not that one’s possessing something, or its fitting into one’s life 
in a certain way makes it good. If one says that ‘pin is bad’ it is not my possession of the 
 24 
pain that makes it bad versus someone else’s having the pain; rather, as James Griffin 
argues, “the ‘my’ and the ‘your’ are not part of the reason –generating consideration. The 
clause because it hurts lacks reference to me or to you, but it lacks nothing of what we take 
the disvalue to be” (Griffin 1996, 74; and cf. Sumner 2004, 40-1). So a statement regarding 
value or disvalue only needs an indexical part in order to locate in whom the pain or value 
belongs---but this reference is incidental to the value or disvalue being what it is.  
 As Mack argues, much of this criticism receives its force from portraying agent-
relative value as a species of subjectivism. We will be discussing the subjective idea of 
value later; but for now it should be noted that agent-relative value states that it is not just 
one’s possession of something that makes it valuable. Rather, the thing one ‘possesses’ 
must stand in some further and more “substantive relation, (e.g. its fulfilling my preference, 
its satisfying my desire, its being constitutive of my self-realization)” in virtue of which 
one has reason to promote it (Mack 1989, 85). For the agent-relative theory, it is not by 
some sort of axiological Midas effect of an agent’s touching things, or by possessing them, 
that makes them valuable (Mack 1989, 85); rather, it is the recognition that often things are 
only valuable to an agent because they satisfy one’s own preferences, etc., and would not 
be a value to another agent.  
 The second argument is also from Moore: he argues that if we believe that any 
single man’s happiness, or interest, ought to be his own ultimate end, “this can only mean 
that man’s ‘interest’ or ‘happiness’ is the sole good, the Universal good, and the only thing 
that anybody ought to aim at” (Moore 1960, 99). Moore concludes that this view ends in 
contradiction since if we hold these premises about the ultimate good as man’s own 
differing ends, then we would have to conclude thateach man’s own happiness is the sole 
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good---“that a number of different things are each of them the only good thing there is—an 
absolute contradiction” (Moore 1960, 99). But this only follows if the agent-relative 
theorist would hold that each person can claim that his own end is the ultimate good which 
everyone ought to aim at. But why need he do this? It eems that the agent-relative theory 
need only hold that each person’s own good is that w ich he should aim at; it seems that if 
the good can be ‘relativized’ against Moore’s first objection, then his second one looses its 
effectiveness. But there is still a need to discuss the plausibility of agent-relative value in 
light of Moore and Griffin’s charges that only an agent-neutral view of value can ground 
our assertions about what is good or bad. 
 
 §2.2 Agent-neutral Value as External Value and the Transmis ibility of Practical Reason. 
In speaking of the value of something as not essentially related to the person whose it is, 
Moore and Griffin seem to be implying that values are things that exist ‘out there’ in the 
world. There is much debate in metaethics as to how exactly values and moral reasons 
exist. Here we will examine a few claims regarding the ontological status of values. I will 
argue that if one holds that values are agent –neutral like Moore suggests, then one must 
also hold that values are agent –external, which is implausible. So, the agent-relative nature 
of values will be offered as a best explanation of the ontological status of values. 
 There have not been many recent defenders of the agent externality of values. But it 
seems that if one wishes to really say that values ar  not essentially related to those who 
hold them then one will be committed to the idea that ey exist somehow apart from us. 
Thomas Nagel warns that this view is frought with difficulty since how can one hold the 
external existence of values and their practical significance? It would be, as Nagel argues, 
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to say that it would be a good thing if the Frick collection survived even though no one was 
around anymore to see it (Nagel 1986, 153). But there is a problem with those who wish to 
make values more related to people in order to get around this problem. The problem is that 
if one modifies the claims of agent-neutral value in order to help them retain their practical 
significance one will have to say that a necessary p t of X’s being a value is that it be 
related to an agent somewhere, sometime or somehow (Mack 1989, 88). This condition 
often shows up in definitions of ‘intrinsic’ value: a value is said to be intrinsic if it is either 
sought for its own sake, or if it exists as good in itself/ by itself. As Tara Smith notes, the 
two conceptions are not usually distinguished since people often assume that something 
sought for its own sake must be good in itself (Smith 2000, 63). But they need not be 
conflated since the sought for its own sake view may gr nt that a value is related to a 
person but it is not sought for any other end in relation to his other ends. But the honest to 
goodness view of intrinsic value, or agent–neutral value, is Moore’s notion of something 
that is good in itself, full stop. So, it seems that either a value will contain some relation to 
an agent, or it really will be good in itself, in that a description of its goodness contains no 
essential relation to an agent. And, of course, it is Moore who has famously argued for this 
view.  
 If there are such things as intrinsic or external values I think it will be granted that 
they cannot just be perceived. Such values must be intuited or shown to exist by another 
route. Moore attempted to provide a way of showing that there are such things as intrinsic/ 
external goods via his method of isolation. Henry Sidgwick claimed that it would be 
irrational to aim at the production of beauty apart from any possible contemplation of it by 
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human beings. Moore thought he could produce a counterexample hence proving the 
plausibility of intrinsic value: 
 
Let us imagine one world exceedingly beautiful. Imagine it as beautiful as 
you can; put into it whatever on this earth you most admire---mountains, 
rivers, the sea; trees, and sunsets, stars and moon. Imagine these all 
combined in the most exquisite proportions, so that no one thing jars against 
another, but each contributes to increase the beauty of the whole. And then 
imagine the ugliest world you can possibly conceive. Imagine it simply one 
heap of filth, containing everything that is most disgusting to us, for 
whatever reason, and the whole, as far as may be, without one redeeming 
feature. Such a pair of worlds we are entitled to compare….The only thing 
we are not entitled to imagine is that any human bei g ver has or ever, by 
any possibility, can, live in either, can ever see and enjoy the beauty of the 
one or hate the foulness of the other (Moore 1960). 
  
Moore argues that given our ability to conceive of such a state of affairs existing apart from 
any person’s contemplation of them that it would be irrational to hold that the ugly world 
should exist rather than the beautiful world. It seems open for Sidgwick to reply that 
Moore’s own method requires that persons contemplate the very thing in question—
namely, whether something can be good apart from anyone’s contemplation (Bates 1973, 
165). So, this is a flatly self-contradictory exercise since Moore needs worlds that are not 
imaginable for his thought experiment to succeed.  
 28 
But even if we could grant Moore the coherence of this method of isolation, it still 
is implausible to hold that the value (or lack of value) of these two worlds exists apart from 
any agent. It seems that we need persons to agree to say that the beautiful world really is 
beautiful; this requires agents to look at the whole, say an agent’s getting a certain amount 
of pleasure from the contemplation of the beautiful world, and then asking him to 
contemplate the world apart from the pleasure he get from it. Here one must adhere to his 
principle of organic unity which states that the value of the whole (the world) must not be 
assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts (the bits of good things in the 
world); for Moore then it might be that all the good things in the world have one common 
property for the agents who contemplate them--say, they produce pleasure for the agents—
but we do not need to assume that the whole is valuable because it also possesses this 
property, or is made up of all the bits of personal pleasure. But then what Moore wants us 
to do in the case of the beautiful world is to imagine that it has some property over and 
above the common property of producing pleasure for the particular agents contemplating 
it. But what is this property? Is the property something in pleasure that makes it good, or is 
the property just pleasure considered abstractly? If the former then we might be off on an 
infinite regress of further good-making properties, or if the latter then it seems odd since 
pleasure’s goodness is usually tied to agents who experience it. Moore does seem to think 
that pleasure can be contemplated as good apart from any particular bit of pleasure an agent 
might experience. But, as Bates argues, this is absurd since pleasure “to be pleasure must 
be the pleasure of some sentient being, but once the sentient being gets back into the 
picture, it seems that Moore’s ideal of absolute isolation is lost” (Bates 1973, 167).  
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It is plausible then to suggest that the search for a purely intrinsic value be given up. 
Even pleasure as a value is related to some particul r agent who has it. But there are more 
complex arguments designed to get around the problem of the existence of extrinsic 
disvalues or values. One could argue that there are still agent-neutral reasons for saying 
that something is a value or disvalue without trying to answer the problem of how exactly 
these reasons of value retain their practical significance even though all sentient life might 
be extinguished. These arguments are a direct challenge to the claim outlined in the 
introduction that one cannot move from the first thesis of practical rationality to the second. 
If Nagel’s argument for the impersonal disvalue of pain holds, then there may be a bridge 
from thesis one to the claim that we have reason to value or disvalue what others do 
because those things really are valuable or of disvalue. We will look at Nagel’s arguments 
on how pain can be thought to be an impersonal disvalue next. But if the adherent to agent-
neutral value must accept some sort of relational clause as a necessary condition of his 
description of value, then, as I noted above, he must accept that value is really agent–
relative and not agent-neutral; and, also, that the bridge between thesis one and the reasons 
we have for valuing other’s ends doesn’t hold. 
Griffin argues that there is a transmissibility of practical reasons for action which 
can be derived from certain normative and factual presuppositions. He claims that there are 
the same values at stake for all human beings; also “motivation is internal to something’s 
being a general human interest” (Griffin 1996, 73). From this he argues that it is a small 
step to go from general human interest to reasons for action. “If something is such an 
interest [for all humans], then it is capable of generating a reason for action” (ibid.). He 
says that the step from what gives me a reason for action to what gives you a reason for 
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action has seemed daunting; so, what gives you a reason for thinking your own pain bad 
seems much different from what my reason would be for thinking your pain is bad. But 
there is no step according to Griffin since, as we saw before in the case of Moore and 
Griffin, the ‘my’ in the claim ‘this pain of mine is bad’ does not add anything to the claim 
that pain is bad.  He notes that ‘egoists’ (or in this case agent-relativists) will charge that 
pain cannot just be bad simpliciter, rather it is always bad for someone (Griffin 1996, 74). 
He claims that there need not be much more to say to those who do not take pain as bad 
simpliciter, except to argue that “given the best background against which to look at it, this 
seems the natural way to take it” (Griffin 1996, 75). There is no other reason we need to 
account for why I would take your pain as bad since because it hurts contains the disvalue 
and generates the response for anyone who understands i .  
 But this argument is problematic. First of all, the transmissibility of disvalue from 
your pain to my also disvaluing requires that pain be something that is bad in itself, since 
the motivation for avoiding the pain is internal to the pain’s badness. While Griffin wants 
to disavow himself of subjectivism (or what Griffin calls the Utilitarian view that well-
being is wholly a question of one’s conscious state (Griffin 1996, 75)) in making the 
disvalue solely dependent on an agent’s own internal perspective, he goes too far in making 
a person’s reason for pain’s being a disvalue something external to any agent’s reasons; or 
at least Griffin seems to hint that we wants to say more than the claim that disvalue is 
determined statistically, by what a majority would when polled call ‘bad’. The problem 
with such claims of reference to persons is that it seems to make ‘good’ and ‘bad’ wholly 
dependent on person’s changing whims. Moore and Griffin hold not that cruelty is wrong 
because we (or a majority) say it is, rather we decide to call cruelty wrong because it is 
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wrong. This sounds sensible enough and I will have more to say on this a bit later because 
it does seem that the agent –relative theory of value the agent-relative can affirm the latter 
part of the Euthyphro question above, contra subjectivism. But there is still the hard 
question of how a practical reason, say about why you have reason to disvalue your own 
pain, can easily transmit itself to another in an important way---so that one comes to also 
disvalue your pain as you do. The transfer of the practical significance does not occur 
simply because there are generic values and pains that we all agree on. For instance, it 
might seem upon first glance that pain is always described as a disvalue. But what about G. 
Gordon Liddy who liked to hold his hand over a hot stove in order to show his ability to 
withstand pain? The factual description of the pain would remain the same but there are not 
the same practical reasons that give rise to the judgement pain is bad. The point here is that 
the factual reasons or description of pain may be the same as usual---the thing what we all 
want to avoid---but the practical reasons do not remain the same since they are somewhat 
dependent on Liddy’s own desires and goals (Den Uyl 1991, 31). It may be that Liddy 
wears oven mitts when he bakes cookies, but in this case his goal is to bake cookies and not 
to touch the hot stove to prove his machismo. So the motivational reasons do not seem to 
be internal to the description of pain. It is open for Griffin to argue, in order to save the 
notion that pain will always have negative motivating reasons, that that we should re-
describe what Liddy is feeling as something other tan pain—say, a sort of pleasure. But 
this seems to be case of going against ordinary usage (The No True Scotsman Fallacy) in 
order to save the idea that motivation is internal to a general human interest. There is 
another problem with this line of argument better brought out by Loren Lomasky’s defense 
of a similar claim. 
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 Lomasky argues that what we want in the type of situation we are looking at is an 
explanation of the reasonableness of why a practical reason transfers its significance from 
one agent to another. He argues that realizing that one is an agent in a world with other 
such agents is logically sufficient to “provide the basis for transmission of rational 
motivation” (Lomasky 1987, 63). He argues that thisrecognition gives agents some reason 
to act so as to advance the ends of others---but not in the trivial sense of A promoting B’s 
end because it pays A to do so, but, rather, by understanding B’s end to be of value A then 
becomes by that understanding motivated to promote B’s nd. Lomasky believes that 
values are best looked at in terms of being bundled together as projects that agents pursue. 
Values then are not impersonal things, like Moore and Griffin believe, but are inherently 
related to the individuals to have them. They are basically agent-relative. But he argues that 
even though B’s reason to promote E2 is not exactly the same as A’s also having reason to 
do so, there is a sense in which “A recognizes that there does exist reason for bringing 
about E2” (Lomasky 1987, 63-4). The argument runs as follows: “one who recognizes R as 
a reason for E2 is thereby logically bound to admit that it is not t tally and in every respect 
indifferent in respect to whether E2 obtain. R is why E2 should obtain; otherwise R could 
not be conceived to be a reason…To understand what it is for someone else to recognize 
the existence of evaluative grounds that have not been provided by oneself for 
oneself….Because we can make sense of personal and impersonal value as both being 
value, there ought to be some link between them. The transmissibility of practical reason is 
such a link. Recognition that someone values end E is sufficient warrant for one to judge 
that there is value that attaches to E; one need not first note that the one who values E is 
indeed none other than oneself” (Lomasky 1987, 64). 
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 So Lomasky’s claim is that one can come to a rough understanding of why another 
values what he does, since the other can give reasons for his valuing it. But there is a 
problem with the inference from the claim that we can understand why another values 
something and this is sufficient for our coming to value his end. Lomasky switches from 
B’s giving a reason for why he values end E2, to A’s just coming to value that end because 
he sees that B’s valuing E2 is sufficient warrant for our doing so too. But does A come to 
value E2 because of the reasons B gives, or just because he es that E2 is valuable? It is not 
clear which –or even if just seeing that another values E2 is sufficient to give it intrinsic, 
impersonal value. But if this is the claim then it goes against what Lomasky argued a few 
pages earlier. 
Here Lomasky (1987, 60-1) wants to point out that tose who try to ground rights 
by inferring that since rational agents each value their own projects (in an agent –relative 
sense), and each value having rights that will protect their status as a project pursuer, to the 
further claim that therefore each is committed to als  holding to a regime of rights since it 
“is a common good that each has reason to advance” is fallacious. The fallacy involved is 
that of composition since, as Lomasky continues, what “each is rationally obliged to value 
is not a world in which rights are generally respected but a world in which A is accorded 
the status of a rights holder” (Lomasky 1987, 60). He concludes, each “values rights for 
himself but because of the presence of that indexical referenc , each is not valuing the same 
imagined state of affairs. Of course, A might value a world in which everyone is accorded 
rights---and B, C.., might also value that world---but A is not committed to anything so 
charmingly democratic. He need merely value his ownhaving rights” (Lomasky 1987, 60). 
The problem is that one cannot take as composed in the conclusion, say everyone’s valuing 
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everyone else’s rights, from what is necessarily individuated in the premises, each’s only 
valuing his own rights. All that follows from the premises is the weak claim that each 
person values his own rights, not that he necessarily v lues anyone else’s. As will be 
discussed in the next chapter this is often how people try to move from a theory of value to 
a ground for rights. But not even Lomasky thinks it will work, at least on the agent-relative 
view of value, or what Lomasky calls the personal nature of projects.  
But I think the same problem that Lomasky points out above in the move from 
one’s having reason to value one’s own projects and rights to the further claim that one can 
come to have reason to promote another’s ends because those ends are valuable in 
themselves besets his argument for the transmissibility of practic l reason. As was noted in 
the introduction, given that values and value-related reasons are agent–relative, the first 
claim about practical reason is that rational agents are interested in promoting their own 
values and well-being, we need a good argument to the effect that “in order to show that A 
has reason to promote it [B’s end, E2], what has to be shown is that E2 or B’s well-being 
has value-for-A. It does not suffice to point to the ultimate value of B’s well-being or the 
contribution that E2 makes to that ultimate value”(Mack 1999, 89-90). But the fallacy of 
composition Lomasky raises rests upon the idea that one will only have reason to promote 
one’s own projects and the rights that protect them; but one cannot move from this to the 
idea that an agent will come to value other’s rights because he comes to value the other’s 
projects. A project has importance to an agent and motivates him because it is his own 
preferred set of values; the idea of being a project pursuer runs so deep that Lomasky also 
argues that “one component of a person’s identity over time is constituted by his 
commitment to projects” (Lomasky 1987, 32).  
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So projects, or values, are motivating and have their importance because they are 
necessarily related to--even part of a description of-- one’s identity. But to then say that 
another’s end can be seen to be good (apart from our own ends) and therefore provide a 
reason for our promoting it is to make the same move Lomasky says cannot be done: 
namely, to say that since each has reason to promote his own end because he values it---it 
has practical significance to an agent because it i his end---that A can come to promote 
B’s end because A can recognize B’s reasons for valuing his end. It would seem that either 
A must recognize some inherent, agent-neutral worth in B’s ends which just motivates 
anyone who recognizes such worth, or A must come to be persuaded (by B) that his ends 
are worth promoting. But to affirm the former is to deny the agent-relative nature of 
projects---and why it is important that they are not really comparable or open to tradeoffs 
as Lomasky wants them to be—or he is really saying that B’s value is really agent-relative, 
and while B might give A reasons to help him promote his end E2, this is not equivalent to 
saying that B’s motivating reasons for holding E2 transfer to A just by A understanding 
them. B can surely explain his reasons for why he values E2, but the practical significance 
of E2 need not also accompany A’s understanding. B might love fixing up old cars and 
share his reasons for thinking such a thing ought to be promoted with A; but A’s 
understanding B’s reasons need not give A reason to take up such a hobby. So I think 
Lomasky’ move from A’s personal project (E2) being of value to A, to the claim that B’s 
understanding of A’s reason, R, for E2 gives B a reason of value to promote E2 fails 
because it exhibits the same problem he shows in his example of the fallacy of 
composition. 
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So far I think there have been some plausible attemp s to deny the first thesis of 
practical reason by citing some sort of external value which is internally motivating, and 
therefore to deny the second claim (that one cannot move from one’s own values as what 
one has reason to promote) to the idea that another’s ends can be inherently valuable and 
motivating. But I do not think that we have yet had good reason to think that practical 
rationality requires an agent to advance another’s end apart from how that other’s end 
related to the agent who must do the promoting. Such a laim would require a robust 
principle of transmissibility of practical reason “whereby S’s having reason to promote X 
by transmission leads to B’s having reason to promote X, [so that] X’s value reemerge[s] as 
agent-neutral” (Mack 1989b, 78). Because Thomas Nagel’s arguments for the impersonal 
nature of pain are important and have influenced Lomasky and Griffin’s arguments about 
the transmissibility of practical reason, they will make up the last part of this survey before 
moving on to the next section on the objectivity and subjectivity of value. If Nagel’s 
arguments succeed in showing that practical reason requires that A come to promote B’s 
end because of the externality of the reasons for doing so, then he will have provided a 
denial of the second thesis of practical reason. 
Nagel’s argument for the transmissibility of practical reasons turns on his 
distinction between the objective/ impersonal self and the subjective/ personal self and their 
respective impersonal or personal viewpoints. From an objective point of view one can see 
how things are apart from one’s own personal perspective.  
 
Each of us begins with a set of concerns, desires, and interests of his own, 
and each of us can recognize that the same is true of others. We can then 
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remove ourselves in thought from our particular position in the world and 
think simply of all those people, without singling out as I the one we happen 
to be. 
From that [impersonal] position, the content and character of the different 
individual standpoints one can survey remain unchanged: One has set aside 
only the fact that a particular standpoint is one’s own, if any of them is. It 
isn’t that one doesn’t know; one just omits this fact from the description of 
the situation (Nagel 1991, 10). 
 
 
Objectivity is traditionally thought to require this sort impersonal perspective and I take it 
that it is not terribly controversial.  But in ethics, or matters of practical significance in 
general, it seems more contentious; for in taking a personal point of view one would 
consider certain states of affairs, say pleasure and p in, as valuable or not according to how 
they relate to oneself, or, Nagel argues, one could consider the pleasures or pains from the 
outside, or from the objective point of view. Here such a perspective looks at the pleasures 
and the pains in themselves; this perspective can affirm the pain as bad and pleasure as 
good without merely describing the motivation of an agent (Nagel 1986, 153). This is 
important Nagel argues since his own brand of normative realism requires that we must 
discover reasons for action “instead of deriving them from our preexisting motives” (Nagel 
1986, 139).  
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You cannot sustain an impersonal indifference to the things in your life 
which matter to you personally: some of the most important have to be 
regarded as mattering, period, so that others besides yourself have reason to 
take them into account. But since the impersonal standpoint does not single 
you out from anyone else, the same must be true of values arising in other 
lives. If you matter impersonally so does everyone (Nagel 1991, 11). 
 
But how does the impartial viewpoint see certain states of affairs as good or bad apart from 
one’s personal relation to them? Why should we think that for “a given quantity of 
whatever it is that’s good or bad—suffering or happiness or fulfillment or frustration—its 
intrinsic impersonal value doesn’t depend on whose it is”(Nagel 1991, 11)? Nagel seems to 
have at least two different arguments for the agent-n utral badness of pain and the ability 
for impersonal practical reasons to transfer themselve .  
The first argument or intuition for the agent-neutral badness of pain is based on the 
idea that if one does not recognize one’s own pain, then one will have dissociated one’s 
objective self from one’s subjective self since the subjective self can see that one has 
reason to want the pain to stop but the objective self remains disinterested. The problem is 
according to Nagel that if we only have agent relative reasons to see that the suffering 
should stop then only the subjective self has reason to stop it, while the objective self has 
not reason and only sits dispassionately watching the suffering. The objective self can only 
say that the subjective self has reason to want the suff ring to stop. But this seems to go 
against Nagel’s requirement that a normative realist have reasons for acting not simply 
derived from one’s preexisting motives. But such reasons, not describable in part by their 
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relation to an agent’s motives, must be objective. The objective self then should not 
become dissociated from one’s subjective self by not being able to see the practical 
significance of the pain for the subjective self. And this requires it seems that the pain be 
recognized by the objective self for what it is---bad. 
One could argue that this goes in a nice circle: it seems that the practical 
significance of the pain’s being bad for the subjectiv  self who is motivated to end it is a 
reason to say that the objective self should see th pain as really bad in itself. But the 
objective badness of the suffering is derived from the motives of the subjective self, or else 
how is that the objective self comes to see the pain as bad? Nagel might grant this but argue 
that what really is at issue here is the problem of the dissociation of the selves which occurs 
when the objective self cannot understand the motivation of the subjective self in wanting 
the pain to stop. But the reply to dissociation is, ‘so what?’ The whole point of having two 
selves as construed by Nagel is for one self to get outside, attain a ‘view from nowhere’, in 
order for it to look at things existing apart from one’s motives, or ‘biases’. As Mack argues, 
Nagel’s claim that there exist two selves with different standpoints “and a structure for 
value which allows those two selves to live in harmony may be a matter of wanting to have 
and to eat one’s metaphysical cake” (Mack 1989a, 90). 
Mack also notes that the bifurcation of selves may le d to a kind of axiological 
schizophrenia: one’s subjective self may focus on allevi ting one’s own pain, while the 
objective self would not be able to say why one’s own pain ought to be negated over 
anyone else’s pain since it would only focus on the ag nt-neutral badness of pain in 
general. So the objective self will tell a person t reduce the suffering in the world while 
the subjective self tells one to reduce one’s own suffering.  But as Mack concludes, “[i]n 
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almost all circumstances, one of these practices will have to be sacrificed to the other” 
(Mack 1989, 90). Nagel himself argues that from the impersonal standpoint “Everyone’s 
life matters as much as [one’s own] does, and [one’s own] matters no more than anyone 
else’s” (Nagel 1991, 14). This leads to the natural conclusion, which Nagel does not accept, 
that from the impersonal standpoint we are left with making ourselves “instruments for the 
realization of those impartial values that appear from the impartial standpoint” (Nagel 
1991, 15). So it is not clear that there is a real n ed for negating dissociation for such a 
division of perspectives is required for objectivity, even though it may lead to the objective 
and subjective selves at war with each other. 
Nagel’s second claim more directly addresses the question of the transmissibility of 
practical reason. His argument is the idea that if we only have agent-relative reasons for 
acting then we will not be able to give a plausible account of why we would help another 
alleviate his suffering. If one is in a hospital and another patient is in pain and wishes to be 
given a painkiller (analgesic) we need to ask ourselves why it is that we would give him the 
painkiller (if we would at all). Nagel argues that if we are only permitted agent-relative or 
personal reasons for giving the patient an analgesic then the patient would have to say that 
“though he has reason to want an analgesic, there is no reason for him to have one, or for 
anyone else who happens to be around to give him one” (Nagel 186, 160). It would be true 
that there would not be an impersonal reason to give him a shot of painkiller, but this still 
doesn’t mean that there are no agent-relative reasons for him to get it or for others to give it 
to him (Mack 1989, 91). He may feel better and others around him in the hospital may feel 
better too. But the force of Nagel’s argument is the claim that from my own perspective as 
someone who is in pain I can understand why I would want an analgesic, but can I 
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understand why someone else would think it reasonable that I get one? Why would he, 
from an agent-relative perspective, want me to get a shot? Is it because he sees that pain is 
bad, or is it just that my groaning is bothering him (Nagel 1986, 160)?  
The problem Nagel thinks is that from an agent-relative perspective the other’s 
reasons for my getting a shot might not have anythig to do with the badness of pain, but 
only rest on his desires or tastes---that is, he wants me to get a shot so that he can watch 
‘The X-Files’ without being bothered. It seems that the agent-relative view of value can 
only interpret his reasons in terms of his own motives, and not in terms of the agent-
neutrality of my badness; but the agent-neutrality is needed in order to conform to the 
normative realist view that the other patient’s desire to end my pain fit with the moral facts 
about pain’s objective badness (Mack 1989, 91-2). In what sense values can be thought to 
be objective or subjective will have to wait until the next section. But the claim Nagel is 
making, that practical significance requires some notio  of the impersonal dreadfulness of 
pain, seems implausible because it rests on the idea that pain is something that can be 
viewed ‘from the outside’ as impersonally bad. Nagel’s view of objectivity is that one 
abstracts oneself from a situation to view it without reference to oneself. But how does this 
work with things of practical significance? Nagel say  that one’s pain “though it comes 
attached to a person and his individual perspective, is just as clearly hateful to the objective 
self as to the subjective individual. The pain can be detached in thought from the fact that it 
is mine without it losing any of its dreadfulness. It has, so to speak, a life of its own” 
(Nagel 1986, 92). It is this thing with a life of its own that gives another a ‘correct’ motive 
to end my pain. But this is to just return to the claims about intrinsic value above. And I 
think little more needs to be said about the idea that something is good or bad intrinsically. 
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If there is no intrinsic practical significance in some state of affairs--which is to say that 
that state of affairs can be described as good or bad apart from any relation to an agent—
then we have not yet been presented an argument how practical reasons, understood as 
reasons for some agent to promote some end, transfe themselves to others. 
But there is another problem that needs to be discussed in the next section. Nagel 
hints at the Euthyphro problem in his claim that agent-relative reasons can only be 
subjective, or based on motives we might have for eliminating another’s pain, but not 
reasons which are based on the actual disvalue of the pain for the agent. Does the agent-
relative view of value turn into subjectivism, or in trying to escape subjectivity must it turn 
into a view like Nagel’s, taking what one has motive to promote as deriving from some 
agent-neutral good that really ought to be promoted? 
 So far we have seen that the agent-relative definition of value requires as part of 
the description of value an essential reference to the agent whose value it is; and agent-
neutral value does not require this reference. And it was also shown that the agent-neutral 
view seems to require the existence of external value. But such ‘value’ seems highly 
implausible since a value does not seem to be the kind of thing that can retain its practical 
significance apart from agents who relate to it in some way---viz., who wish for whatever 
reason to promote it. The importance of this claim was illustrated by examining how agent-
neutral practical reasons might conceivably be saidto transfer themselves from one agent 
to another based on their internal badness or goodness. I have rejected this view as less 
explanatorily adequate: a value is related to the agent who has it, and hence his reasons for 
holding it only give him (directly) reasons for prom ting it. B’s reasons for holding E2 as 
an end do not simply transfer to A even though A understands them; but until now we have 
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not talked about what sorts of reasons he might have for promoting E2, and whether these 
reasons are best considered objective or subjective.  
  
§2.3 The Objectivity and Subjectivity of Value. The topic of how to interpret the ontological 
and epistemological status of values and moral claims in general has a long and thorny 
history. Often ‘objective’ refers to something’s existing as mind independent, and 
‘subjective’ as the thing’s existing dependent upon one’s perceiving it—so, an objective 
value is one which is intrinsic, or exists outside of one’s experience of it, and a subjective 
value exists only in a person’s experience of something as good. Or ‘objective’ might refer 
to the thing’s being inter-subjectively verifiable, and ‘subjective’ to the thing’s not being 
open to such verification. In ethics objectivity and subjectivity might be spelled out in 
terms of the scope a moral claim possesses: is it ‘universalizable’ and applies to all agents 
impartially, or whether it only applies to one agent, being indicative of his own personal 
preferences; so far the agent-relative theory has implied that there are no ‘universalizable’ 
claims about an agent’s values being suitable for any other agent. I will not be pursuing the 
idea that objectivity requires this sort of ‘universalizability’; but I am concerned with the 
first sort of ‘objectivity’ which implies independent existence from an agent---but I think 
that what exists independently are reasons for values, not values themselves. The 
requirement that objective values be agent-independent seems to conflict with this external 
idea of objectivity since part of the description of a value will be its relation to the agent 
who has it; so if agent-relative values are objectiv , their objectivity must allow for their 
relative nature.  
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A good place to start with the idea of objective values is Plato’s famous question in 
the Euthyphro when Socrates asks Euthyphro whether something is piou  (or good) 
because the Gods say it is, or whether they say it is good because they see that it is good? 
On the face of it, the question seems to demarcate subjectivists (those who see no problem 
with affirming the former) from objectivists (those who affirm the latter). I think that the 
agent-relativist can affirm the latter in a sense. To know exactly in what sense we need to 
distinguish two different senses of affirming that something is called good because we see 
that it is good. For Plato, an agent—even the Gods--would have reason to call something 
good because there is a corresponding Form of Goodness that some particular good thing 
mimics, or partakes of; but I think that this sort f intrinsic notion of goodness has been 
shown to be implausible given the arguments above. But that is not to say that one cannot 
make sense of the Euthyphro question as demanding that an agent give reasons for saying 
that something is good or bad. This is a constraint on our ability to value things, since it 
cannot be the case, as the subjectivist wants to hold, that valueless states of affairs come 
into existence simply by being the object of one’s de ires, preferences or commitments 
(Mack 1993, 221). Objectivity, if it is to have any meaning at all, requires we be able to 
judge whether our affections are appropriate or not depending on whether their objects are 
worthy of our affections (Mack 1993, 321). 
To say that an object is subjectively valued is to ay that it acquires value by being 
the object of one’s affections. The classic statement of this is by Hobbes: “But whatsoever 
is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that it is, which for his part calleth Good; And 
the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill…” (Hobbes). Sometimes it is thought that 
subjectivists of value need to hold value to be reducible to some other psychological state, 
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say pleasure. Utilitarians thought that what people really valued could be explicable in 
terms of, and interpersonably measurable by, this psychological state; but this view has 
been pretty much abandoned. The reason is that subjectivists need only hold that “value is 
created or determined through preference. Values are the products of our affections” 
(Gauthier 1986, 47). There need not be the restriction that the object of preferences is only 
pleasure—rather, anything can be the object of one’s preference, from eating a good meal 
to planning one’s retirement 40 years from now.  
This broadening of what can be an object of one’s preference has lead the 
subjective theory of value to be adopted by economists and many in philosophy as a 
superior way of explaining human action and moral choi e.  It is thought that the subjective 
interpretation of value supports the non-neutrality of value. As we noted above the agent-
relative idea of value makes the value relational to a particular so that one could not simply 
substitute another agent in his place and say that he is just as happy. The subjective idea of 
value supports this idea since a thing only has value if it is the object of someone’s 
preference; and this object need only have value for the individual who prefers it. As Mack 
puts it, on the subjective account, “my desire for S1 may have the power to confer value on 
S1 for me, [but] it is difficult to see my desire for S1 having the power to bestow upon S1 an 
agent-neutral value that summons all to its service” (Mack 1993, 222). This would limit the 
reasons for being able to argue that there is some overarching Good that we all must 
recognize and work towards. But there are also implausible implications of holding values 
to be explainable only in terms of being objects of one’s preferences. 
The agent-relative theorist agrees with the subjectivist that values have some 
essential relation to an individual but there is also an important difference. The agent–
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relativist need not hold that a thing is only valuable when it becomes an object of our 
preferences. The reason for not wanting to have to defend this claim is its implausibility in 
claiming that we need not judge whether our affections are appropriate or not. For instance, 
to use Mack’s example, take a person who desires to grow the largest tomato in East Baton 
Rouge Parish (Mack 1989, 86). He could either extinguish this desire, or attempt to carry it 
out. If he does attempt to carry it out we could ask the subjectivist what the reason is 
beyond just saying that this state of affairs is the object of his affection. If the subjectivist 
were to say that he wants the accompanying ‘felt satisfaction’ that comes with growing the 
tomato, then it seems that what is valuable is this felt satisfaction---but this pleasure, or 
whatever, is not purely conferred upon the state of affairs by the agent. Indeed, what he 
cares about might actually be growing the prize-winning tomato: “Were he to discover that 
the prize had been awarded by mistake, the afterglow w uld be lost. But why? The 
revelation of the mistake would not show that he had not achieved the felt experience of 
growing the tomato and the felt satisfaction of winning” (Mack 1989, 96 n.34). The reason 
is, of course, that one can evaluate whether the stat of affairs is worthy of our affections. 
There is objectivity for agent-relative values because we can often specify when a 
state of affairs ‘fits’ with what we wanted to achieve. And the more we move from short 
term objects of our affections, such as pleasure, to long term ones, such as one’s career we 
need a good explanation why one might attempt to carry out these ‘objects’ of one’s 
affections rather than extinguishing them. A plausible claim is that these ‘preferences’ are 
based on our belief that these states of affairs are worth having—that they are worthy of 
our accomplishment. It is only the belief that such large goals are worthy that sustains our 
drive to get them. There may be few felt sensations that could accompany such long 
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projects; so the desire to actually do them, I think, resides in our belief that such things 
really are of value to us. 
Of course in saying that some objects can be judged to be worthy of our affections 
is to presuppose some standard for judgement—we are not just looking for any reasons, but 
good reasons. But one must be careful about introducing generic goods into an agent-
relative framework for, as Gauthier argues, “The semingly relative goods of the several 
kinds are really facets of absolute good. The demands of objectivity thus force an 
apparently relative conception of value into an absolutist mould” (Gauthier 1986, 53). 
Gauthier’s claim is that any account of the objectivity of agent-relative goodness will have 
to rely upon some standard of general goodness. One might explain why one sees one’s 
being a social worker as worthy because it allows one t  instantiate some good, say 
benevolence; and this characteristic is desirable, or worthy, because it exemplifies some 
agent-neutral goodness, or facet of absolute good. Hence, the agent-relative theory seems 
to need something that it denies—a goodness existing externally from agents. But need we 
accept that the objectivity of agent-relative values implies the agent-neutrality of value? 
Take the following claim regarding how to establish objective claims about values: 
 
 1 “X is not living well,” a truth claim that can be established objectively. 
2. “In order to live well, X ought to do (only) Y (as one possibility),” which 
is also possibly true and can be established objectively. 
3 “If X does Y, he or she will live better than by doing Z,” another truth 
claim that can be established objectively (Machan 1998, 63). 
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There are two levels of difficulty here: first establishing that there are generic goods based 
on human nature; and secondly, the claim that all of one’s personal goals must be fit into 
this scheme and weighted according to how they relate to the generic goals.  
The first problem is notoriously difficult and I am assuming here that there are 
some goods, such as health, wisdom, wealth, etc. whi h are thought to be worthy of pursuit 
for good reason. The problem with trying to glean a list of values and virtues from human 
nature is that the items on the list will be underdetermined by the facts which support them. 
The second problem, the attempt to fit one’s personal e ds into this model and relate those 
ends back to generic goods derived from human nature, may seem daunting. But it is the 
job of one’s practical reason to figure out how one’s inclinations fit with certain generic 
goods. As Den Uyl and Rasmussen argue: 
 
We should not imagine the basic goods that comprise human flourishing as 
existing or having value apart from the individuals whose goods they are. 
Further, we should not imagine individuals as mere placeholders or loci in 
which these basic goods are instantiated. Individuals are not mere 
metaphysical ‘pincushions’ in which these basic goods are ‘stuck,’ and 
individuals do more than locate these basic goods in space. It is only 
through their practical choices that individuals make these goods, 




One will need to know what generic values his interests and values are reflective of and 
how exactly these will be weighted in relation to oher so-called generic goals. How much 
value one should place on ‘integrity’ versus ‘honesty’; how exactly are these goods to be 
weighted in one’s life? An athlete might place more emphasis on ‘health’ than ‘charity’---
why does he do this? It is not a case that charity is really more important from the point of 
view of the universe than looking after one’s health; rather, given that he has adopted the 
project of being an athlete he will have a different set of values he will need to instantiate 
to achieve these goals. And these values are probably quite different from a Priest’s; but 
they are not on the face of it worse, but good for him given his inclinations.   
The following considerations should give us concern about adopting subjectivism 
as an explanation for the values we hold. We think that the values we have, for the most 
part, are worthy of being acquired. But this is only worthiness relative to our selves, to our 
own goals, desires and needs, etc. The question still remains how do our ends or values 
stand to others? Must another agent see my ends as worthy of pursuit because I consider 
them worthy? Or need another agent only be able to r c gnize the fact that I have ultimate 
ends, good for me, apart from his ends? I think the latter is more plausible given the agent–
relative nature of value. To illustrate, it will be instructive to use the Lomasky example in 
the previous section. Lomasky had argued that A’s understanding B’s end as valuable for 
him was sufficient to give A reason to promote it. He concluded: 
 
…it is being maintained that there are not two radic lly different ways of 
understanding reasons for action: understanding a reason as mine, which is 
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suffused with motivational force, and understanding it as thine, which is 
entirely bereft of motivational force (Lomasky 1987, 65). 
 
But this attempt to argue that values transfer their motivation based on understanding the 
reasons for them did not seem plausible, because, as Mack argued, if “anything is suffused 
with motivational force, it is A’s reason; ot his understanding of that reason. The reason, 
not his understanding of the reason, has motivationl force for B” (Mack 1989b, 84). 
In reply to this criticism, Lomasky argued that in saying the pains and pleasures of 
others are not among the motivationally inert facts of the world, he did not mean to argue 
that there exists any sort of external value (Lomasky 1989, 119). Lomasky claims that he 
was trying to argue for the more modest idea that te pains and projects of another are not 
to be classified among the motivationally inert facts of the world. For instance, if squealing 
chalk drives one up the wall then one would do well to extinguish this response by either 
staying away from chalkboards or by some sort of hypnosis, etc. Lomasky says that the 
extinguishment of the chalk response would not “render you oblivious to something that 
remains genuinely an evil. There is no ‘fact of the matter’ concerning the badness of chalk 
squealing independent of the subjective tinge of your experience” (Lomasky 1989, 119). Of 
course we have seen that an agent may have good reason for himself to not have to 
experience this sound and the reasons may not be just because of a subjective tinge. But 
why might one be apprehensive about adopting this srategy in the case of the patient who 
is in pain? One could just give him a shot and not be bothered by him anymore. Or one 
might just move to another room and this would have the same effect on one’s own 
experience. Lomasky argues that the reason why one w uld not do this is that it is 
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irrational: what matters to one is not primarily the state of “your consciousness but the way 
things are in the world. Similarly, the extinction strategy is irrational because it would take 
a capacity for apprehending what is valuable and disvalue in the world as if it were only a 
spotlight on one’s own psyche” (Lomasky 1989, 119). 
The objection Lomasky makes seems directed more at subjectivism, than agent-
relative value because the agent-relativist need not hold that badness is merely conferred on 
things by an agent. But what about the status of the o er’s pain or disvalue? One knows 
that if one leaves the room the other agent’s pain does not just go away with the closing of 
the door; but does this mean that the badness of the situation remains even though we go 
away, or that the badness of the situation remains for the sufferer even though we depart? 
On the agent-relative view of value, or disvalue, it could only be the latter. But even though 
we affirm the latter and deny that the practical signif cance of the disvalue need transfer, 
we can come to see others as moral agents, not mere mechanisms “that can affect me for 
good or ill”(Lomasky 1989, 119).  
One can come to understand that something is good for another without also having 
to promote that end oneself. The reason is that the recognition of values as objective and 
agent-relative is different from the claim that theother’s ends need to be promoted because 
they are valuable (or disvaluable) in themselves. As Henry Veatch argues:  
 
If the good of X is indeed but the actuality of X’s potentialities [agent-
relatively considered], then this is a fact that not just X needs to realize, but 
anyone and everyone else as well. And yet given the mere fact that a certain 
goods needs to be recognized, and recognized universally, to be the good of 
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X, it by no means follows that X’s good must be taken to be Y’s good as 
well, any more than the actuality or perfection or fulfillment of X needs to 
be recognized as being the actuality or perfection of Y as well (in Den Uyl 
and Rasmussen 1997, 33). 
 
The denial of the universality of a value’s applicability does not mean that we need deny 
the universality of the judgement that something is ood or bad for another. As we saw in 
the second section to say that a value is agent-relativ  means that an agent, P1 has a reason 
for ranking a world W1 with G1 over a world W2 without G1. But this ranking need not be a 
reason for P2 to also prefer W1, especially if his own good life requires the fulfillment of 
some good, G2, that cannot be combined with G1. So, this leads to a ‘universalization’ in 
the sense that just as G1 gives P1 a reason to act so as to promote W1, so too does G2 give 
P2 a reason to promote W2. As Den Uyl and Rasmussen continue: “…if one knows that 
attaining one’s good provides one with a legitimate reason to act, because it is one’s good, 
then one also knows that another person’s attaining his or her good provides that other 
person with a legitimate reason to act; this claim is what is universalized” (Den Uyl and 
Rasmussen 54). 
 Finally, we should note that although values are agent-relative it is true that all good 
lives will require a certain set of values. The reason for this is that there are certain values 
that ought to compose a good life. It is arguable exactly which values ought to be on this 
list, but Den Uyl has suggested the following: Intellectual pursuits, artistic pursuits, justice, 
honor, friendship, wealth, beauty, health and intellectual ability (DenUyl 1991, 188). These 
are not listed in any hierarchy of importance and may best be seen as slices of a pie chart 
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that may differ in width depending on their importance to the agent’s life. The life of a 
judge will require more of an emphasis on justice than will the life of a supermodel. Yet, it 
seems plausible to argue that a life that is absent any concern with justice is not much of a 
life at all. This consideration is important because it means that if justice and other goods 
ought to be part of one’s life, then they ought to exist in one’s life in some degree. So if 
justice ought to be a concern one has, then there may be concerns that one ought to be more 
cognizant of in order for one to be just. This concer , as we will see, may have interesting 
implications for deriving a theory of rights.  
  
§2.4 Conclusion. So, the objectivity of other’s values, given that those values are agent-
relative, resides in the realization that one’s own values are not the only values in the 
universe. This is to move beyond the idea that the only real values are one’s own to the 
idea that there are other moral agents who are ends in themselves. This denial of 
axiological solipsism may seem pedestrian, but it will be seen to have more importance 
later when we get into arguing about rights. The obj ctivity of agent-relative values in the 
interpersonal sense is a pretty abstract understanding: it does not require that one come to 
promote all the various ends people have, but it does require that one come to see others 
agents as ends in themselves. What sorts of actions A can perform on B is the subject of the 
next few chapters when I examine the attempt to base constraints on consequentialist or 
value theories and why we must turn to a deontic theory to better explain such constraints. 
But suffice it to say, at this point, we do not have a reason why A cannot use B as an 
unwilling instrument towards his own ends.   
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Chapter Three:  
Value Pluralism and the Value of Well-Being. 
 
§3.0 Intro. 
§3.1 Value Pluralism. 
§3.2 The Value of Well-Being. 
§3.3 Conclusion.  
 
 
§3.0 Intro. The plurality of agent-relative value. Value pluralism (VP), or the belief 
that there are ways of life not just different from ne another, but differently good, is a 
staple of liberal belief. Below I will briefly examine the idea of subjective VP and then 
look at its main contender, objective VP. I will show how VP, as viewed from an agent-
relative perspective, provides a more attractive int rpretation than its competitors. The 
principal reason for preferring the agent-relative basis of value incommensurability is that 
it allows us to keep the insight that different ways of life may be both good and 
incommensurable while rejecting the idea (associated with the traditional form of value 
pluralism) that incommensurability rests primarily in an agent’s inability to make a rational 
decision between two equally good but incompatible values. The theory of objective value 
plural incommensurability will be shown to be implausible from the agent-relative 
perspective because it relies on agent-neutral values. The preferred interpretation of Value 
Pluralism based on agent-relative value will show h values are incommensurable in a 
sense, but not in the sense that has been offered by pluralist theorists before.     
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§3.1. Value Pluralism. In order for one to be called a liberal, a necessary, if not 
sufficient, condition would be that one holds some form of value pluralism. Liberals, qua 
value pluralists, do not claim to have some standard to decide which good life is the 
optimal one. Pluralism implies that individuals areble to choose what sort of good life 
they wish to make for themselves. Thus, pluralism stands in direct contrast to monism, the 
belief that all values can be ordered and ranked according to one standard or supreme 
value. Kekes explains that the modern rejection of ethical monism shows the appeal of 
value pluralism:  
 
…pluralism is quite unlike monism. For what monists wi h for us is that we 
should overcome the obstacles that prevent us from embracing the one true 
system of values through which we could achieve a good life. The 
pluralistic ideal is that we should make a good life for themselves. The 
monistic ideal is that we should find the life that is good for all of us. 
…Both see living a good life as the goal. But for pluralists the goal is to 
achieve what we individually want to achieve, while for monists the goal is 
to achieve what all individuals alike ought to want to achieve (Kekes 1993, 
14). 
 
The need for individuals to choose exactly what sorof good life they want goes against 
what is a need of traditional morality: to provide some overarching standard of a good life 
for agents to strive towards. This need might not jus be based on the monistic prejudice 
that there can only be one Good life, but seems to be a requirement of transitivity in 
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practical reasoning: If one prefers A to B and B to C, then it cannot be the case that one 
prefers C to A. This is a requirement of rationality; without some one end to compare other 
values to, we may end up preferring C to A which would be irrational, but also to prefer in 
moral terms the less valuable to the more valuable. Hence Aristotle’s claim there must be 
some one end to every practical science and the end of all ethical striving is happiness.  
But value pluralism, the belief that there are differing ultimate ends which are good, 
would seem to be a rejection of this condition of practical reason that there be a single 
value. The consequence of admitting an irreducible plurality of ends seems, as Stuart 
Hampshire states, “to admit a limit to practical reasoning, and to admit that some 
substantial decisions are not to be explained, and not to be justified as the right decisions, 
by any rational calculation. This is a possibility that cannot be conceptually excluded, even 
if it makes satisfying theoretical reconstruction of the different uses of ‘good,’ as a target 
setting term, impossible” (quoted in Den Uyl 1991, 163). The problem of the breakdown of 
transitivity in practical reasoning was raised here because it is often thought that ethics as a 
whole must provide some overarching standard by which everyone can come to make 
choices which are compossible and rankable by a standard of the Good. But given the 
argument for agent-relative value it should be apparent that while we cannot have 
incommensurability at the personal level, only at the interpersonal. So there need not be a 
break down in practical reasoning when agents are reasoning about their own values 
because they can judge what is most important in their lives given their more important 
values/ goals and act accordingly.  
The first strand of VP we will examine is subjective alue pluralism. This is the 
belief that things have value by being the objects of our preferences, and since there are as 
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many different and conflicting values as there are ag nts who confer value, values derive 
their plurality from these two considerations. Von Hayek defends this view of value 
pluralism when he is discussing the problems of socialist planning. He argues that those 
who would try to make plans for directing all of our affairs neglect to consider that  “scales 
of value exist only in individual minds, nothing but partial scales of value exist, scales 
which are inevitably different and often inconsistent with one another” (in Crowder 2002, 
227). At one time any socialist trying to plan what sorts of preferences ought to be satisfied 
will only have his own goals to go by; even if he wanted to satisfy as many others as he 
could, he will be limited in knowing what other’s values are since, all he will have are 
partial scales of what this person or that consider from his own point of view to be of 
value. There will be no way for the socialist to rank everyone’s values according to some 
impersonal standard because such a standard will only be a reflection of the socialist’s own 
preferences, which may or may not coincide with anyone else’s.  
From this idea of subjective and plural values, Hayek argues that within limits 
people should be allowed to “follow their own values and preferences rather than 
somebody else’s” (in Crowder 2002, 227). Hayek wants to move from the idea that values 
are plural to the liberal idea that people should be left to pursue their own lives without 
interference from others. This is often defended in a utilitarian fashion, as Roger Scruton 
puts it: “ when people are negatively free they are, ceteris paribus, unhindered from doing 
what they decide to do; and people are by and large the best judges of what is most likely 
to satisfy them; hence negative liberty freedom tends to maximize utility overall” (Scruton 
1994, 584). Scruton remarks “the naivete of the second premise needs no comment”. But if 
values are subjective and plural, then this makes th  second premise more plausible than 
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Scruton believes—values are conferred on things by persons, so why would people not be 
the best judges of what they want? But as Crowder points out, the problem from a pluralist 
view this argument is one from indeterminacy: the subjectivist claims that since (1) value 
pluralism means there is no way competing values/ goods can be measured or ranked 
objectively, we can infer (2) that such rankings ought to be left to individuals. But even 
supposing that (1) holds and the subjective theory of value is true, (2) does not follow since 
(2) would seem to be the claim that at least one state of affairs can be ranked objectively—
namely, the one where we are left alone to make our own decisions. And we have observed 
other reasons above why (1) might not be the best explanation of value since individuals 
consider their values as worthy apart from being just the products of our affections. But the 
problem for value pluralism becomes how to interpret (1)—if values are not subjective, can 
they be objective but in some sense incommensurable by virtue of being incompatible? 
John Gray has argued that values are objective, plural and often incommensurable. 
There are many kinds of good life. He has said that the idea of objective pluralism comes 
from Isaiah Berlin, who derived it from the study of Herder in whose work Berlin found 
the idea of pluralism: “the recognition of an indefinite variety of cultures and systems of 
values, all equally ultimate, and incommensurable with one another, so that the belief in a 
universally valid path to human fulfillment is rendered incoherent” (Hausheer 1998, xxx). 
But Gray has argued that Berlin’s own theory of value pluralism upon which he bases his 
liberalism “founders on the historic reality that many constellations of these [plural-
objective] goods, and many forms of human flourishing, have non-liberal social and 
political structures as their matrices” (Gray 1995, ). Gray gives the following ways 
objective and plural values arise through conventions that govern how moral goods can be 
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fit with one another given the value assigned to those goods within a culture—and also 
when different cultures apply different standards to the same good, we may end up with 
different interpretations of the good—and incommensurability can also be generated when 
different goods and virtues are honoured in different cultures: “What some praise as 
virtuous others may condemn as vice” (Gray 2002, 35).  This is true incommensurability 
where two sides of a debate talk past one another because, as Kuhn claimed, “to call one 
idea right and another wrong implies the existence of a common framework for evaluating 
them, which is pecsiely what Kuhn denies” (Okasha 2002, 86). The notion that goods are 
incommensurable means they cannot be compared in overall alue: “Some varieties of the 
good life are neither better nor worse than each other, nor the same in value, but 
incommensurable; they are differently valuable” (Gray 2000, 34). He gives the example of 
friendship: 
 
…goods that are incommensurable cannot be compared in overall value. 
Consider friendship. Insofar as someone charges money f r the time he 
spends with others, he is not a friend. It is part of friendship not to exchange 
the time one spends with friends for money. This does not mean that 
friendship must be ranked over any amount of money. To say that friendship 
and money are incomparable in value does not mean that having friends is 
incomparably better than having money. It means that friendship and money 
cannot be compared in value. As Joseph Raz has put it: ‘Only those who 
hold the view that friendship is neither better norw rse than money, but is 
simply not comparable to money or other commodities ar  capable of 
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having friends. Similarly only those who would not even consider 
exchanges of money for friendship are capable of having friends’ (Gray 
2000, 35-6). 
 
The problem here according to Gray is that the value of friendship and the value of money 
are somehow incomparable because one cannot logically combine the two things--say, 
paying a person to be one’s friend because a ‘friend’ by definition cannot be a commodity. 
This would be like trying to make a married bachelor. But it is not clear that being a friend 
cannot be combined with receiving some form of payment: Aristotle thought that there 
could be two kinds of inferior friendship based on the pleasure or financial benefit we 
receive from others; but in his superior form of friendship, which is what Gray probably 
means by friendship, the object of the friendship is not pleasure or financial gain, but 
another’s virtuous qualities (NE bk. 8). This view of incommensurability has been term d 
the incompleteness version (Gauss 2003, 33). On the incompleteness view one cannot hold 
anyone of the following orderings to be true: (V1 < V2), (V2 < V1) or (V1 = V2). The reason 
why our preferences are incomplete is because at least one of these should hold true for an 
agent---either he prefers V1 to V2, or V2 to V1 or he is somehow indifferent between them. 
An agent may see friendship and money as both good but he is unable to rank one over the 
other; but nor does he find them to be equally good since he must choose and cannot 
simply remain indifferent regarding their value. The problem here would seem to be that if 
the first two orderings do not hold true because V1 and V2 make ‘incomparable demands’ 
then the third may hold true since neither set is preferred to the other which entails that 
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they are equal in some respect. The question Gaus here raises is how do we distinguish 
incompleteness from inequality?   
Gray seems to be arguing that the incommensurability of friendship and money 
rests not only in that they cannot be compared in value but that they are not compatible. 
What else would be the need of proclaiming that two values are incommensurable if that 
means only that they are incomparable? My love for spaghetti might be incommensurable 
compared to my love for Beethoven, but they are not incompatible. It seems that when he 
speaks of the value of money and friendship as incommensurable and incomparable, he 
means that they are incompatible somehow, not just different in value. 
 We can see this move in an argument from John Kekes also. In trying to say what 
incommensurability is he starts out by claiming that some values are incompatible. “The 
incompatibility is due to qualities intrinsic to the conflicting values” (Kekes 1993, 21). He 
gives us the example of having a restful sleep and trying to engage in interesting 
conversation as “entirely incompatible, while political activism and solitude are partly so” 
(Kekes ibid.). He continues: 
 
The basic idea of incommensurability is that there are some things so 
unalike as to exclude any reasonable comparison among them. Square roots 
and insults, smells and canasta, migrating birds an X ray seem to exclude 
any common yardstick by which we could evaluate their respective merits 
or demerits. That this is so is not unusually troublesome because the need to 
compare them rarely arises. But it is otherwise with values. It often happens 
that we want to enjoy incompatible values, and so it becomes important to 
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compare them in order to be able to choose among them in a reasonable 
manner. If, however, incompatible values are also inc mmensurable, then 
reasonable comparisons among them become problematic (Kekes 1993, 21). 
 
 
In terms of goods, is Kekes claiming that values are incompatible because they reside in 
objects that cannot be had at the same time—like the physical characteristics that makes the 
act of sleeping non-compossible with the act of speaking consciously—or that goods are 
incompatible because we have no way of comparing two good things to say which is best?  
Kekes’ claim that values are incommensurable rests upon the plausibility that they first 
must be specifiable as incompatible—but not just incompatible in their physical properties 
so that doing them both at the same time is impossible, but that they are incompatible in 
terms of their moral properties.  
 But there is a problem here. If two things were incommensurable, or had no 
common measure, there would be no need to choose betw en them—or worry about 
combining them; ‘incommensurability’ between two goods would mean, as Gray 
acknowledges, that “no comparison is possible…They can be compared endlessly—but 
they cannot be compared with one another in overall value”(Gray 2000, 41-2). But the 
examples he uses suggest that ‘incommensurable’ means th t two goods are 
incompatible—that they cannot or should not be combined—and that we must sometimes 
choose between them even though we have no standard for choosing. And Gray often 
claims that values and virtues are incompatible: “human nature being what it is, some 
virtues crowd out others. It is hard, if not altogether impossible, for a profoundly 
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compassionate person to be at the same time dispassion tely just” (Gray 2000, 39). But if 
two values (or two paradigms) are truly incommensurable, or not open to comparison by 
the same standard, then it does not seem that they can be incompatible (Okasha 2002, 86). 
Without a common standard for interpreting the value of two things it does not make sense 
to say that they are incompatible, since how is it tha they disagree, or fail to fit, with one 
another? But this is what Gray rejects: “If rational i quiry has failed to produce agreement 
on the best life, it is not because of any imperfection of human reason. It is because the idea 
of perfection has no sense in human life” (Gray 2000, 39). Two cultures that interpret the 
same value differently cannot really be said to hold incompatible or incomparable values if 
they are truly incommensurable—for this would require that there be some way (a standard 
of ‘perfection’) to compare the traditions in order to see why they cannot be compatible. 
So, for Gray, friendship and money are not just incommensurable—that is differently 
valued according to different paradigms—but also incompatibly good, which is say that do 
not fit together according to some notion of what is good. But even accepting that he means 
‘incompatibility’ and ‘incomparability’ by incommensurability what are we to make of the 
claim that there can be goods that are equally good, but not comparable?  
 The claim that two goods are different, but each good, and that there is no way to 
rank them, seems to rely on the idea that the two goods are agent-neutrally good, but not 
comparable with one another in terms of their goodness so that an agent who had to choose 
between them would be at a loss to explain why he prefers one to the other. Even though 
Gray speaks of values as deriving from cultures and conventions, he claims that they are 
not just relative to these societies but are reflectiv  of a moral reality: 
 
 64 
Value-pluralism is closer to ethical theories which affirm the possibility of 
moral knowledge than it is to familiar kinds of ethical skepticism, 
subjectivism or relativism. It enables us to reject some judgements about the 
good as being in error. At the same time, it means giving up a traditional 
notion of truth in ethics. To affirm that the good is plural is to allow that it 
harbours conflicts for which there is no one solutin that is right. It is not 
that there can be no right solution in such conflicts. Rather, there are many 
(Gray 2000, 6). 
The good is independent of our perspectives on it, but it is not the same for 
all. It is not just that different ways of life honur different goods and 
virtues….Value pluralism is the claim that both might be right. …It may be 
that the good cannot contain contradictions; but it shows itself in ways of 
life that are incompatible (Gray 2000, 6-7).  
 
 As I argued above there are good reasons for not accepting an agent-neutral theory of 
value; the claim that objectively plural (agent-neutral) values would lead to a breakdown in 
the transitivity of practical reasoning for an agent would be another reason. If an agent 
faced a decision between two goods but was unable to compare them, or able to rank them, 
but felt the pull of both of them (because they are ag nt-neutrally good) then he would face 
a problem in choosing which to do—but only it seems if they are incompatible. And Gray 
reinforces this as his own view: “…universal values do not fit together to compose an ideal 
life….There may be a best life for any individual; but not one that is without loss” (Gray 
2000, 9). One could spend time making friends and making money—but not both at the 
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same time and in the same respect: “A kind of moral sc rcity is built into the fabric of 
human life. It is because human needs are contradicory that no human life can be perfect” 
(Gray 2000, 10). But the problem that an individual might need to choose between two or 
more goods which cannot be compared is not really a problem if we reject the agent-neutral 
view of value that underlies it.  
 Gray’s examples are meant to show that there is a bre kdown in practical reasoning 
because an individual must choose between goods in a ituation where they are not open to 
comparison, but in which one is ‘forced’ by the pull of the goods to choose some over 
others. Hence, the claim that one cannot have a perfect life—we will always have to 
sacrifice some goods in order to choose others. One wonders if this is ever a problem for 
real individuals? People may be conflicted about ends and know that choosing one thing 
means foregoing other opportunities, but usually people (who are rational, non-akrasic) 
choose what they think will be best for them—even if it means foregoing the chance to get 
other goods. But one need only look at this as a loss if one must place as much value on the 
things one foregoes as on those one chooses—and this claim seems implausible given the 
agent-relative view of value. As Den Uyl and Rasmussen argue:  
 
Indeed, if human flourishing involves an essential reference to the person 
for whom it is valuable as part of its description, a d if the individual 
provides relevant content to the character of human flourishing, then 
pointing out that there are versions of human flourishing that are 
incomparable creates no problem. This is entailed by the claim that human 
flourishing is both agent-relative and individualized. There is no version of 
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human flourishing that is better or more valuable than some other version 
period; versions of human flourishing are only valuable relative to some 
person. This if we are careful not to confuse abstrctions with realities, we 
see that one person’s version of human flourishing is not strictly comparable 
with another’s (Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1997, 46). 
 
 
As we saw above in response to Gauthier even if values are reflective of some generic 
goods that we use to give our lives worth, this is not to say that these values hold some 
intrinsic worth that makes us choose between them. One can choose some goods and not 
pay much attention to others without much loss. Even if we thought that every life required 
a certain set of virtues, the degrees to which theywould be realized, or weighted in each 
person’s life will differ significantly given differing interests and goals. Does the athlete 
who weights heavily strength and endurance, ever miss the life of Mother Teresa, who 
weighted heavily charity and compassion?  If the answer is ‘yes’, then the reply is ‘why are 
you an athlete’?! It is the agent-relative interpretation of value that best makes sense of 
conflicting values; the overcompleteness type of incommensurability is the claim that 
“Values V1 and V2 are incommensurable if it is the case that both (a) V1 is better than V2 
and (b) V2 is better than V1” (Gauss 2003, 32). A choice between V1 and V2 would only 
lead to a conflict if the values somehow had the same measure of the same sort of property 
and that these properties were incomparable; but on the agent-relative account agents need 
not face such indecision when deciding on their own values because “the rational agent 
adjusts his commitment to the various [valuational] dimensions, at least to the extent that 
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he no longer claims that both dimensions automatically yield overall rankings” (Gauss, 
2003, 39). It seems plain here that if the athlete would really rather be a saint then he has 
chosen unwisely. On the agent-relative view there is no necessary conflict for an individual 
on how he ranks or weights his own values. 
 Part of the problem then with traditional expositions of value pluralism rest on the 
conflation of the ideas of incomparability and incompatibility. Steven Lukes says that in 
interpreting incommensurability we never ought to lo k for incomparability in the abstract 
goods themselves, but only in the particular bearers of values (Lukes 2003, 64). In deciding 
about the goodness of places to live we are concerned with our real choices between a poor 
community with a nice landscape versus a more prospe us community filled with 
unsightly smokestacks; we do not also choose between the value of beauty versus that of 
prosperity. But such a choice does seem to be what Gray and Berlin claim must be made. 
Of course Lukes’ idea is that we can make sense of value incommensurability or 
incomparibility in terms of the incompatibility of the extensional descriptions of subvenient 
properties. The two neighbourhoods are incompatible because one cannot (presumably) 
choose to live in both at the same time. If values are agent-relative, then the worry about 
values being incompatible and hence incommensurable is th  worry that agents will have to 
choose between two values that have for them the same amount of agent-relative value. 
This argument makes incompatibility between values a private concern since agents are 
faced with making tradeoffs between their agent-relative values; yet these trade offs need 
not be tragic, but only a part of life for agents who live in a world of scarcity. For an agent 
who holds agent-relative values, his values are comparable enough that he can decide what 
to do about conflicts by finding out which weighting of values best serves his needs at the 
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time. But the pertinent aspect of incommensurability of values concerns that of the 
incomparability and incompatibility of interpersonal v lues.  
 
§3.2 The Value of Well-Being.  In order to proceed to discuss rights from within t e value 
pluralist perspective it will be helpful to delineat  the ways in which pluralist ideas of well-
being could ground obligation towards others. Eric Mack has distinguished 3 such ways: 
Combinatory agent-neutralist, Anti-combinatory agent-neutralist and Agent-relative (Mack 
2000, 78-84). The combinatory agent-neutralist view is that each persons well–being is 
agent neutrally good and that persons values are rankable and combinable in some way to 
determine which trade offs among them are agent-neutrally good. The anti-combinatory 
agent-neutralist view, which seems to be what Gray holds, asserts that each agent’s well-
being has agent-neutral value but the various well-being of distinct agents cannot be 
combined to determine which trade offs are best. The third view is that of agent-relative 
view of well-being which has been spelled out last chapter: it asserts that each agent’s well-
being has ultimate agent-relative value for him andthat there is no way to rank or combine 
agent’s values to see which trade offs are best between agents.  
Only the third way shows us how values are incomparable because it shows how 
the incomparability between different agent’s values li s in the fact that the values belong 
to different, distinct agents. Even if it were possible that two agents were to pursue the 
same value in the same magnitude what makes the valu s incommensurable is that they are 
agent-relative, not that they are incompatible. On the agent neutral view of VP, 
incommensurability of value resides in the idea that for an agent two values are both good 
but incompatible in their attainment; but this does not seem to give us the strong 
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requirement that a theory of incommensurability would have to meet—namely, that the two 
values themselves be incomparable qua different values. With the agent-relative idea 
applied between agents we can see how values are more than just incompatible in their 
obtainment, they are incomparable in their relative valuation. This means that values are 
not open to tradeoffs or interpersonal comparison in terms of value.2  
 
§3.3 Conclusion. Gray’s idea of value pluralism would make values incommensurable 
because each agent’s well-being has ultimate agent-neutral value and that this ultimate 
agent-neutral value cannot be combined to determine which trade offs are optimal among 
individuals. The agent-relative view holds that each individual’s well being has ultimate 
agent-relative value and that the ultimate agent-relativ  well-being of distinct individuals 
cannot be combined to determine which trade offs are optimal (Mack 2000). But Gray’s 
view of the incommensurability of agent-neutral goods is not plausible because only the 
agent-relative idea of goodness makes sense of the idea our goods are not open to trade 
offs. As Mack argues, if two different persons’ interests have value sameness, then they 
exemplify the same type of value. A staple of agent-neutral theory is that two goods can be 
incomparable in terms of their worth, but still give an agent the same amount of 
motivational reasons for desiring them both. This leads to a tragic sense of life because 
agents have equal reason to promote two values that require incompatible actions for their 
attainment. If the two agent’s interests exemplify the same agent neutral value to the same 
extent then they have agent-neutral value sameness a d magnitude sameness (Mack 2000, 
                                                
2 This does not mean that values are incomparable in terms of their meaning. As I argued last chapter, agent-
relative value does not entail relativity of value. Under relativity of value we would not be able to compare 
values because their meaning would become fixed to the group or persons who hold them; under agent-
relative value it is only the value’s significance that becomes ‘relativized’ to an individual who is capable of 
having the value.  
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82). But if this occurs—and it seems plausible to say that it could on the agent-neutral 
account—then we have equality of worth, contrary to Gray’s belief that agent-neutral 
goods are incomparable in terms of worth.  
The agent relative account makes values incommensurable by asserting that two 
interests can have the same value making property to the same degree and yet not have 
equal worth. This can occur if the two interests are judged by two incommensurable 
standards: The value of agent one’s interest for him versus the value of agent two’s interest 
for him (Mack 2000). It is the agent relative aspect of the interests that makes them 
incommensurable. As Mack states, “Equally extensive instantiations in the lives of 
different agents of the same interest can have incommensurable value only if the value of 
those instantiations are agent-relative” (Mack 2000, 82-3). The claim that values are agent 
relative and incommensurable in this way will be significant for the argument for rights, 
because if rights are to be grounded in the value of agent’s fundamental interests they will 
need to be grounded in their agent relative value.  
In arguing that agent-relative values can be called p ural we have shifted the focus 
of value pluralism. Values are not necessarily in co flict because we can compare them in 
terms of their meaning for different agents. Life need not be tragic because we will face 
situations where we will have to choose between values neither of which we can do 
without. Agent-relative value means we each have to choose a good life for ourselves, and 
also the means by which to acquire the values necessary to it. Because we do not feel the 
motivational pull of two values that we must have but cannot, we can make tradeoffs in our 
own lives as to which values we must have and which we can do without (to some degree). 
As argued last chapter, the athlete can do without many of the things the intellectual deems 
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necessary. The athlete can even weight less heavily those values, like justice, that the judge 
must have to a high degree without suffering a tragic loss. The problem for rights is that 
agent-relative value pluralism does not allow for interpersonal comparisons of value. So if 
rights are said to be value-based, then they will show who has the right and who the 
corresponding duty by showing which kind of value (p rhaps the object of the right) 
outweighs which other kind of value. 
  As we will see in the next chapter, many believe that rights, or constraints, are 
based on the value of the objects they protect. But if rights, or constraints, are value-based 
in this way, then it would seem that P1 has reason not to interfere with P2’s promotion of 
W2 (and G2) only if either G2 does not interfere with G1, or P1 somehow comes to see the 
constraint against his interference, and the end it protects, as valuable for him. But it is 
precisely the latter claim that the two theses of practical reason seem to throw into doubt. If 
rights are value-based, then in order for P2’s promotion of G2 to give rise to a constraint 
against P1’s interference with G2, one will need to show how P1 not interfering with P2’s 
well-being (G2 (or the value of some condition, G3, which underlies it) is based on the 
conduciveness of the constraint to promote either P1’s own well-being or P2’s well-being, 
thereby giving a sufficient value-based reason for P1 not to interfere with P2’s promoting 
G2 We will see that the prospects for explaining the robustness of P2’s constraints against 
P1’s interference on the value from P1’s perspective of constraints as conducive to P1’s well-
being (P1’s abiding by constraints against P2 is conducive to his own well-being), or to P2’s 
(P1’s abiding by the constraint is due to its conduciveness to P2’s well-being) is bleak. The 
next chapter, Four, will examine problems with trying to ground rights on the nature of 
agent-relative value. 
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Chapter Four:  
Agent-relative Value and the Value of Constraints. 
 
§4.0  Intro.  
§4.1  The Value of Constraints. 
§4.2  Doing Without Rights-Talk? 
§4.3. An Alternative: Converging Interests and Contract? 





§4.0. Intro. Part of the problem some theorists have with the idea of rights is the thought 
that they are primitive and mysterious. Nozick (1974) claims that rights obtain simply as a 
consequence of our separate moral existences. Dworkin (1978) thinks that basic rights to 
equality and respect are so fundamental as to be‘axiomatic’—they cannot be demonstrated 
but just assumed. David Norton notes that there may have been a time in liberalism’s 
history, in the history of the conflict between indivi uals and the state or church, when 
such a ‘manifesto’ characterization of rights was warranted. But such a strategic take on 
rights will not suffice anymore since “political liberalism is situated in a world that knows 
it well, and some sectors of the world judge it wanting, whereas some sectors have serious 
questions that cannot be blunted by stipulative definitions” (Norton 1995, 107). There 
would seem to be a need to provide an explanation for rights that makes them less 
mysterious, more related to the value of what they protect. Norton quotes Joel Feinberg as 
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stating that having rights allows us to stand up like men, look others in the eye, and feel in 
some fundamental way the equal of everyone else (Norton 1995, 108). Feinberg argues that 
our status as rights-bearers means we have some for o  minimal self-respect that is 
worthy of the love and esteem of others. But, as Norton continues, Feinberg “is mistaken to 
identify worth with rights. To be a rights-bearer say  nothing about one’s worth—unless 
rights are so defined as to presuppose worth, and they are not thus defined by [classical] 
liberalism” (Norton 1995, 109).  
Here we touch upon the seeming need to ground rights n their value to us, but we 
also touch upon the seemingly paradoxical nature of ights that reasons for abiding by 
rights, or even valuing rights, may not depend on the value of what they protect for a 
rights-holder, nor the value of the corresponding obligations for those subject to them. 
Rights have something to do with values, but as we will see, they are not dependent 
directly for their force upon certain things being valuable to us. Rights, if they are 
dependent upon values, would seem to be dependent upo  very broad and abstract values—
such as autonomy—so that they would seem to protect th se sorts of values, rather than 
what these broad values are themselves used for. More pertinently, rights must be based 
upon the value of such broad values for us and for others—so that while others have reason 
not to interfere with our rights because of the existence of these broad value-based reasons, 
we also have reason not to violate other’s rights because of the same reasons.  
 To be sure when others harm us by not respecting our rights we know it is bad; and 
conversely when we violate the rights of others they know it is bad. What we want to know 
is why we have reason to refrain from violating their rights and they have reason to refrain 
from violating our rights. We want to know why violating someone else’s rights is so bad 
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that we ought to refrain from doing so. We will look at two value-based reasons for why 
we should not violate someone else’s rights—the recipi nt view and the agent well-being 
view. Each claim that we ought not to violate someone else’s rights because doing so is to 
seriously cause harm—but harm either to the person subject to rights or to the rights holder. 
I will argue that the well being view seems problematic because it claims that we ought not 
violate another’s rights because to do so is to cause ourselves harm, which makes violating 
rights a harm to the duty holder and leaves out an explanation of why violating another’s 
rights is not a harm to them. And the agent recipient view, which claims that we ought not 
violate another’s rights because doing so is to cause harm to the well being of the rights 
holder, cannot account for why we have motivation to help the other agent achieve his 
good when practical reason is agent relative. A third alternative is that we need an 
explanation that somehow unites, or coordinates, deontic reasons for recognizing rights 
with agent-relative reasons for pursuing our own values. This chapter will outline the three 
ways of arguing why we have reason to concede another’s rights. The most plausible 
explanations are the coordinate view and the well being view. Laying out these views will 
help us when we attempt to formulate an argument in Chapter Five for why we have reason 
to concede another’s rights.    
    
§4.1 The Value of Constraints. A right is a form of constraint; hence rights seem more 
closely tied to deontological theories than consequential ones. To see why there is this 
appearance we will examine the basic form of both theories and how they relate to rights as 
types of constraints that agents face regarding the pursuit of their ends. While there are 
reasons for seeing rights as equivalent to kinds of de ntic rules, there are also reasons for 
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separating rights from deontic theories and consequential ones. The inability for either 
dominant theory of value to capture the nature of rights leads one to conclude that rights 
form a domain of their own and are not reducible to talk about values. 
There are familiar paradoxes that seem to surround both consequentialist and 
deontological theories. The consequentialist theory c nsiders an act or rule to be ‘good’ if 
it leads to good consequences for an agent or for a gre t number of agents. On a 
consequentialist view, one should not commit an act of murder (or one should follow the 
rule not to murder) because it leads to the best consequences for that agent or for society. 
The usual objection made to some generic theory of consequentialism is that in its fixation 
with maximizing a certain state of affairs it often requires that agents commit acts which 
seem intuitively wrong—say, killing one innocent person to save five other innocents. It is 
also claimed that the agent-neutral version of it may require agents to sacrifice too much of 
themselves, of their own integrity, in trying to achieve some impersonal good. As Shelly 
Kagan notes, the telling criticism against consequentialism is that there may be normative 
factors not adequately accounted for by its focus on consequences (Kagan 1998, 73).  
The deontologist claims that in focusing on factors hat may override the promotion 
of overall value his theory takes into consideration hese factors. The deontological theory 
rests in part on the intuition that theories which make it permissible to do harm in order to 
do greater good are contradictory. As F. M. Kamm argues, “it would simply be 
contradictory for it to be morally permissible to minimize violations of the constraint itself 
for the sake of showing concern for it “ (Kamm 1992, 384). So in the case where we could 
save five innocent people by killing one innocent person, doing so would be wrong because 
the rule against harming innocents does not allow for looking at the situation in terms of 
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the value of one life versus five. For the deontologist the right has some content apart from 
specifications of the good (Kagan 1998, 74).  
The usual criticism leveled against deontic theories is that in order for its intuitive 
plausibility in requiring no harm be inflicted upon innocents, it requires either an intuition 
about what is of harm, or a straightforward explication of ‘harm’ in value terms. Samuel 
Scheffler argues that the claim it is wrong to killone innocent person if doing so will 
prevent five other innocents from being killed rests on there being an important 
characteristic/ property of a person in virtue of which it is undesirable for persons to be 
victimized (Scheffler 1982, 103). So in trying to explicate the appeal of the rule ‘do not kill 
innocents’ the deontologist will be pressed to conclude that the rule is plausible because of 
the underlying value of not violating certain properties of others—such as their innocence. 
The reason why we cannot kill innocent P1 even if doing so will save innocents P2- 6 is 
because we ought not to violate the allegedly significant valuable property that underlies 
the principle. But if the problem with harming one p rson is that it violates some agent-
neutral value (innocence?), then the question becoms why not allow one violation of the 
property in order to prevent five other violations of it?  
But if the agent-relative theory of value outlined in the last chapter is correct and 
implies there is no such entity as agent-neutral value, the criticism Scheffler makes against 
deontology loses some of its force. The underlying property in question would have to be 
agent-neutrally good and have the required inbuilt transmissibility of practical reason in 
order to claim that what one needs to do is to work f  the minimization of it. But the 
agent-neutral idea of value was shown to be implausible because agents only have agent-
relative reasons for promoting their own good and these reasons need not be reasons for 
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anyone else. The property in question would have to be ne that could appeal to agents in 
terms of being conducive to their well-being. From the agent-relative perspective what 
matters is the conduciveness of rights to protecting o e’s own well-being—either as the 
agent who is the recipient of what the constraint pro ects, or the agent subject to the 
constraint. If one could posit some property or reason that all agents find conducive to their 
well-being, then one will have shown why a theory of rights is rationally encumbent for 
agents since such a property/ reason will be something at everyone has an interest in 
promoting.  
 An interesting theory that attempts to connect the ag nt-relative or personal point of 
view with the agent-neutral or impersonal point of view if that of Thomas Nagel. Nagel 
claims that rights reflect the fact that when an agent harms another agent, the agent-
neutrality of the harm is ‘lit up’ from the agent’s point of view (Nagel 1986, 180). The pain 
that might be caused to a child is agent-neutrally understandable; yet, the fact that I 
intentionally cause it rather than someone else magnifies the disvalue from my perspective. 
This means that rights have an agent-relative component and an agent-neutral one—the 
intention and the harm caused, respectively. Nagel says that this blending allows us to see 
how the following case can be solved: Imagine that only by twisting an innocent child’s 
arm can I prevent a somewhat greater evil to my stranded friends. Because the harm to the 
child is intended and the harm to one’s friends merely foreseen one should not twist the 
child’s arm because one would be causing that harm intentionally. The intentional 
perspective of one’s causing the harm versus just foreseeing the to one’s friends  means 
that one cannot cause the child harm even though, he says, from the impersonal perspective 
things will be better overall if one’s friends are not harmed.  
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 But as Mack (1989) notes, this theory seems to make rights dependent upon some 
kind of calculus of value, because if one didn’t twist the child’s arm then things would be 
better off for oneself (since they are your friends) and just in general since fewer persons 
have been harmed. But because of the magnifying effect of one’s intention, it is better that 
one’s friends suffer and the child is not harmed. But if the latter situation is better overall 
then why does it not over rule the magnifications of one’s intentions? The answer seems to 
be that the agent-relative disvalue for one of twisting the child’s arm rules out his 
performing the twisting in order to save his friends from harm. But why exactly does one’s 
intention magnify the disvalue, especially when preventing harm to one’s friends would 
have a heavy agent-relative value? And it might also be asked what if a third party was 
going to harm the child in order to save my friends? I hould protect the girl against the 
harm, but since I am not doing the harm, the harm cannot be lit up from my perspective.3  
 Both virtue ethics and consequentialist theories also have a hard time accounting for 
rights. 
  An act or rule consequentialist theory would tellan agent to do that act or rule 
which gives him the most pleasure. Practical reason w uld tell each agent to do what best 
promotes his own pleasure. But then how do we get rul s that give us something equivalent 
to the deontological claim that stealing is wrong? The usual consequentialist move is to 
bring out the Golden rule: “the requirement that what we say we ought to do to others we 
have to be able to say ought to be done to ourselve were we precisely in their situation 
with their interests. And this leads to a way of moral reasoning (Utilitarianism) which treats 
                                                
3 Mack (1999) notes that the problems with intentionally –based accounts of rights should make us think 
twice about trying to base constraints on double-eff ct type reasoning. The addition of intention to the
explanation of why we ought not to violate someone’s rights does not turn an action that was not 
condemnable into one that is condemnable. Intention may may make the action more condemnable, but it is 
not sufficient to turn one that is not blameworthy into one that is blameworthy.   
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the equal interests of all as having equal weight”(Hare 1998, 165). The inference from each 
agent has reason to promote his own well-being (pleasure) to the claim that each has reason 
to promote the aggregate well-being (pleasure) is a notorious one. The reasoning relies 
upon the idea that if one has a reason to prefer a more pleasurable state than a less 
pleasurable one then one ought to be motivated to make sure that another have a more 
pleasurable state than a less pleasurable one. An example is that if I have reason to prefer a 
better quality restaurant over a lesser quality one in t rms of the quality or quantity of 
pleasure I receive from the better one, then what mat ers here is the pleasurable states 
(Mack 1999, 92). If one has a choice between going to the lesser quality restaurant and 
allowing another to go the better quality one, then one should allow the other the 
experience of the better quality restaurant if he will receive greater overall pleasure from it. 
Smart argued that the reason one has for preferring the better quality restaurant in both 
cases is the same: the reason why one chooses the res aurant in both cases is the greater 
pleasure produced. It does not matter whose pleasur it is. The consequentialist then can 
move from reasons that an agent has to prefer his own pleasure to reasons why agents will 
prefer favouring that others also have greater state  of pleasure. An agent will be willing to 
forego a state of lesser pleasure to enable another to enjoy a greater state of pleasure. 
All one need do to get a theory of constraints is show how certain actions or rules 
lead to greater states of overall pleasure. We may adopt a rule against stealing not because 
it harms any particular agent but because it leads to an overall lessening of pleasure. The 
‘deontic’ force of an obligation need not be accounted for in terms of harm to another, but 
in terms of obligations that are generally conducive to society’s well-being. As Kagan says: 
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…a suitably sophisticated value theory could be used to mimic the various 
other commonsense constraints as well. (Presumably it would do this by 
giving direct and significant weight to acts of harm doing, acts of lying, acts 
of promise breaking, and so forth…). Loosely speaking, we might say that 
sophisticated consequentialism successfully mimics constraints, without 
actually endorsing them, by incorporating constrain v olations directly into 
its theory of the good (Kagan 1998, 216). 
 
 
The usual criticism against this consequentialist attempt to mimic deontological constraints 
is that it fails to capture the harm done in situatons where overall utility can be promoted 
by harming an agent. As Douglas Oderberg puts it: “The best the consequentialist…can 
come up with, then, are prima facie duties not to interfere with the actions of others, and to 
these duties correspond prima facie claims which he calls ‘rights,’ but they are no more 
than one ingredient in the melting pot of maximization, liable to sacrifice whenever the 
overall, impersonal and agent-neutral good demands it (Oderberg 2000, 73). But the point I 
want to make is that on the agent relative theory of value one cannot universalize the claim 
that one person’s pleasure gives him a reason to act thereby giving him reason to act to 
give away his pleasure/ good to another. Given the agent-relative theory of value we saw 
that what is universalized is the fact that just as one’s own good gives one a legitimate 
reason to act, so too does another’s good give him a legitimate reason to act. But this does 
not allow us to infer that the two sorts of goods have some underlying quality that allows 
one to conclude that an agent would be rational to give up his ‘lesser’ good in order for 
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another agent to have a ‘greater’ amount of it. So, the consequentialist account of rules is 
implausible because there is no common standard for assigning weight to acts of lying, 
theft, etc., so no way to say why and to what degre tradeoffs required by the value-based 
constraints are justified.   
But the virtue ethicist qua agent-relativist fairs l ttle better in accounting for the 
obligations that other’s moral lives may seem to impose on one. As Rosalind Hurtshouse 
states: “According to virtue ethics…what is wrong with lying, when it is wrong, is not that 
it is unjust (‘because it violates someone’s ‘right to he truth’ or their ‘right to be treated 
with respect’) but that it is dishonest, and dishonesty is a vice. What is wrong with killing, 
when it is wrong, may not be so much that it is unjust, violating the right to life, but, 
frequently, that it is callous and contrary to the virtue of charity” (Hursthouse 1999, 6). It 
does seem plausible to argue that the problem with lying is that violates one’s own sense of 
integrity—often the only person harmed when one lies is oneself. But what about wrongful 
killing? It seems that, contrary to Hursthouse, the problem is not so much that one has 
acted without displaying the right virtue (charity) but that one has killed another.4 Virtue 
ethics seems well suited to accommodating agent-rela iv  value, but it also seems just as 
problematic in accounting for the harms done to others in a way not based simply on 
failings in one’s own character. Any plausible account of rights must take into 
consideration the nature of rights as relational and the nature of harm done to others. 
I should pause to note here that while the agent relativ  theory of value claims that 
we have reasons for not doing what will maximize ovrall good or for not doing acts that 
will be cases of universalizing some goal in a Kantian sense, this is not because agent-
relative values only make it permissible to prefer ou good to the general public’s, or some 
                                                
4 One has ‘taken away all a man has, all he ever will have’ as Eastwood says in Unforgiven. 
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stranger’s; we can look after our own happiness, or tend to the needs of our selves or loved 
ones over those of a stranger not because it is permissible to do these things in the face of 
some rule that calls for them to be maximized or universalized, but because we really 
cannot find such impersonal rules. So saying that agent-relative value is an agent-relative 
concern that makes it permissible to prefer our values in the face of rules that would 
otherwise call for us to do something different is mi leading. There are no such utilitarian 
or Kantian rules that would force us to do something different were we not able to act upon 
our agent-centered considerations. But this is not to say that we cannot refer to our agent-
relative values as giving us agent-centered considerations that we want to have protected in 
the face of others’ desires for us to do what they want. What we need to find is not why we 
have rights not to do what impersonal value tells us to do, but why we have rights 
protecting us against what others’ agent-relative considerations tell them we ought to do.       
It seems that two basic defenses are open to the theorist who wishes to account for 
the acceptability of rights or constraints in terms of agent-relative reasons5: One can defend 
the agent well-being view, in which the source of P2’s rights against P1 that P1 abide by 
them is the conduciveness to P1’s well-being in abiding by those constraints (Mack 1998a, 
4); or one could argue that what really matters is the well-being of the recipient of the 
rights, or recipient of the constraints on P1’s action: so the source of P2’s rights against P1 
that P1 abide by those constraints is rights conduciveness to P2’s well-being (Mack 1998a, 
4). Both theories attempt to show that rights are tied to the well-being of agents such that it 
seems rationally encumbent upon one to accept constrai t  since doing so is conducive 
either to one’s own well-being, or to another’s. Both views can be laid out as follows: 
                                                




P2’s having a right against P1=  (Agent well-being view) P1 is obligated and has 
reason to abide by a constraint C1 (a correlative to P2’s right) iff P1’s obligating 
reason(s) for abiding by C1 is explained in terms of what is conducive to P1’s well-
being. 
 
P2’s having a right against P1 = (Recipient well-being view) P1 is obligated and has 
reason to abide by a constraint C1 (a correlative to P2’s right) iff P1’s obligating 
reason(s) for abiding by C1 is explained in terms of what is conducive to P2’s well-
being.   
  
The agent well-being account of rights will attempt to make P1’s reasons for abiding by C1 
as something that obliges because abiding by C1 is actually conducive to his well-being.  
This account seems plausible precisely because of its logic—it appeals to something that 
will motivate P1 into accepting a doctrine of rights by making abiding by C1 conducive to 
his well-being; while P1 may not have reason to value the state of affairs that P2’s right 
protects (because this need only be a state of affairs v luable for P2), he may have reason to 
abide by C1 if it can be argued that C1 is really an obligation he has to his own well-being. 
The agent recipient well-being view seems plausible because it claims that the correlative 
obligation of P2’s right (C1) holds independently of, and need not be simply contingent 
upon, agent-relative reasons that P1 may have for abiding by it. The recipient well-being 
view focuses on the idea that P2’s rights may give rise to correlative duties that impose 
constraints on P1 independently of what P1’s well-being gives him reason to promote. I will 
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argue that both views fail to account for the nature of rights: the agent well-being view, like 
versions of Kantian constraints, makes obligations t  oneself primary and hence cannot 
fully account for P1’s abiding by C1 as a recognition of the independent moral status of P2; 
it is this status that gives rise to P1’s obligation and not P1’s obligation to his own well-
being. The recipient view, like versions based on agent-neutral value and weightings, 
makes obligations to others as primary and perhaps olding independently of one’s 
obligations to oneself, but in doing so makes it hard to account for why P1 is motivated to 
abide by an obligation that is related to another agent’s well-being, not his own.  
 
§4.2 Doing Without Rights Talk?  So far we have been talking about rights as if there is 
some need for them. But if we think that what is important is the value of the underlying 
property they protect, or the value of their correlative obligations to the person subject to 
them, then maybe rights talk is noting more than a roundabout way of talking about the 
good. In his book What’s The Matter With Liberalism, Ronald Beiner argues that “the 
substance of rights is drawn from the sphere of the good, [so that] we can dispense with the 
whole argument over rights and revert directly to the conceptions of the good that 
originally ground these otherwise mysterious rights” (Beiner 1995, 89). Rights function as 
claims not open to debate or compromise. He remarks that anyone who wants to be heard 
today in the political arena must locate—or invent—some right that protects what one 
thinks is one’s due (Beiner 1995, 81). Beiner argues that posing one’s claim in terms of 
rights (viz., not open to being trumped by someone els ’s claim) makes conflicts more 
intractable; rather, we ought to look at issues in terms of what is good, since such 
considerations admit of being open to weighting andcompromise. So given the value-
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based nature of rights, they may not be absolute claims after all since all can be weighted 
and compared endlessly in terms of value to see how t ey can be ranked and what tradeoffs 
are rational. There may even be cases where the rigt not to be tortured must be disallowed 
if some greater good is to be achieved.  
Firstly, I think that the claim that turning to notions of the good as a way of solving 
social problems may not be less tractable than relying on rights. In arguing that rights talk 
is merely a strategic way to make sure one’s own values will prevail without 
counterargument, Beiner might be said to face the same problem as rights theorists face: 
since rights are really a covert way of talking about ne’s values, one wonders why rights 
disagreements should be so intractable if what really underlies them are values that are 
open to reasonable discussion? Obviously the answer Beiner wants to consider is that rights 
talk erects barriers because of how rights claims are structured; but one might also argue 
that perhaps value talk is just as intractable, hence when switched to may erect the same 
sorts of barriers to conflict resolution. So if rights talk is really about value talk, then the 
whole problem of intractable conflict may re-enter d pending on whether people stick to 
their values as unconditionally as Beiner thinks they stick to their rights. If rights talk is 
really talk about values, then people could be saidto be sticking to their rights because they 
really weight the underlying values heavily—perhaps not open to debate. So values may or 
may not be as open to weighting as Beiner thinks—dissolving rights talk in favour of talk 
of the good may just move the whole problem of conflict back a step. The status of rights 
as absolute or not will be discussed later, and we may resist the inference that if rights are 
value-based then they lose their absolute nature, bt what is important for this chapter is 
not his claim that talk about rights will lose its compelling (non-conditional) appeal if such 
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talk can always be transposed into the language of the good—but simply the idea that such 
a transposition is possible.  
He claims “anything that can be legitimately couched in the language of rights can 
be transposed into the language of the good” (Beiner 1995, 82). Rights have no 
independent force of their own; rather they are just covert ways of talking about values that 
underlie them. If liberals claim that people have rights to autonomy, then this notion can be 
transposed into talk about the value of autonomy for agents. In trying to settle debates 
between the rights of a fetus to live versus the rights of a woman to ‘dispose’ of her body 
as she wishes we must settle the debate by appealing to more substantial questions: “What 
warrants rights in general? And this question carries us, willy-nilly, into the language of 
good” (Beiner 1995, 93). This is not to say that one does not need a theory of constraints, 
but any theory about why an agent is not to interfer  with another’s right to autonomy or 
life will be explicable in terms of the respective alue of autonomy to a woman, or the 
value of life to a fetus. It may be that if there is a need to explain and justify rights or moral 
constraints in terms of the value of what they protect hen rights talk becomes otiose since 
what is important is the underlying question of value; therefore, contrary to what rights 
theorists wish to do in making rights bypass question  of value, it becomes necessary if one 
wants to solve rights disputes to talk about which substantive value is to trump the other. 
This latter idea is what Beiner claims follows when we dissolve rights talk into that of the 
good. The problem for liberals then is to explain why their preferred values (which underlie 
liberal rights) trump other values when rights are supposed to be a neutral, or non-value –
based way, of solving disputes. The general idea to be advanced later is that if rights talk 
need not be reducible to talk of the value for an agent of that which they protect and, 
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therefore, that rights—even though they are normative—need not be justified in terms of 
the value of that which they protect, then one willhave an answer to this seeming paradox. 
But for now we will examine his claim that rights-talk does nothing substantially different 
from value-talk. 
As an illustration of the implausibility of Beiner’s claim that rights talk is 
dispensable, we will look at a view that seems to assimilate the concept of having a right 
with that of doing what is right. Henry Veatch’s view that rights are grounded in natural 
duties we owe ourselves assimilates reduces rights to cases of doing what is right. Veatch’s 
view is meant to provide a way of connecting or coordinating one agent’s good with 
another agent’s duties to abide by rights. It will be shown that there are good reasons for 
not conflating the two—hence, also not thinking that rights talk is dispensable because the 
work that it does is different from talk of the good, or value.  
Veatch’s (1989) argument for rights runs like this: Since we have duties of self-
perfection specified by our natural function, each of us is required by nature to fulfill these 
obligations. “To prevent or interfere with a person’  efforts to fulfill his natural obligations 
deprives that person of what he and others recognize he ought to do. Therefore, our duty to 
self-perfection generates the right not to have the pursuit of our end impeded” (Den Uyl 
and Rasmussen 1991, 108). This view has the benefit it seems of asserting that no one has 
the right to interfere with our end. So it would seem that we have moved from the good 
construed as what values individuals have a duty to promote for themselves to a notion of 
why other agents must constrain their behaviour in relation to these duty-bound agents—
the basic reason is that there is no real difference between P2’s having a right to be left 
alone in, say, contemplating the good life and it be ng right that P2 contemplate the good 
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life; and the reason why P1 has a reason to abide by a constraint protecting P2’s right is that 
P1 can see that P2 is doing something good with his time. Veatch’s characterization of 
rights is an example of the coordinate view of rights since the reason why P1 has reason to 
abide by P2’s rights is not that it is only good for the rights holder or only the rights bearer, 
but that doing so is a means to both agent’s good.   
But as Den Uyl and Rasmussen point out there are several problems with trying to 
assimilate the concept of having rights with that of d ing what is right. The first problem 
would seem to be that Veatch’s argument commits what they call the moralist fallacy: this 
is the fallacy of moving from claims regarding what is right for someone to do, to the 
further claim that he has a right to do it. This is a fallacy because what one has a right to do 
may not be right for him; nor need it be true that what is right for him means he has a right 
to do it. What if P2 is not pursuing the life of virtue and decides to live a life of hedonism? 
Why would P1 not have the right to interfere with P2 either to put him back on the path to 
virtue, or just to use him for his own means? Veatch does not claim that P1 has the right to 
interfere, but if he does not it is not because he would be interfering with P2’s rights. Since 
P2 has decided not to pursue the good life, and even though he may not interfere in anyone 
else’s life, he has forfeited his rights since it is only his pursuing what is right that 
generates a real obligation on the part of others not to interfere. The moralist fallacy is 
committed when one fails to see that having a right has a broader extension than doing or 
being in pursuit of what is right (Den Uyl & Rasmussen 1991, 109). Rights are not 
dependent upon an actual achievement of what is right, but only the potential for such 
achievement.  
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A second problem is the weakness inherent in the infere ce that P2’s obligation to 
his own well-being is sufficient to generate constraints on the part of others. P1’s 
recognizing that P2 is doing something that he is obligated to do by his natural end need not 
give P1 reason not to interfere with P2’s promoting his own good. This is the main problem 
with the agent well-being claim that P1 will have reason to abide by P2’s rights since doing 
so is conducive to P2’s well-being: P2’s well-being may give rise to obligations that hinder 
P1 from promoting his own well-being—so whose well-being is to take precedence? As we 
have seen with the transmissibility of practical reason, P1’s obligations are agent-relative 
reasons for him to pursue his good; but the fact that his good gives him reason to act, need 
not also give anyone else reason not to interfere with him.   
Also such an argument would lead to this strange result: if P2 strays from the path 
of virtue then he has interfered with his own rights. His right to autonomy is based on 
autonomy’s being right for him. As David Norton argues, the reason why we have a right 
to autonomy is that it is right that we exercise autonomy (Norton 1995, 110). But then if 
one fails in this obligation to cultivate a certain degree of autonomy it would seem that he 
has interfered with his own rights since his rights are derived from obligations he owes 
himself and need not specify to whom they are owed. This claim seems odd because it fails 
to account for the relational nature of rights—rights are specifically about obligations that 
others owe us or we them, not obligations we owe to ourselves.  
As Den Uyl and Rasmussen conclude, the main problem with the assimilationist 
approach of Beiner, Norton and Veatch is their failure to recognize that the duty expressed 
by the concept of rights may not be similar to other moral duties one has (Den Uyl and 
Rasmussen 1991, 110). For Veatch and Norton’s perfectionist account of rights, there are 
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only duties and obligations one owes oneself; and so persons do not have rights in any 
irreducible sense—as generating obligations on the part of others not to interfere with one’s 
life, whether it is a‘flourishing’ life or not. According to Veatch if an agent engages in 
nonperfecting conduct then the actions “that he taks and the conduct that he pursues are 
then no longer right at all; nor can his natural rights to life, liberty, and property be said to 
entitle him so to live in the way he has foolishly and unwisely chosen to do” (Veatch 1989, 
205). Similarly, Norton argues that one does not have the right to incommensurate goods—
viz., more goods than one can use in the utilization of one’s potential worth. “To possess 
such goods is to live with a perpetual distraction fr m one’s true course in life. If one 
succumbs to this distraction, one’s actualization of one’s own potential worth is 
compromised” (Norton 1995, 128). But to argue in this way is to make the concept of 
rights redundant; all one needs is the concept of what is right and one’s duty to do what is 
right. The assimilationist argument speaks as if talk about rights can be reduced to two 
other ideas (Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1991, 110-11): 1. To say that P2 has a right to X-ing 
is to say that it is right that P2 Xs, or that X-ing is necessary to Y-ing, which is right for P2 
to do; and, 2.) It is in virtue of the rightness of P2’s X-ing, or that X-ing is necessary to Y-
ing which is right, that P1 has the duty not to interfere with P2’s X-ing.  
 So rights must not be too closely connected with any of the particular goods we 
think it is right for people to pursue, or else rights cannot account for the diversity of value 
pluralism; if my right to have freedom to do something depends upon my doing it, then my 
pursuing some other course of action would mean that I might be open to having my 
actions manipulated to put me back on the course to virtue. This flies in the face of the fact 
that there are many different kinds of reasonable good lives. In order for rights to protect 
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this fact they must be based upon some feature that is right for us—a feature whose 
rightness does not cancel out too many other good lives, or allow for paternalist 
manipulation of those who are not pursuing our own valued lives.  
 
§4.3 Converging Interests and Contract. It might be thought that if we can assume that 
everyone has a reason to want his rights protected that he will also have a reason to abide 
by others’ rights. But this on its own does not allow us to infer that each rational agent then 
has reason to value a world in which everyone is accorded rights. The reason why this is a 
bad argument for the acceptability of rights is that it commits the fallacy of composition. 
As Lomasky remarks it is equivalent to the following: Each runner in the race desires that 
he come in first; for every runner it is desired that that runner come in first; therefore, it is 
desired that every runner come in first (Lomasky 1987, 60). From the fact that every 
runner, or agent, wishes that he be accorded first place (or rights), it does not follow that 
there be a runner who wishes that every runner come in first place (or have rights). We 
cannot combine in the conclusion what is separate in he premises.  
Yet, having pointed out that it would be hard for the agent well being view to show 
why we all have consistent reason to abide by others’ rights, this does not mean that it is 
impossible to show that there might be some agent-rela ive reason we all have for 
conceding each others’ rights. We need to argue that we have reason to want our own 
rights protected and that we also have reason to abide by others’ rights. The next chapter 
will attempt to spell out how such an agent well being argument could work. 
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§4.4 Coordinate View of Rights. This chapter was meant to explore this idea and has found 
it problematic. If one were to assume some agent-neu ral value that requires everyone to 
follow it, then we might have a norm that could explain why rights are valuable. But even 
though the agent-neutral theory was rejected in favour of the agent-relative theory, there is 
still the problem that an agent-neutral conception of value would seem to call for the value 
a right protects to be minimized in cases where one could infringe one person’s right to 
prevent five more infringements. This is counter-intuitive because if one has a right 
because of some property F, then F cannot be infringed even to prevent further 
infringements of it. This goes against an agent’s imperative to pursue his good life. Rights 
must recognize this imperative but, as we have seen, th y also must recognize the 
imperatives of others, the moral separateness of others. 
The solution might seem to require that a theory of rights both recognize the 
imperative to pursue one’s own good and the moral separateness of others—a separateness 
that calls for recognition no matter how it affects the pursuit of one’s values. The 
alternative to making rights dependent on the value of them to the recipient or subject of 
them is what Mack terms the co-ordinate account (Mack 1998a): 
  
P2’s having a right against P1 = (Co-ordinate View) P1 has reason and is 
obligated in relation to P2 to abide by a constrain C1 (a correlative of P2’s 
right) iff P1’s obligation to abide by C1 is explained in terms of how abiding 
by C1 is conducive to P1’s good and also how abiding by C1 is a way for P1 
to recognize the separate moral existence of P2. 
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One may have reason for thinking that rights can make use of both the agent and 
recipient perspectives if they can be reconciled somehow. This reconciliation would require 
a theory that showed how an agent has from his agent-relative perspective a right to pursue 
his own good, but also provide a theory that showed how others have rights because they 
have a separate moral existence. Ideally, this viewwould ‘coordinate’ both perspectives 
without subordinating one to the other (Mack 1998a, 5). In the next chapter we will see if 
there is something about the agent-relative perspective that makes it rationally encumbent 
upon one to accept rights that protect one’s own imperative to pursue one’s good, and also 
makes it rationally encumbent to recognize the moral separateness of others.  
   
§4.5 Conclusion. This chapter has examined the value of rights from an agent-relative and 
agent-neutral perspective. We have been concerned to answer the question what reasons an 
agent might have to respect the rights of others. This problem has traditionally been spelt 
out in Kantian terms as a dilemma of practical reason. As Lomasky puts it: 
  
If one’s motivations to cede moral space to others is understood as in any way a 
function of one’s concern for those others, that is, if it involves my taking what is a 
value-for-them as thereby being a value-for-me, then t re is nothing distinctively 
moral about one’s response to them. Rather, one is…efficintly pursuing one’s 
ends. Or, as Kant would put it, this is an instance of the exercise of practical reason, 
but not of pure practical reason. On the other hand, if the purity of one’s practical 
reason is impeccable in the sense that the circumstances of one’s valuing or 
disvaluing an outcome is studiously excluded from one’s reason to act, the 
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difficulty becomes to understand how such reason can be practical. What reason do 
I have not to encroach on the moral space of others if such restraint neither directly 
nor indirectly is a product of what I find to be of personal value (Lomasky 1989, 
121)? 
 
We need a theory that can recognize both the agent’s need for rights to pursue his own 
good and also reasons for recognizing the rights of others when doing so may not be part of 
what constitutes our good. We theorized that the coordinate view would both explain why 
others have reason to abide by our rights and why we have reason to abide by other’s rights 
because of a reason or reasons for doing this. A theory of rights must show why we have 
reason to find rights beneficial and to demand that others accept them, but also why others 
have reason to demand that we accept their rights. Prima facie, this might seem like half of 
the co-ordinate view is concerned with practical reson, because it deals with our agent-
relative reasons for wanting our rights protected, and the other half pure practical reason, 
because it deals with practical reasons that are someh w about why we ought to abide by 
other’s rights but not because we have an interest in doing so. Yet, it remains to be seen 
whether we need to introduce a dualism into the co-ordinate view. Next chapter we will 
face this question regarding Mack’s attempt to co-ordinate self-interested actions with 
one’s that cannot be self-interested in order to explain why we have reason to abide by 
other’s rights.  
 Also, we can see in a clearer way why rights are a domain of their own. What is 
significant about rights is that they protect the pers ectives of the persons who can exercise 
them. Rights are the recognition of the fact that individuals are the agents who make and 
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choose lives of their own. For some theories of value, ike consequentialism and 
Kantianism, the individual is not important for what kind of obligations he can have, since 
what obligations are important are decided by impersonal reasoning. But if we accept the 
agent relative view of value, then we can appreciat individuals become much more 
important for defining the nature of obligations. By ‘important’ we do not need to think of 
importance from the point of view of the universe. Importance refers to the fact that having 
one’s ability to pursue a good life is important for everyone from their own perspective. 
Whether there is some common feature we all care about that underlies all the various good 

















§5.1 Rights, Coordination, and Agent-Relativity. 






§5.0 Intro. So far the last few chapters have dealt with the conceptual issues surrounding a 
theory of rights. This chapter will seek to provide a justificatory explanation of rights that 
takes account of the conceptual constraints outlined  Chapter Four and the theory of value 
in Chapters Two and Three. There is a controversy whether respect for others’ rights need 
to be based upon agent–relative reasons or whether we can have a coordination of reasons. 
As Mack argues, the affirmation of rights as robust constraints is, 
  
undercut by the ‘obligation to self’ account of rights, according to which one’s 
reason for acknowledging rights is entirely a matter of acknowledgment of and 
compliance with these moral claims being instrumental for and partially constitutive 
of one’s own prescribed ends. The affirmation of rights as moral side- constraints 
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can only be grounded and preserved by an account of rights in which the existence 
of other agents as beings with a moral status one must recognize, plays a more 
fundamental role (Mack 1993, 96).  
   
For Mack, any theory of robust rights—rights as a domain separate from value—cannot 
“affirm the side-constraint character of rights without affirming that these constraints 
fundamentally reflect, for each constrained agent, the moral status of other rational agents” 
(Mack ibid.). It seems that in order to recognize th  moral status of others, a theory of 
rights will take into account the harm done to the rights-holder when rights are violated and 
not simply explain the harm that rights violations cause in terms of the harm done to the 
integrity or well being of the perpetrator.  
 The problem so far seems to be this: We can base respect for rights on agent-
relative reasons, and thereby risk concluding that rights are nothing but duties to 
ourselves—which do not provide agents sufficient reason to abide by rights when doing so 
conflicts with their own good; or we can try to argue for a coordinate view of rights, which 
means that ‘deontic’ reasons for respecting rights have a different, stronger source of moral 
obligation than do our agent-relative reasons for pr moting our own good. But in the 
following chapter I will argue that we have good reason to reject the coordinate view 
because its requirements would require us to have two sources of moral obligation; and 
having two sources of moral obligation makes it hard to understand how the two sources 
are coordinated with each other, and why one source can trump the other one when they 
prescribe conflicting actions. It was argued last chapter that the agent well being view is 
problematic, but it also fits best with the requirements that our main motivations will be 
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agent-relative in nature. If we can have an agent rela ive reason for why respecting others’ 
rights will in general promote our good (agent well being), then this gives agents a 
principled reason for abiding by others’ rights.  
The argument for rights will be as follows. First, following Mack, we will see that 
agents have reasonable prerogatives to both having space to pursue their good lives and to 
having a second prerogative that protects the reasons for the first prerogative. But rather 
than following Mack in asserting that agents have a r ason for abiding by other’s rights 
because other agents have the status of ends in themselves apart from us, I will argue that 
agents are possessors of themselves and it is having  r ght to protection of this factor that 
gives us reason to abide by others’ rights. Since we each have an agent-relative interest in 
making sure that we can continue to promote our owngood, we will also have reason to 
abide by others’ rights when doing so helps us promote our good. I will argue that we can 
find that it is a wise policy to adopt the general principle of abiding by rights because doing 
so is more likely to allow a person to promote his self-interest than is abiding by rights on a 
case-by-case basis. The rest of the chapter will defen  the above argument by examining 
what self-possession is, why our right is based upon our being the first possessor of 
ourselves based on finders keepers, and how this right can survive Rawlsian criticisms that 
natural abilities ought to be divided between all agents. I will argue that we have reasons to 
think that a right to self-possession is based in a consideration of the moral default position 
of first come first served. Of course this and the next chapter do not attempt to present a 
full theory of rights, but rather attempt to show why agents have reason to concede others 
their rights, which fits with the scope of the task of this thesis.  
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§5.1 Rights, Coordination, and Agent-relativity. The explanation of value that is both 
agent-relative and plural forces us into thinking that each person’s life possesses for him 
ultimate incommensurable value. Therefore, a theory of ights will need to take this aspect 
of human existence into account by accounting for the prerogative we have to pursue our 
own good lives (Mack 2000, 73). This means a theory of rights will need to explain and be 
based on agents’ partiality for pursuing their own good. In this section, using Eric Mack’s 
terminology, I will argue that this feature of human existence can be made sense of via the 
idea of prerogatives and restrictions. Restrictions will be those constraints that are called 
for to protect our or others’ prerogatives; and prerogatives are those agent-centred reasons 
we have to pursue our own good and have the pursuit of that good protected by constraints 
on others.     
We have seen in the preceding chapters that there is a presumption in favour of an 
agent being able to pursue his own good. The first thesis of practical reason and ARV are 
meant to show how values are connected to an agent in such a way that practical reason 
and value only make sense when conceived of as relative to an agent’s desires, needs, etc. 
This gives us a reason to claim a prerogative (P1) in favour of the agent pursuing his own 
good in contrast to theories that claim he should devote himself to the pursuit of others’ 
good, or overall good, etc.6 Agents will have reason then to want a further preogative that 
allows them to pursue their own good unhindered by others (P2).  
  So assuming the plausibility of P1—the idea that we have freedom from always 
directing our actions to pursuing the good of others or society—we now must explain how 
we arrive at P2—the prerogative asserting that one ca not be used or forced by other 
                                                
6 This is Eric Mack’s argument (2005) for restrictions from prerogatives; of course the interpretation is my 
own.  
 100 
agents to do what is in their, or the overall, good. The reason is that if one assumes the first 
prerogative asserting that an agent is rational and justified in assigning more weight to his 
own good, then in order for this prerogative to be carried out it is also rational and justified 
to claim that others may not use him in certain ways. If others can treat him always as a 
means to their ends, then his prerogative is meaningless. So in order for the first 
prerogative to be coherent—for an agent not to have to devote himself to the pursuit of 
other’s good—the second prerogative is needed to make sure the first one obtains. In order 
for P1 to make sense then we also need to posit P2, which asserts his prerogative not to be 
used by others for their own ends. 
If A has a prerogative both to pursue his own good an  not to be used by others in 
the pursuit of their good, in order for these prerogatives to obtain others must face 
restrictions on their behaviour. The rationale for the prerogatives is the recognition of the 
presumption that the good is always an agent’s own good. Without introducing restrictions 
we cannot be sure that the rationale for the prerogatives will be recognized (Mack 2005). 
So restrictions are necessary in order for the prerogatives to obtain; without restrictions that 
actually protect an agent against being forced to pursue the overall good, or others’ good, 
or even being forced by others to do what produces th  best overall consequences, an 
agent’s prerogatives do not hold.  
So Mack’s argument seems plausible to the extent that it can show that P2 is 
necessary for realizing P1, and that both of these prerogatives need to be protected by 
restrictions against others.7 Of course just showing that one has these two prerogatives that 
follow from the first thesis of practical reason only gives us one side of the story—it seems 
                                                
7 Jan Narveson notes that rather than there being two distinct prerogatives, the second prerogative is just 
another way of looking at the first one. So, it might be the case that what we have is just two ways of stating 
the same thing. But I do not think that it makes a large difference for Mack’s argument if this is the case.  
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Mack has succeeded in showing that we have reasons to want restrictions for ourselves 
because they (in the form of rights) are protective of the pursuit of our own good. But these 
prerogatives do not yet show why any of us have reason to respect other’s rights. He claims 
that the reason we have reason to be committed to respecting others’ rights is that doing so 
is a way of recognizing the moral separateness of others. As a rational agent one is able to 
see that other agents like him are also moral agents, with separate ends of their own. 
Mack’s recognition argument has two parts—firstly, just the bare ability for rational agents 
to see one another as ends in themselves must have some practical significance for how we 
treat others; and secondly, the proper response for rational agents is to treat others as ends 
in themselves.  
The practical significance claim is basically the id a that we will be disposed to 
treat moral agents differently than we would treat nonmoral agents based on the fact that 
others are ends in themselves, not because of what they value. He argues, “For Anna to 
possess a deontic reason to contour her behavior toward Bella in certain ways, it must be 
the fact of Bella’s existence as a being with ultimate purposes of her own and not the value 
of that existence or of what derives from it—whether that value be agent-neutral or agent-
relative—that provides Anna with the reason in question” (Mack 1993, 111). So rather than 
appealing to a common value that we possess that might ake us treat others as ends in 
themselves, he appeals to “some form of failure in rationality in an individual who 
acknowledges that others are each separate beings wth rational ends of their own but 
insists that this has no practical significance for him, that it has no rational impact on how 
he ought to behave” (Mack 1993, ibid.). Of course th  rational response might just be a 
strategic one, so that when one is faced with other rational agents one adjusts one’s 
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behaviour accordingly to best acquire what one wants in his situation. But why is this an 
inappropriate response to other moral agents? Mack argues that the appropriate response in 
this situation is to adjust the way you pursue your wn values in order to fully recognize 
the moral status of others. He claims, “The deontic dimension of practical reason constrains 
conduct, not by directing it to (or away from) certain outcomes, but rather by restricting the 
permissible routes to whatever outcomes are pursued…. Only by constraining your conduct 
towards others can you give expression to your otherwis  inchoate affirmation of their 
existence as beings with ultimately valuable ends of their own” (Mack 1993, 115). When 
one recognizes that others are ends in themselves, on  must come to the realization on 
penalty of failure of rationality that others are no longer available to service one’s own 
ends (Mack 1993, 116). In this way Mack tries to make the appropriate response to the 
existence of others that they are off limits to ourmachinations because we can identify 
them as beings like ourselves who are ends in themselves.  
Mack’s argument is plausible and makes rights a variant of the coordinate view8, 
because agents are obligated to abide by restraints that are correlative to both agents’ well-
being. Mack doesn’t want respect for rights to be based on what he calls an obligation to 
self argument9 because this will mean that we only respect the rights of others to the extent 
that doing so is conducive to one’s own well-being. Yet, it seems that Mack erects his own 
form of an obligation-to-self argument by claiming that when agents do not properly 
recognize the existence of others they are failing n a duty to themselves to be rational. For 
                                                
8 Co-ordinate model of rights: A’s having a right against B = B has reason and is obligated in relation to A to 
abide by a constraint C1 (a correlative of A’s right) iff B’s obligation to abide by C1 is explained in terms of 
how abiding by C1 is conducive to B’s good and also how the act of abiding by C1 is a way of B’s 
recognizing the separate moral status of A. 
9 Here I should note that by ‘obligation to self’, Mack just means one’s own desire to promote one’s values. 
To say one has an obligation to self means simply that one has an agent-relative reason or interest in doing 
something.   
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Mack we must have an obligation to ourselves to be rational. So it seems that we cannot 
escape some kind of obligation to self argument—either as a moral or rational obligation to 
oneself to abide by others’ rights. If the argument is an obligation to self argument, then we 
must also admit that the reason to be rational is an agent-relative one. It cannot be non-
agent relative, for it has to be valuable, even implicitly, for an agent. This argument shows 
us that an obligation to self argument will underlie any claims about why it is we have 
reason to do something. This means we should not be afraid of utilizing an obligation to 
self argument, but must rather make it work to our advantage in showing why agents have 
reason to abide by others’ rights.    
Mack’s recognition argument relies on there being a du lism between the right and 
the good. In order for Mack’s argument to work, he must hold that there are two distinct 
and separable kinds of obligations: Those obligations that one has to pursue one’s own 
good, and those obligations one has to respect others (D n Uyl & Rasmussen 1993, 124). 
The benefit of adopting such a dualism would seem to be that it allows us to say that 
obligations one owes to others can be stronger and trump those obligations one owes to 
oneself, hence paving the way for a theory of rights as strong side constraints. This means 
that there is not a single source of moral obligation, since at least two are needed: One to 
account for the first principle of practical reason and another to account for the obligation 
to treat others as moral ends in themselves. But the problem with this view is to account for 
which obligation takes precedence, especially when agents are said to be obligated to 
follow the first principle of practical reason that prescribes one’s own good comes first. He 
does not think that a shared value can do the job of showing why we have reason to 
recognize the rights of others because such a value–bas d reason would only be a way of 
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recognizing our own good, which may or may not be reason for abiding by other’s rights. 
But we would do better to avoid such dualism because it brings up its own set of problems: 
Which level is to trump the other and why? How do the good and the right relate to each 
other? My own view is that we only need to find one factor that appeals to agents, and that 
is implicit in everyone’s good, in order to ground a system of rights.  
If Mack’s view worked then it might give us robust rights because we would have 
reasons for constraining ourselves that trumped reasons we have for pursuing our own 
good. But since this view seems to require that we have two sources of moral obligation, it 
is not plausible as a reason for why we will constrain ourselves. Here we need to pause and 
see why agents have a reason to accept a system of rights in the first place. We can agree 
with Mack that rights will be principles that make sure that our second prerogative is 
protected. We cannot make sure that we can pursue our own good unhindered by others 
based either on our invincibility or the kindness of trangers. We are not invincible and so 
must protect ourselves from others; but also, we cannot rely on others not interfering with 
us based on their fondness for us, because often as xperience teaches they won’t be fond 
of us. We must see that rights are a need we all have in common. But we each want our 
own rights guaranteed because we each care about our own good more than we do others. 
So, people will accept other’s rights imposing restrictions on their behaviour if the benefit 
to themselves of recognizing other’s rights exceeds the cost of doing so. 
What motivates people to abide by rights is a normative claim, not simply a factual 
one.10 I am not simply saying that agents desire to continue to promote their good, but that 
they think it’s good that they continue to promote th ir good. This gives us a normative 
                                                
10 For instance, Nozick asserts that since agents are eparate moral agents we need to recognize they have 
moral rights. But it’s not clear how far the factual idea of agents being separate moral ends will get us. 
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premise to begin with in order to understand why agents think that abiding by rights is 
something they will want to do. Agents cannot avoid seeing it as good and as something 
they each ought to accomplish if it leads to the promotion of their good. So I am not just 
holding that each agent desires to continue living, but that each agent can see that his being 
able to continue to live is good. Each agent must see it as good that he continue to live in 
order to promote his own values.    
Furthermore, the claim that each agent thinks it’s good that he continue to promote 
his good is an agent-relative good for that agent. I do not hold that my thinking it’s good to 
continue to promote my ends gives others reasons for wishing to promote my ends too. 
Yet, while my good may not have practical significan e for others, it has practical 
significance for me. And if we can plausibly hold tha  each of us will do better by abiding 
by each other’s rights, then we have a case for thinking that all of us will choose to abide 
by a system of rights.  
Of course there are reasons for thinking that we might not do better by abiding by 
others’ rights. What about Hobbes’ fool who thinks that he can do better in some cases by 
not abiding by rights, or not always abiding by covenants, because to “…not keep 
covenants, [is] not against reason, when it conduce to one’s benefit” (Leviathan chap. 
XV)?11 The fool has a point because there might be times when not respecting someone’s 
right can be more beneficial than respecting it. So, the fool’s challenge is to show him why 
                                                
11 Cf. Plato has Glaucon tell the story about the Ring of Gyges. Gyges the shepherd finds a magical ring that 
allows him the power to become invisible. With the ring he kills the king and marries the king’s wife. The 
moral of the story, Glaucon says, is “that no one is just of his own will but only from constraint, in the belief 
that justice is not his personal good, inasmuch as every man, when he supposes himself to have the powr t  
do wrong, does wrong. Fot that there is far more profit for him personally in injustice than in justice is what 
every man believes…” (Republic 360). I take it that Hobbes’ Fool, The Ring of Gyges, Hume’s knave, etc., 
all have the same point in challenging morality to sh w that it is always in one’s best interest to be moral.   
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he should respect rights when it pays him not to. Why should he respect rights in a 
principled way?  
One answer is to suggest that he should respect others’ rights because, once we 
have an accounting of all the costs and benefits, doing so will always be in a person’s 
overall benefit. It might appear that we can do better by ignoring someone’s rights, but this 
is only an appearance that dissolves once we have taken into consideration the effects of 
doing so on our reputation and other’s willingness to abide by our rights in the future. Yet, 
even though reputation and trust are important, it seems implausible to hold that abiding by 
rights will always promote an agent’s good. “Surely there are some circumstances in which 
breaking a covenant [or right] would do insufficient harm to outweigh the benefits, even 
when all the costs are fully accounted for” (Darwall 1998, 105). So how can we show the 
fool that he ought to abide by others’ rights in geeral, not just on a case-by-case basis? 
Following Hobbes, we can admit that it may be in an agent’s interest not to abide 
by rights sometimes because it would help to promote his good. But the reason why he 
should not is because it is never a wise choice to do so. According to Hobbes, even when it 
might seem beneficial not to abide by another’s rights, we can never really know that it is 
beneficial. Since we can never really know that we will be able to get away with not 
abiding by another’s right, we would do better to av id the risks and costs of doing so by 
simply abiding by the other’s right. As Darwall notes, Hobbes is arguing that the wisdom 
of the choice does not depend upon its actual outcome; Hobbes states: “…that when a man 
doth a thing, which not withstanding any thing can be foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to 
his own destruction, howsoever some accident which e could not expect, arriving may 
turn it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it r asonable or wisely done” (Leviathan 
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chap. XV). The fact that someone can get away with ignoring another’s right does not 
mean that it is wise to try to do so. He did not have reasonable information to conclude that 
he could have got what he wanted by ignoring rights, t erefore it is best to act in 
accordance with one’s reason and not take the chance. “The policy or rule of always 
keeping covenants is a better means, in general, to ny human agent’s self-interest and self-
preservation than is the policy of determining whether to keep covenants on a case-by-case 
basis according to whether doing so is likeliest in that instance to have the best outcome” 
(Darwall 1998, 106). The reason the fool should abide by rights is that doing so will best 
enable him to continue to promote his own good. So, he (and each agent) will need to see 
that acting on a general principle or rule about respecting others’ rights will be the best 
policy.  
Yet, it might be wondered if our reason for adopting a principle to respect rights is 
based on the idea that since one can’t really know that one could do better by adopting a 
case-by-case strategy, it can’t really be claimed that one might not do better by using a 
case-by-case strategy. What the argument tries to show is that the probability of doing well 
is connected to keeping your promises or abiding by other’s rights. Given that others can 
interfere with us and make it so we cannot get what we want, we would do better to abide 
by their rights so that they are more likely to abide by our rights. In the situation where we 
both abide by rights there is mutual benefit—at least there is more benefit than in the 
situation where we try to interfere with each other’s lives. If one doesn’t abide by another’s 
right and he gets away with it, then he does better but it does not seem likely that he can 
say he knew he would do better. One might win a large sum of mney by playing Russian 
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roulette. It might be true that the odds are in your favour since there is only one bullet in 
the gun’s chamber. But as Darwall says, 
  
Hobbes believed that breaking a covenant is like playing Russian roulette in that it 
is something that just doesn’t make sense to do even if it is likeliest to have the best 
outcome in an individual case. The policy or rule of always keeping covenants is a 
better means, in general, to any human agent’s self-interest and self-preservation 
than is the policy of determining whether to keep covenants on a case-by-case 
basis…(Darwall 1998, 106). 
 
So, even though someone might be pretty sure that not abiding by rights in a certain 
situation will work out to his benefit, he cannot be absolutely sure that it will. The best 
policy to adopt is to abide by others’ rights because this policy removes the risk that one 
might lose everything by trying to play Russian roulette with other people. If one picks the 
wrong person to mess with, then the bullet in the camber might indeed have your name on 
it. Not abiding by rights is not the wise policy because one risks too much—one could lose 
one’s life, and thereby any ability to promote any other goods.12  
The view of why agents will concede others their rights is basically an agent 
relative or agent well being view. The reason why agents will respect others’ rights is 
explained primarily in terms of the duties an agent may have to his own self- preservation. 
But does this also mean that we must fully explain (or reduce) the harm done to a rights-
holder to the harm done to the agent who has the duty to respect his rights? If an agent’s 
                                                
12  Of course, there might be emergency situations when abiding by rights does not make sense. We will look
at the threshold of rights next chapter.  
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rights are violated, then must we say that the reason why this is wrong is that the violator 
has failed in some obligation to himself? If so, then this seems to make this account of 
rights less plausible because it explains harm in terms of the harm done to the violator, not 
the violated. It is true that taking the agent well b ing view will mean giving up our 
ambitions to have a coordinate view of rights that explains why we have reason to view 
others as ends in themselves and hence be able to explain when rights are violated it is the 
rights holder who is being harmed in the ‘deontic’ sense of violating rights being a case of 
not recognizing another as an end in himself. 
When we do not abide by another’s rights we can see that it is he who is being 
harmed. The situation can be plausibly described as a situation where the rights holder has 
been harmed because we can see that his interest or choice in being a self-possessor has 
been taken away from him by the person who violated his right. So, while it may be true 
that his choice or interest that is protected by the right is not the primary reason another has 
to abide by his right, we can still say that the violation of this choice or interest is a harm to 
him because violating one’s choice or interest over one’s being a self-possessor in 
situations where it is legitimate to harm an agent. 
Of course in order for the system of rights to work people will need to take it upon 
them selves to act to reinforce rights-respecting behaviour. Everyone must have an 
investment in using criticism to induce others to have the disposition to abide by rights. 
This means that if they see someone else’s rights being violated they will speak up about it 
in order to make sure that others know what is goin . Suffering disapprobation and 
having one’s name sullied will have the effect of making sure that people are more likely to 
cooperate. The reason why we will do this when it does not directly pay us to watch out for 
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other’s rights is that it will be in our long term benefit to make sure the system of rights 
survives. Since the system of rights is to our benefit, we will find it in our interest to make 
sure rights are being respected. This kind of disposition to look out for the rights of others 
is one that will be reasonable to adopt once the system has been adopted.  
It might be asked whether my respecting your rights is necessary and/or sufficient 
for your respecting mine? At the level of individual action I cannot be sure that my abiding 
by your rights will lead to you abiding by my rights. I might respect your rights but you 
may not respect mine in return if you can get away ith it. We do not always deal with 
others multiple times. So the expectation of future meetings may not induce one to be more 
cooperative. How are we to know when someone else is r specting our rights and when 
they are not? Even though we think it’s a wise choie to abide by other’s rights in general, 
since we cannot monitor other’s actions all the time t might not seem rational to trust 
others if we do not know whether they are likely to cooperate. But this problem can only be 
dealt with by the idea of inducing others to cooperat  by taking it upon ourselves that 
people have the disposition to cooperate. If getting others to abide by rights becomes a 
general policy, then we can rest more assured that people will be more likely to cooperate 
with us; even if we have little experience with them, we can assume that if they are still ‘in 
business’ that they have been cooperative with others. If they have been less likely to 
cooperate and abide by rights, then it’s more likely under the system of reinforcement that 
we would have heard of them through others who have previously run into them. So, we 
can see that taking it upon ourselves to make sure that rights are respected means that we 
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can all rest more assured that a higher percentage of p ople we deal with are likely to be 
cooperative and respect our rights.13  
Since this theory attempts to give agents principled reasons for respecting rights, it 
does go some way to making us act in a uniform way towards others even though the 
reason for acting this way is not dependent upon us having to see others as ends in 
themselves. We can be said to contour our behaviour to the requirements that the rights of 
others impose upon us; and this is done mainly because we seek our own betterment that 
can be realized by respecting rights in a principled way. Mack believed that the agent well 
being view would fail, in part, because we would never have a coincidence of wants/ 
values that would be sufficient to make sure we abided by others’ rights. But if agents all 
believe that it’s good for them to promote their own good, and this can be done effectively 
by adopting a principle of abiding by others’ rights even when it might pay not to, then we 
can claim to have given a reason for habitually respecting others’ rights that is based upon 
self-interest. 
Now we need to address what kind of basic right(s) will be suitable for all of us 
given our reasons for wanting to be moral and our willingness to abide by a system of 
rights. I argue that we will all have a basic right that recognizes our being the possessors of 
ourselves. This argument here is that everyone is a self-possessor, which means that they 
can all be described as possessing themselves. Furthermore, since everyone is a self-
possessor, if we can argue that they are the first possessors of themselves, then they also 
                                                
13 The reason for wanting to have a system where we take i  upon ourselves to enforce rights-respecting 
conduct might have an analogy with the broken window theory of crime. “The broken window theory argues 
that minor nuisances, if left unchecked, turn into major nuisances: that is, if someone breaks a window and 
sees it isn’t fixed immediately, he gets the signal th t it’s all right to break the rest of the windows and maybe 
set the building afire too” (Levitt and Dubner 2005, 128). Similarly, if people get some hint that it’s OK to 
start violating rights, then it might cause a rise in the quantity and quality of such behaviour.   
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have a legitimate claim-right to exclusive use of themselves.14 The rest of this section will 
attempt to show how this argument works.  
The idea of self-possession is not the same as self-ownership. Often self-ownership 
is said to be what our basic rights consist in. I am not arguing with this claim. Indeed, I will 
go on to argue that we have a right to continue to be self-possessors—to have moral rights 
over our own bodies, faculties, energies and talents (Mack 2002b). Sometimes it is just 
asserted that being a self-possessor is to have a right to self-ownership: “Each individual, 
as a natural fact, is the owner of himself, the ruler of his own person” (Murray Rothbard in 
Den Uyl & Rasmussen 2006, 206). But just describing o eself as a self-owner does not 
seem sufficient to assert we have a right to be a self-owner. As Den Uyl and Rasmussen 
argue: 
 
It is evident that one has de facto possession and, to some extent, control over one’s 
body, faculties, talents and energies—that is to say, ‘one’s constitutive ontological 
properties’—and that these facts are presupposed by any account of what one ought 
or ought not to do. Yet, to say this is some distance from saying either that one 
ought to have exclusive control over what one does with these properties or that one 
has right to such control…(Den Uyl & Rasmussen 2005, 2 8). 
 
Even though I am asserting that we are all self-posses ors I will still argue that we have a 
legitimate right to control ourselves and utilize our talents. I will be arguing that we have a 
                                                
14 Note: originally I had conflated the two ideas of first possession and self -possession. First possession 
seems to be a mixture of self -possession and the idea of first come first served. To better explain how the 
argument for rights to ourselves works, I am distinguishing between our basic self-possession and the 
normative idea that is meant to legitimate it, first come first served.  
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right to be self-possessors from the fact that we are self-possessors and the normative 
claims of finders keepers.  
 Before proceeding further we should pause here to consider what ‘self-possession’ 
means by examining what we mean by ‘self’. D.W. Hamlyn notes that “… the term ‘self’ 
reflects something about us, as human beings—namely that we are self-conscious and that 
many aspects of the forms of consciousness we have are reflexive” (Hamlyn 1984, 188). 
Our identities as selves is wrapped up in our being thinking beings, but also in the fact that 
we can come to see ourselves as thinking beings. I do not mean to suggest that all that we 
are is thinking beings, as if we are spirits—if we accept naturalism, then we must see that 
our substance must be describable in natural terms. What I want to assert is that we can 
come to see ourselves, through self-reflection, as beings who have certain abilities, 
characteristics, values, goals likes and dislikes; thi  ability to see ourselves as beings comes 
from our ability to see that all the experiences we have must belong to something. Hume 
thought that when he reflected on his consciousness h  could not find some entity called a 
self that had the experiences, because all he ever exp rienced were his perceptions. 
Therefore, it might be possible that there is no such thing as a self and that particular 
perceptions might exist separately in such a way tht they “have no need of anything to 
support their existence” (Treatise I.iv.6). But the Kantian counter charge is that there 
cannot be representations of things that are not ‘owned’ by someone. “The ‘I’ is therefore 
presupposed in the very having of a perception, so that consciousness with respect to 
perceptions is ipso facto self-consciousness with respect to the ‘I’” (Hamlyn 1984, 192). 
One discovers one’s self by reflecting on the fact tha one has experiences and that these 
experiences must be the experiences of someone.  
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 Having located the self, we can now see how it is po sessed by us and what 
implications this has for the argument here. One comes to experience one’s self as a thing 
that has certain experiences. And upon further reflection we can see that our self has a 
certain identity. We can say that our self is composed of certain characteristics, memories, 
desires, and that we have certain goals and values we wish to pursue. We can by reflection 
see that these desires, values, goals, etc are what we experience but they are also what 
compose us. So, we can say that we don’t just have certain experiences of ourselves, but 
also that we can come to stand in a relation to ourselves through self-reflection. It is this 
ability of our consciousness to be self-reflexive that allows us to say we possess ourselves. 
It allows us to assert that we have experiences of ourselves as being a certain kind of thing, 
but also that we possess that thing.  
 It might be thought that if we are composed of memories and have personal 
experiences as part of our self’s identity that there is no way that anyone could possibly 
take such things away from us—so what is the practic l significance of saying we are self-
possessors if no one can really affect our personal identity? Of course it might be true that 
no one can steal my memory of last summer and put it somewhere. But surely others can 
take away our memories from us because they can harm ou  identities. If one is hit over the 
head and loses one’s memory, or becomes a vegetable, then we can appreciate how much 
others can affect our selves for ill. If they do us harm, they can take away our ability to 
promote our values. Our identities as selves must center around certain major 
characteristics and goals, such that if they were changed then we would no longer be who 
we are. We do not wish this to happen. No matter how much we might wish to be a bit 
better looking or smarter, we don’t hear people say th t they’d like to be totally different 
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people from who they are. We wish to keep our identiti s because we want to be able to 
continue to promote our values and our long-term goals—we wish to keep extending our 
selves into the future as the persons we are. So, our ability to possess our selves has great 
practical significance for us.  
A right to self-possession means we have the ability to control ourselves, take 
actions to promote our good, and reap the rewards from our actions. Such a right is a right 
to be and to remain a self-possessor. This right seem  a plausible starting point for what 
kind of rights we might have because of how it underlies all of our possible good lives and 
because of how it ties in with our desire to promote ur own good. Firstly, self-possession 
is something we all need to have protected in order to pursue any sort of good life. If we 
did not have the ability to have control over ourselves and take certain actions to pursue our 
good, we would not be able to have any sort of good life for ourselves at all. Secondly, 
since what we care about is promoting our values, w can see that self-possession is 
something we will also have to value as a means to that end. We will find rights that 
protect our self-possession acceptable because they are means to furthering our ends. This 
does not mean that I need to value others’ being first possessors, but we will need to come 
to see acceptance of their rights as a means to getting our own ends. If we didn’t abide by 
their rights, then, as we noted before, they can be imp diments to us promoting our own 
ends.  
The reason why a right to self-possession gives us legitimate control, or ownership, 
over ourselves (and what we produce) is because of the idea of finders keepers or first 
come first served. First come first served, while not a principle of justice, is more like a 
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moral default position.15 When there is no other principle to turn to, we can use it to show 
that someone has a legitimate claim to something. This social convention underlies why we 
think that it’s OK to stand in line for things, why the first person to arrive has a claim that 
others do not. It helps us to resolve disputes by appe ling to the fact of who came first. In 
the next section we will examine why it seems more plausible than its main competitor, 
equal shares, for solving disputes at this level.  
Our basic right to first possession is a claim right. My right to promote my way of 
life, as long as it does not interfere with someone els ’s right, implies that others have 
duties not to interfere with me. Each of us will have claim-rights against others when others 
have duties to respect our being first possessors. Thi  means that others will have duties not 
to interfere with us using our natural talents to make our lives better for ourselves. We will 
have basic rights to protect our selves and our holdings. Of course we are complex beings 
with many physical and mental components. So, we need to recognize that a right to 
continue to be a self-possessor is a right to control our bodies, our minds, our desires, etc. 
The basic right is one that protects our making the call on how we live our lives.  
The right to make the call is best described as a negative claim-right we each hold 
against others. General claim-rights are “rights against interference; their correlates are 
never duties that such-and-such be the case, but are duties of noninterference” (Edmundson 
2004, 163). Our basic rights only impose negative duties of noninterference on others. 
Duties that such-and-such be the case are correlates of special rights that arise from agents 
engaging in voluntary acts with one another. Since our rights are negative, we have rights 
to change ourselves if we wish. I might have a right to all of my features, even my 
                                                
15 In this regard David Schmidtz (Schmidtz 2006, 157) says, “ First possession may not be a principle of 
justice, but not every question is a question of what people are due. Sometimes the question is how to resolve 
disputes over what people are due. Sometimes we resolve disputes by settling who gets to make the call”. 
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appendix, but this does not mean that I may not want to change some aspects of myself. 
My right to myself allows me to change myself because it gives me the call on how I can 
change myself.    
I think that a system of equal rights will be the only one that we all will find 
acceptable. It’s true that each of us would like to have more deference supplied to us than 
we would have to grant others. We will each prefer a world where we receive more 
deference than we have to grant others. Yet, as Lomasky argues, if this system where I 
need not defer to anyone else were to be brought into existence, it would be far from ideal 
if, correspondingly, no one need defer to me (Lomasky 1987, 79). This should give most 
agents reason to adopt a system where equal rights are made into rules for all to follow.  
For each of us, then, there will be some minimal amount of deference that we will 
find acceptable as a cost for abiding by others’ rights. This amount of deference need not 
be the same for everyone, but there will be a specifiable range of deference we will find 
acceptable to grant others in order to receive the same amount in return from them. The 
argument here is that all of us will find it acceptable to have a system of rights that protects 
our ability to continue to be self-possessors. The reason why this is acceptable is that it 
only requires that “the amount of required deference be close to level of deference ideal for 
the least deferential members of the community” (Lomasky 1987, 82). This system of rights 
will be stable because agents will find it in their interests because in being asked to supply 
the least amount of forbearance they are not being asked to supply too much deference to 
other agents.  
So, in order to have a system of rights that works—that is, one that is mutually 
acceptable—we all should accept Hobbes’ second law of nature: “…that a man…be 
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contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against 
himselfe”. This equality is deference will help to make the system of rights acceptable for 
all because it removes a potential bias of systems hat benefit some at the expense of 
others. Secondly, the system will impose a minimal amount of deference on all agents. This 
makes the system more acceptable to almost everyone by making the costs of accepting it 
low. People will only need to respect others’ negative rights to noninterference; so, duty-
bearers have a high incentive to abide by others’ rights because they do not have to bear the 
burdens of duties that required more interference would impose on them. This outcome 
also has the effect of allowing a greater system of pluralism because agents are allowed 
more freedom to pursue their own ends and are not burdened with duties that require them 
to act paternalistically towards others.    
We might wonder if this system will impress the fanatic. It seems unlikely because 
for the fanatic the deference supplied to him will be insufficient to compensate him for the 
like amount of deference he must supply others. How can we deal with the fanatic? It’s 
possible to change the amount of deference we must supply him in order to bring him into 
the community. This means that he will be willing to live with us if we can supply him 
more deference than he needs to supply us. But such an unequal system of rights is unlikely 
to be popular with the rest of us. Moreover, if we re to allow this kind of system that 
privileges fanatics, then there will be a tendency for people to identify themselves as 
fanatic, so that they will only have to supply a mini al amount of deference to others in 
order to receive more. The only way to deal with the fanatic is by means other than rational 
argument.  
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So, another reason to have an equal system is to make sure that the system is stable; 
and one way to do that, besides making sure that people only need to supply a minimal 
amount of deference, is to make sure that the system does not tend to reward fanaticism or 
those who seek to give a little and take a lot. A stable system of basic rights will be one 
which requires equal amounts of deference be traded between agents. The system will be 
stable and be deemed acceptable when it imposes the least costs on agents. This means that 
our basic rights will be ones protecting our ability to promote our own good, and basically 
to be left alone from interference by other agents. How exactly these rights can be spelled 
out is a question for another day. The narrower claim here is just that rights will be deemed 
respectable when they require the least amount of deference on our part, yet they give us 
the most moral space we can expect from other agents who think the same way we do. Our 
rights to continue to be first possessors and others’ rights to do the same will entail that we 
are required to give each other the same amount of deference because the more some 
people are given special rights, the less stable the system of rights is likely to become.   
Here we should pause to consider childrens’ rights. Often rights theories are 
accused of paying little attention to the rights of infants. Although the point of my thesis 
was to show why adults have certain rights, I can poi t out the direction rights theory can 
take in order to more fully give moral recognition to children. Of course, a full account of 
why children have rights is outside the scope of this t esis since the burden here is to show 
why adults will have reason to abide by other adults’ rights. The theory of rights presented 
here asserted that people have rights because of thfact that they are self- possessors. But it 
also makes rights partly dependent upon other agents co ceding one rights. If a theory 
asserted that all those who have property F (self possession) also have property R (rights) 
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then it might be hard to explain why children have rights because they often do not yet 
have property F (cf. Lomasky 1987). But since rights are partly dependent upon others 
conceding people their rights, we can say that it is at least po sible that beings without F 
can have R. In order to see whether children have rights, then, we need answers to two 
questions: Can B recognize A as a rights holder even though A can’t see himself as one? 
And two, are there grounds for this kind of recognitio ? As for the first question, it seems 
like we do recognize the rights of children in society all the time. Children do not see 
themselves as promoting their own good, or doing things for their own survival, but we 
believe that they deserve rights. We are able to confer rights on infants that make it just as 
much murder to kill them as is killing any adult. Of course it might be true that we can act 
as if things have rights even though they may not. So is there a good reason for thinking 
that children ought to have rights because we are conceding that they do?  
I think one of the best possible answers is to assert that since children will utilize 
the characteristic of self-possession someday, we ought to treat them as if they had rights. 
Their rights can be said to rest upon the fact that t ey have some need to have their self- 
possession protected because it will be a factor that they need for their future good lives. 
So, if children have rights it is because they have the potential to become adults who are 
full rights bearers. They do not quite have the full right to self- possession, not because 
they cannot realize they aren’t self- possessors, but because they cannot need self 
possession to realize a good life yet. But this means their rights will come into force when 
they reach a certain age, but in the meantime we hav certain duties to protect them and 
make sure that they can reach this age. And given that people in part have rights because 
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others have good reason to concede them rights, we can say that children have rights now 
because we are willing to concede them rights that they will have.  
Of course saying they fall under our protection isn’t to say that they get their rights 
by being the property of their parents—for while this might seem to protect them against 
society, it would not protect them against abusive parents because they are simply their 
parents’ property. In order for children to have protection against their parents we must 
simply assert that we are holding most of their rights for them until they reach a certain age 
of maturity. But until then, they have a basic right against being killed or abused, although 
they do not have rights against paternalistic interventions (devoted to their betterment) 
because they are not yet capable of choosing a good life for themselves. We ought not to 
think of children as objects possessed by their parents because we think that when they are 
harmed they are wronged, not just damaged. As Lomasky argues: 
 
If parents and interested onlookers take offense at the child’s maltreatment, that fact 
is itself to be explained by their conviction that, in the first instance, a wrong has 
been committed to the child. The parent accounts the harm a misfortune to him or 
herself because it is a misfortune of the child. This constitutes, in part, the 
difference between regarding something as an object versus regarding it as a being 
with moral standing (Lomasky 1987 157).  
 
Objects are not things that can be wronged, only damaged; so to better explain how we 
usually talk about children we need to see them as beings who have some moral standing 
and can be wronged by certain actions. If we burn the American flag we might be charged 
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with damaging an object, but we would not be wronging it. We do not need to take people 
as being ends in themselves to see that some kinds of entities can be wronged, while others 
can only be damaged. This recognition can lead us in the right direction about why we need 
to think about children as moral agents who are desrving of moral recognition in a way 
that other objects are not.16  
 In this way we can make sense of the fact that children are thought to have some 
basic rights against being killed by seeing why they can have rights because others are 
willing to concede them certain rights. While I do n t have a full answer to the question 
why agents will be willing to concede children rights, we can see that if agents can have 
rights even though they cannot recognize themselves as having rights, then the door is open 
to argue that children can have rights even though they cannot recognize themselves as 
having a right to self-possession over themselves. 
Another hard problem for rights is that of the mentally insane/ ill. If they are 
temporarily ill or insane then perhaps the case for childrens’ rights applies to them also. So 
in such cases we just hold onto their rights until they are able to regain their sanity just as 
we hold onto most childrens’ rights until they are older. In such cases we can also hold that 
                                                
16 It should be noted that although adults have basic negative rights, it seems that what is important to 
children are basic positive rights—such a right to be protected, a right to be fed, etc. that must be provided by 
their parents. Why do they have these rights? Tibor Machan plausibly argues that children have these rights 
and parents the corresponding duties because parents have chosen the obligation of raising moral beings who 
will be future adults: “…[B]ecause children have been invited into the parents’ lives, and since they are 
children (indeed, initially totally dependent infants), parents have committed themselves to provide for their 
children. May these be enforced by the government? Yes. Here is the reason why. When people have 
children, they enter into a compact with them—or, rather, with the adults children will be. This may be 
difficult to appreciate because it is a unique relationship, one that is only possible with human children. 
Parents have children as their offspring and not adults, and children are for the larger portion of their lives 
dependents—i.e., their parents can only be understood as making a promise or taking a kind of oath to supply 
for them something they need to grow up….Children, in turn, may be taken to have the (positive) right to 
being so treated that they will become sound and able adults. This right they have by virtue of their parents’ 
choice to have them as the kind of beings who will as adults have the right to be able to choose to live” 
(Machan 1992, 20-1). Because parents choose to have children they also choose to have positive duties 
towards them until their children are old enough to take care of themselves.  
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a principle of paternalism applies: the amount of paternalism justified is inversely 
proportional to the degree of autonomy present. So, the less autonomy present, the more 
paternalism is justified. But what about cases where they will not be regaining their senses, 
or not be fully able to exercise the rights the rest of us can? (Perhaps the mentally retarded 
can also be put into this category for simplicity, although there are often large degrees of 
difference between being retarded and being insane).  I  such cases it seems that they could 
not have full rights. Indeed, we are able to lock them up and often make them accept 
treatment—ingesting drugs, having surgery, etc. This cannot be because we mean to make 
them better, but because we just wish to make them less dangerous to others and 
themselves.  In such cases, where they cannot become better, it could be that they are at our 
mercy and, so, they really do not have rights. But it might also be that because they are 
persons, and we cannot be sure that a cure might not be f und, that we wish to treat them as 
still potentially possessing rights that they could realize at a later date. It’s possible that 
because we might find a cure, that the wise choice is to treat them now as having some 
moral standing. This would move them back into the category of potentially having rights 
and having more moral standing for us.  
 
In conclusion, we have seen that Mack’s way of showing why agents will abide by 
a system of rights works by connecting prerogatives and restrictions, rights based on the 
idea that in order to properly recognize others we must see them as ends in themselves full 
stop seems incorrect. Mack believes that only by granting others this status will they be 
able to get the proper recognition that a rights holding entity deserves. But since we are not 
able to grant others this status it seems that another reason must be sought that is able to 
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show why we have to accord others proper respect and also how others are related to our 
own well-being.17  
A basic right is a claim agents have that imposes duties on others to leave rights 
holders alone. Each of us will find it rational to want such a principle to guard our first 
prerogative to pursue our own values. It is rational, as Mack argued, that if we want the 
first prerogative we will also need and want the second one in order to make sure that the 
first one obtains. But we found Mack’s argument implausible for why we will also abide by 
others’ rights. We found that we needed to appeal to our own agent relative values for why 
we will have reason to concede others their rights. Our basic right was a right to self- 
possession. And we also saw that the reason why this starting point was plausible was the 
idea of first come first served (or finders keepers). But finders keepers has been challenged 
by those who appeal to an opposite view—equal share. So in order to better make the case 
for basic rights to self- possession, we will need to better examine the idea of finders 
keepers.   
   
§5.2. Moral Defaults and First Possession: Getting there fi st or just acquisition? It might 
be objected that we could not have a theory of rights t at protect us as self-possessors 
because our abilities and identity are a matter of chance, and when our abilities are a matter 
of chance they cannot be ours as a matter of desert, but must be distributed to everyone 
equally. The idea of distributing our abilities, or the products of our abilities equally, is 
                                                
17 One might argue that in making rights dependent upon one source of moral obligation would I not have to 
say that the reason ultimately why we do not violate another’s rights is that to do so would be something one 
would have to live with; yet in saying this, it explains the harm done to the other in terms of the consequences 
to oneself? But this is to focus too much only on the fact that there would be some bad consequences for 
oneself—the reasons why one would have a hard time living with oneself are due to the fact that one has
harmed another by violating his rights.  
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based on the idea that equal shares is the moral default position. For instance, if we stumble 
into an orchard and find an apple tree full of apples, we would be offended if one person 
gobbled them all up instead of distributing them equally. The reason is that equal shares is 
the distribution rule we use when we cannot justify an thing else (Schmidtz 2002, 246). So 
it might seem that if we come upon ourselves in a state of nature with certain inborn 
abilities that we did not ‘earn’, the just thing to d  is to distribute those abilities equally 
amongst everyone. But as I will argue self-possession i  justified by an appeal to finders 
keepers if we find that we do not arrive in the world at the same time but rather face a 
situation where people already have divided up the world amongst themselves.  
 What makes us rightful possessors of ourselves is the idea of finders, keepers. This 
is the idea that when one has found something that is unpossessed or unclaimed by others, 
that one has a just claim to that thing and can exclude others from its use. Here I claim that 
one’s possession of one’s body is open to this sort of defense. The mere fact that one 
possesses oneself is not sufficient to show that one legitimately possesses (owns) oneself. 
But if finders keepers holds for our natural abilities, and there is no reason to suppose that 
anyone else is harmed by our claim to ourselves, thn ere can be no legitimate complaint 
against our claim to own ourselves. Certainly if our abilities were in some common pool 
and we happened to snatch them up before negotiations began, then this might seem unfair 
because we ought to have distributed them according to equal shares. But since our abilities 
are already possessed by us, it is not anyone else’s decision to decide how to use them. 
People do not come to some bargaining table all at the same time and decide to distribute 
our abilities as if they were common goods. In reality there are no unpossessed goods 
sitting on a table somewhere awaiting equal distribu ion—people have been born one by 
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one over different generations, so it seems that a different approach is needed than equal 
shares. As Schmidtz argues, 
 
Claims of justice must be fit for the world in whic such claims purport to belong. 
In our World, this means acknowledging that, when any bargainer arrives on the 
scene, much of the world is already possessed by others in virtue of lifetimes of 
work (and workers do not find it ‘arbitrary’ that they are the ones who did the 
work). Theories tend to ignore where we actually are, because theorists want to 
avoid privileging the status quo, but a theory needs to privilege the status quo in 
some ways so as to be relevant to it (Schmidtz 2006, 154). 
  
The principle of first come first served might be a morally arbitrary way to 
distribute goods, but this does not mean that it is unjust. If we think that there is a reason to 
presume that we were the first to acquire our abilities and since they were already 
possessed their distribution were never up for discus ion; we can also assert that unless 
someone can come up with a reason why we don’t deserve ourselves, we have a just claim 
to ourselves on the basis of first come, first served; and since there is no pre-existing reason 
or right to the contrary, the way is open to argue that since we are first possessors of 
ourselves we have a reason to think we have a right over ourselves and others face 
restrictions towards us.   
The theory of rights focuses on what sort of treatment we can demand from other 
agents when we have a case where agents arrive at th ir domains nonsimultaneously. We 
will see that first possession is acceptable in part because we do not all arrive in a garden at 
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the same time to find goods ready to be distributed. So equal shares seems less plausible as 
the moral default position when we see that agents arrive in a world that is already 
distributed and possessed by others. First possession i  a norm that secures agent’s rights in 
the face of the moral default position of equal shares. If equal shares isn’t fundamental 
because nonsimultaneous arrival in a world already possessed better explains the nature of 
how to think about our moral situation, then the burden of proof falls upon the equal shares 
advocate to prove that our abilities belong to some common pool to be distributed. I will 
attempt to show that one of the most powerful arguments and intuitions in favour of equal 
shares, namely Rawls’ transitivity of non-desert argument, fails to provide the strength 
needed to prejudice us against first possession. Now we will examine the strength of 
finders keepers, or first come first serve as a reason for asserting property rights to 
ourselves and things. 
 Randy Barnett attempts to defend first possession as a legitimating reason for 
property in terms of the reasonableness of three conditi ns. Ann finds minerals on the 
ocean floor; her possession of the minerals will be justified as a claim based on FP if (a) 
there is no prior owner; (b) her actions do not disurb others in society; and (c), it enables 
her to act on the basis of her knowledge (Barnett 1998, 69). This makes initial acquisition 
dependent not simply on one’s being the finder of something, but upon the fulfilment of 
other conditions. It seems reasonable to hold that one cannot own something that is already 
owned by someone else. And it may be reasonable to assert (c) the goodness that having 
property can do for individuals. But what is more poblematic is (b). For how are we to 
interpret disturbing others in society. If it means that we cannot violate others rights when 
we are attempting to own something, then I think this is agreeable to all.  
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The most notorious interpretation, though, is to assert that we can only acquire 
something, or be said to have title to it, if doing so does not make others worse off. For 
instance, David Conway says that someone can be said to have acquired something justly if 
his doing so does not make anyone else’s lives worse than they were before it was acquired 
(Conway 1995, 11). Barnett’s condition (b) seems to be this same idea. The most notorious 
condition for being able to acquire property would seem to be Locke’s proviso stating that 
one can only acquire something if one leaves enough and as good for others. But why 
should we accept such a strong condition as Locke’s? One reason for not accepting it is that 
finders keepers does not require it. As Anthony de Jasay argues:  
 
In [rights] absence, it is hard to see why the justice of appropriation of one resource 
by one person should be dependent on other persons having comparable scope for 
appropriating other, equally good resources, though of course it would be nice if 
they did have it. The supposition that they must have it rests on the prior and tacit 
adoption of some egalitarian moral axiom (de Jasay 2002, 140-1). 
 
So, without adopting a tacit egalitarian principle about how things should be distributed, 
we need not worry about whether others have as much and as good left over for them. Of 
course equal shares might be such a principle. We will xamine support for it soon, but for 
now it is interesting to note that finders keepers does not impose so many conditions upon 
what counts as just initial acquisition.18 
                                                
18 David Schmidtz argues that another reason for thinking that we need not worry about a Lockean proviso is 
that coming late in the game is actually better than coming early, and presumably getting an equal share. The 
reason is that when one comes late things have already been produced and prosperity is higher. Would one 
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 Possession by finders keepers ought to be distinguished from the idea that one has 
power over—or owns—those things he has mixed his labour with (Locke). The latter idea 
is that in order to come to own something one must find something unowned, then mixed 
one’s labour with it in order to make it truly fall under one’s control. There are many hard 
cases associated with this view—such as what are resonable boundaries one can erect over 
unowned things that entitles one to say he owns them? Also we might ask when are 
children who are the products of parents mixing their g nes their own autonomous agents?  
Still there is reason to devote more time to the discussion of first possession as it 
relates to the labour mixing theory of value because since Locke the latter is thought to 
underlie the former. The idea that in order to have titl  to something one must mix one’s 
labour with it has a long history in philosophy and law (Epstein 1979). It seems that in 
order to make a case for our possessing something we need to be able to show that one has 
taken some actions to acquire the thing—mixed one’s labour with the thing in question. 
This means that when one asserts title to something, even oneself, one must have 
performed some actions that warrant this claim. But in real life cases we see the limits of 
the labour mixing theory. For instance, in competitive cases of acquisition two agents may 
both invest their labour in acquiring an object yet only the ‘winner’ deserves to keep it 
(Epstein 1979, 1225). Also, it might be objected that labour mixing itself cannot create any 
right to a thing; the reason being that it rests in a circular way on the idea that each person 
owns himself. The idea that each person is the possessor of himself must be justified by 
appealing to the idea that each person is in possession of himself, either by choice or 
because of some natural necessity (Epstein 1979, 1227); but if this possession of oneself 
                                                                                                                                          
wish to live in the middle ages and have an equal sh re, or be alive with today’s prosperity even though one 
has a less than equal share? 
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can establish ownership of oneself, then why is not possession of external things sufficient 
to show ownership of them? “The labour theory is called upon to aid the theory that 
possession is the root of title; yet it depends for its own success upon the proposition that 
the possession of self is the root of title to self” (Epstein ibid.). 
But there does seem to be something to the idea of lab ur mixing as a way of 
acquiring title to things when we conceive of it more broadly as a way of using something 
to get something else. Even when we possess ourselves via first come, first serve we can be 
said to be performing some actions that warrant our having title to ourselves. We got there 
first, so others who arrived latter do not get to have title to the things that compose us. This 
suggests that we need to perform some sort of action in rder to acquire title to things. But 
this does not mean that we need to mix our labour with ourselves in order to have some 
title to possess ourselves. There may be cases where e do need to mix our labour to 
acquire external things in order to make them ours, but if the world is already pretty much 
owned, which it in fact is, then we do not need to account for ownership in terms of us 
mixing our labour with ourselves to acquire the title to ourselves.  
This also suggests that basic rights to our selves and property rights are rights to 
take courses of action and to be protected against others’ actions. A property right to 
possess our selves or something else is not simply a “right which a person has with respect 
to a specific thing” (Gibbard 1976, 77). A right of property is a right one has to take a 
certain course of action, not just to possess a thing. The reason why this is so is because our 
basic right to possess ourselves that we derive from irst come first serve is about our 
ability to secure and use a certain thing, which is ba ically taking a course of action. So the 
basic right is to take a course of action n order to secure or use one’s possession(s). 
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The premise that in some fundamental sense one is a self-possessor and therefore 
ought to have self-discretion may not be thought to lead very far if being a self-possessor is 
a normative dead end. For instance, Rawls has argued that since one is not responsible for 
one’s natural abilities—or what one gets from the lottery of nature—one does not deserve 
praise or blame for whatever one acquires from these abilities, nor does one necessarily 
deserve what follows from those talents; hence, we ought to think of our talents as potential 
collective property, not as necessarily belonging to us. For Rawls the following is one of 
the ‘fixed points of our considered moral judgement’ that, 
  
no one deserves his place in the distribution of natural endowments, any more than 
one deserves one’s initial starting place in society. The assertion that a man 
deserves the superior character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his 
abilities is equally problematic; for his character d pends in large part upon 
fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can claim no credit. The 
notion of desert seems not to apply to these cases (Rawls 1971, 104).  
 
This argument is called the transitivity of non-desert: (Narveson 2002, 145; Rawls 1971, 
104). Rawls uses the idea of the transitivity of non-desert to shore up his idea that agents/ 
contractors in the original position, from behind a veil of ignorance will, in attempting to 
secure the best deal they can for themselves, be led to conclude that since they could turn 
out to be the pauper rather than the billionaire they ought to adopt a principle giving equal 
consideration to all (Rowlands 1998, 57). Even though we ought to take an equal shares or 
equal consideration principle as an assertion regarding the common factor that grounds all 
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of our rights, it does not follow that we cannot have rights that protect our ability to utilize 
our unequal abilities to acquire unequal rewards.19 I will argue that Rawls’ claim that we 
could not have a theory of rights that allows us a right to deserve something based on an 
innate characteristic is false. 
Rawls’ argument from the transitivity of nondesert r sts upon the idea that in order 
to deserve something one’s entitlement must follow fr m some prior entitlement. The 
strength of desert is only as strong as the basis from whence it comes; hence, if one does 
not deserve one’s natural abilities then one cannot be said to deserve what follows from 
them. If one just ended up with a certain self, then one cannot be said to deserve that self 
either. We can now interpret the Rawlsian argument as follows:20  
1. If P1 deserves X it is also necessary that he des rv  the cause of X (F). 
2. Only properties that are not innate can transfer desert. 
3. P1 doesn’t deserve the cause of X because F is an inn te ability. 
4. Therefore, P1 doesn’t necessarily deserve X (by transitivity of nondesert). 
5. Only properties that are deserved can be rightfully possessed. 
6. One does not deserve one’s innate properties. 
7. Therefore, one cannot rightfully possess one’s innate properties. 
8. (Therefore, the Equal Shares position applies to such properties). 
                                                
19 Rawls has two basic reasons for denying the concept of desert as underlying justice—nondesert and also 
the further claim that no one really finds desert a plausible candidate for what counts as just distribu ion.  
20 Ignoring the possibility that having F1 may not be sufficient to acquire X, since we are assuming for 
argument’s sake it is. I believe contrary to Rawls that there is not a simple causal link here between having F1 
and getting X—don’t we also say that so and so has worked hard to get X? And is this not also a reason for 
moral commendation? If so, then we may have another reason for rejecting Rawls’ claim about the 
transitivity of nondesert. 
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This argument seems to capture more of the nature of Rawls’ argument by explicitly stating 
how he sees the idea of nondesert affecting one’s natural/ innate abilities.21 22 (1-4) is about 
the inability of desert to transfer from undeserved properties to other things that those 
properties have been used to make or acquire. (5-8)are about the normative implications of 
nondesert. In order to overcome the claim that our innate properties that compose 
ourselves—really ourselves—are open to the moral def ult position, I will argue that these 
properties that compose our identities can be said to be rightfully possessed even though 
they are innate and not deserved by some prior claim about desert. If one can rightfully 
possess oneself without deserving oneself (due to some prior transference of desert), then 
one bypasses the need to give an argument for rightful possession in terms that would be 
open to Rawls’ charge. I will argue that there are good reasons for thinking that we are 
certainly self-possessors and that our identities ar  something we possess in a necessary 
way; but also I argue that when we think in terms of first possession we can see how we 
‘deserve’ ourselves without having to claim that the ‘desert’ comes from something more 
than being the first to acquire our natural talents. 
Of course, at the level of our selves, there can be o such prior transference of 
desert because one has done nothing to acquire the prop rties that make one’s self up. It is 
true that after awhile one has done certain things to improve (or unimprove) oneself, but 
what we are talking about here is the biological basis that composes us—all of that which 
we come into this world with. These factors/ properties may be malleable to an extent but 
                                                
21 Rawls claims that the natural distribution of things “is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons 
are born into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts” (Rawls 1971, 81). Of course, 
then, it is debatable whether the natural order of things is really a moral problem at all. But it could still be if 
one formulates an argument that we commit an injustice if we fail to correct some state of affairs that is 
unjust (Schmidtz 2005, 166). But why is such a state of affairs unjust to begin with? 
22 And the question for Rawls is: “How would we get from the premise that talents are undeserved to the 
conclusion that talents are community property [viz., open to distribution]?” (Schmidtz 2005, 164 n. 45).  
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they either exist as part of us or they do not. Theproperties that compose us are not open 
for debate, as if they could be imagined away or separated from who we are by an abstract 
use of the mind. Since they are a necessary basis for all the other things that have practical 
significance for us, they ought to be seen as being important for that reason. But beside 
their importance to us we can see their necessity: None of us really could have chosen to be 
different from who we in fact are. We may wish we wre different, had different abilities, 
but none of this is sufficient to show that we do not have the identities as persons we in fact 
have. To paraphrase Kripke, it is a discovery to find that one’s self is composed of certain 
qualities and a certain historical background. If we found a person who resembled me in 
every respect would we say that that person is me, or that I did not have to be the person 
that I am? No. We would instead say that there is someone who resembles me in many 
respects but is not me (Kripke 1980, 128). So, if we can hold that our identities are what 
make us who we are, we do not need to entertain claims to the contrary that since we could 
have been different we cannot be said to possess our elves in any necessary sense23.   
Of course the counter charge could be that one has not yet shown that one’s identity 
is something that had to be the way it is, hence isn’t it premature to argue that anyone else 
needs to see one’s abilities as something that could not just as much have been their own? 
But here one needs to distinguish between showing that one’s identity could not have been 
different, and showing that one’s identity just is composed of these certain attributes. In 
order for one to have the identity one does it is not necessary to show that one’s identity 
                                                
23 In the original Theory of Justice Rawls did not seem to take self-ownership seriously, or at least it was not 
the reason why the separateness of agents was to be taken seriously. But his later works do have something to 
say about self-ownership—“What is regarded as a comm n asset is the distribution of native endowments a d 
not our native endowments per se. It is not as if society owned individuals’ endowments taken separately, 
looking at individuals one by one. To the contrary, the question of the ownership of endowments does nt 
arise, and should it arise it is the persons themselve  that own their endowments” (Rawls 2001). 
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could not have been different. If one takes the Principle of Sufficient Reason too literally, 
then one would have to show that each thing that exis s has not just an efficient, causal 
reason for why it exists, but also a teleological re son for why it exists the way it does 
rather than as something else. For some people a purely causal explanation of why the 
universe exists the way it does is never sufficient si ce, if one accepts the principle of 
sufficient reason, one must give an explanation of why this universe exists rather than 
another one. Similarly, it seems that the desire fo an explanation of why I had to exist this 
way and not some other way is due to a hangover from an outdated metaphysics. At this 
level it seems that we can just ask why this question makes sense. If I have explained why I 
have the identity I do, then it is up to someone els  to show me why I am mistaken about 
this identity; but what is not acceptable is to askme why I had to be the way I am, as if we 
can appeal to some grand design to tell us why I amthis way and someone else that way.  
But the telling point against the charge that we do not deserve ourselves can be 
found when we look at the idea of first come, first served and finders, keepers. Contrary to 
Rawls, we do not start out in a world where person’ abilities are up for debate because we 
enter a world where we, and others, are already in possession of ourselves. Rather than the 
rule of equal shares being the moral default position, we ought to think of first come, first 
served as the moral default position in a world where agents already possess themselves. If 
this is true then we will be more sympathetic to the following kind of position: “If you 
walk into the cafeteria carrying 2 apples, we do not begin to discuss how to allocate them. 
If the apples are in your hand, their allocation normally is not our business” (Schmidtz 
2002, 256). Similarly, when we find that we come into the world where people are already 
in possession of themselves, the allocation of their abilities is normally not any of our 
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business. The fact that they possess these abilities to begin with and are the first and only 
possessors of their abilities is sufficient to cast doubt on the idea that equal shares ought to 
be the moral default position. In order to make the counter argument against first 
possession one must not just appeal to the claim that one’s natural talents are ‘undeserved’, 
but also that they are some how harmful to others hnce one doesn’t have reason to keep 
what one has found. If there is no good reason or right to the contrary, agents ought to keep 
possession of their natural abilities; and from first come, first served, we can see that 
finders, keepers implies that one has title to what one possesses.   
The argument that agents must be made to share or give up their natural abilities 
seems to presuppose that one’s having F excludes someone else’s having F, or enjoying the 
benefits of F. Regarding the latter claim, the great thing about a society in which agents 
trade with one another is that others will not be excluded from the benefits of F. Agents 
may engage in trade with one another and share the innate abilities they were born with. As 
for the former claim, it is not true that my having F means that someone else has been 
excluded from having F. One agent’s having the ability to be musical does not exclude 
anyone else’s possessing this same ability. Sometimes the exercise of these innate abilities 
may be incompossible in certain circumstances, but that is another point. What needs to be 
emphasized is that if there is no presumption that one’s having F has meant to necessarily 
exclude anyone else’s benefiting from F, and that having F is not to exclude anyone else’s 
having F, then we ought to take the moral default position to be first come, first served 
when we assess how we are to treat other agents and their capabilities; this is because the 
claim for dividing by equal shares has not been met because agents ought to be seen as first 
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possessors of themselves, hence their abilities are directly under their own control not 
anyone else’s.          
The upshot of this counter-argument against Rawls is that we are now back in the 
position of dealing with the question why “the goods you want to distribute are yours to 
distribute”, not simply whether the distribution itself can be done in some fair way? 
(Schmidtz 2005, 164). The question of justice can still be framed in terms of whether the 
goods to be distributed are open to be distributed. First possession has been justified as a 
way that agents will see themselves morally—as beings who rightfully possess themselves 
prior to any one else’s claims on them. This argument has not justified first possession 
because of the consequences of a person having a right to being a self-possessor—viz., that 
one must leave enough and as good for others. But this is not to say that First Possession 
does not have favourable moral effects. 
First Possession also has the favourable effects of rec gnizing agents’ senses of 
integrity and justice. Rawls’ argument is problematic because the conclusion he draws 
from the transitivity of non-desert cuts against the integrity and justice objections that 
provide intuitive support for rights. While Rawls is known for his rejection of 
Utilitarianism, it is interesting to note that his transitivity argument upholds the agent-
neutralism and consequentialist objections traditionally associated with the doctrine. As 
Mack argues, the integrity objection emphasizes the fact that individuals have a general 
interest in promoting their own good; being held back from pursuing/ promoting one’s 
good tends to ruin one’s sense of integrity (Mack 1993, 103-4). One must believe that there 
is some valid reason that he can devote himself to pursuing his own good contrary to being 
made an instrument for others’ ends (Mack 1993, 106). Furthermore, moral individualism 
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states that each agent’s good is equally ultimate because of its status as plural and 
objectively good. So, as Mack argues, an account of restraints must account for how an 
agent perceives the asymmetry between his perception of the rightness of pursuing his own 
good and other’s use of him to promote their life plans (Mack ibid.). The idea is that a 
stable condition of allegiance to one’s values means one must see one’s own values as 
morally asymmetrical to values held by others. Each gent must, to have integrity, reject a 
view of his self as a means to other’s ends.24  
But Rawls’ argument would make an agent believe that he had no good reason to 
have allegiance to his values, or his integrity, because he could not truly claim that his 
values are in a significant way morally asymmetrical to others’ values. If one is denied the 
idea that one’s identity—the agent-relative aspect of one’s values—may legitimately give 
one reason for having values that are in a significant way morally asymmetrical to others’ 
then one also denies that one has reason to take one’s values seriously—viz., to be 
dedicated to them (cf. Trigg 1973).  
So Rawls’ introduction of radical contingency into one’s concept of identity also 
introduces skepticism into the idea that one’s values are special to oneself and 
asymmetrical with others’ because they are one’s own. As argued, this idea of moral 
asymmetry gives an agent some idea of what conduct towards him is right and that his 
values are not open to tradeoffs based on some attempt o interpersonally weight or 
compare values. An agent must have some reason to believe that stable interpersonal 
principles protect his choices over himself versus the choices others would use him for. But 
                                                
24 Cf. Michael Walzer on the egalitarian tendency to deny desert: “But this is an odd argument, for while its 
purpose is to leave us with persons of equal entitlment, it is hard to see that it leaves us with persons at all. 
How are we to conceive of these men and women once we have come to view their capacities and 
achievements as accidental accessories, like hats and coats they just happen to be wearing? How, indeed, ar  
they to conceive of themselves?” (Walzer 1983, 260).  
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Rawls’ argument seems to reopen the door to such tradeoffs: An agent does not necessarily 
deserve the benefits that flow from his abilities bcause he does not necessarily deserve 
those abilities in the first place. So one’s abilities are open for redistribution according to 
some notion of what is impersonally best. This means that one’s abilities, one’s very 
identity, is not under one’s control and that one’s integrity does not matter to others or 
oneself.  
If first possession functions as a reason for accepting rerogatives—as a reason for 
rejecting claims that we must abandon our own good and pursue the good of others, or 
even some impersonal good—then restrictions are basd in something that all agents have 
reason to pursue, or value implicitly. And the norms that are directly related to the 
characteristic of first possession are those of that allow one to exercise discretion over 
oneself—self-control and self-direction.  
Finally, it might be thought that providing an answer to the question of how we 
possess ourselves is not also to provide an answer to how we can own external things. 
Often this question revolves around discussions of initial acquisition and provisos 
regarding leaving as much and as good for others. But here I want to suggest that the 
question of initial acquisition—how we come to own u owned things—is not truly all that 
informative. The reason being that we come into a world that is for the most part already 
possessed/ owned. I do not homestead on the land for my first house, keeping away thieves, 
rather I contract to buy it from someone who already owns it. Maybe the land has been in 
his family for generations. This suggests that the problem of initial acquisition might only 
have some import for how we come to possess ourselve . But even though we need not 
worry about the justice of original acquisition, I take it that Nozick’s (1974, 150-3) sketch 
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of justice in transfer is still pertinent: so that anyone who acquires a holding in accordance 
with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is 
entitled to the holding.25  
So, since we have a theory here about how it is we come to possess things to begin 
with, we also have a reason for how we can come to possess things external to us. The 
basic reason is that since I have a right to control myself and take certain actions to make 
my life better, I also have the right to possess things that I can bargain for from others. 
Even if I had to show how it is that I can justifiably possess some external previously 
unowned thing, I could appeal to the fact that if I can come to own myself—a thing I didn’t 
do anything to ‘deserve’—then I can also justify owning external things by the fact that I 
was the first comer who happened to get the thing (Feser 2005, 66). The burden of proof 
seems not to be on the person who has first found and possessed the thing, but the 
latecomer who wishes to dispute the first’s ownership. The latecomer, to make his case, 
could only appeal to his having actual possession of the thing in question at some point in 
the past.   
Morality might not always require adherence to the moral default position of equal 
shares. When we find a piece of pie lying on the floor, morality seems to require that to be 
fair the pie be divided up equally. This distribution of the pie seems to capture the fact that 
we found it together and no one has a prior claim to it. It also might seem to some that if 
we just ‘find’ ourselves in possession of certain natural abilities, our natural abilities ought 
to be divided up equally. The arguments in this section were meant to show that the moral 
default of equal shares does not apply to possession of ur selves, of our natural abilities, 
                                                
25  He says the principle of justice in transfer is as follows: “A transfer from A to – is just as long as A and – 
both consent to the transfer from A to – and neither is coerced” (Nozick 1974, 115).   
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because these abilities are connected to our being the moral agents we are. And the better 
rule to adopt in contexts where agents are already in possession of their abilities and no one 
else seems to have a valid claim of these abilities is finders, keepers. Possession of 
something gives rise to the presumption that one has a title to that thing. First come, first 
serve is used to show that others do not have good reason to lay claim to the abilities one 
possesses first. If we possess title to our abilities hen this means that others face restriction 
on how they may use us to promote their versions of the good life.    
  
§5.3 Conclusion. I have already noted how my theory differs from Mack’s in the fact that it 
tries to avoid the dualism that Mack’s entails. My theory attempts to base rights on a 
common agent-relative concern that underlies all of our values. This means my theory is 
not concerned with showing why agents will have reason to respect other’s rights because 
they have an intuition of others as ends in themselve . My argument is that since we all 
wish to continue to promote our good, and it is a wise choice to do what will promote our 
good, agents will have reason to abide by rights. I also argued that agents will find it 
acceptable to respect others’ right to be self-possessors because this is a factor we all need 
in order to make a good life for ourselves. By having this right protected, we will be better 
able to make good lives for ourselves and promote our own good. This is an argument for 
rights based upon agents’ agent-relative good—or agent well being view of rights—that 
makes respecting rights dependent upon whether doing it is conducive to our own good; 
but I have argued that rights can still recognize the moral status of others because agents 
have principled reasons to change their behaviour towards others even in cases where they 
could do better by not abiding by them. It may sound paradoxical to say that agents will do 
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this when they could benefit by not doing so, but the oddness disappears when we see that 
agents have more reason to abide by rights because this strategy better serves their good 
than does one of picking and choosing when to abide y rights. How a theory of rights can 
be made to be coherent, and what is the threshold of rights in the face of counter moral 
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§6.0 Introduction. The last chapter sought to show how agents have reason to abide by a 
system of rights that protected their first and second prerogatives. But even if this argument 
was successful if the moral basis of rights leads to rights that are inherently conflictual, or 
noncompossible, then the theory will fail to produce a coherent system of rights. Rights are 
derived from restrictions that agents want to have in order to protect and promote their own 
good; also agents will be willing to abide by others’ rights to promote their own good 
because, since other people can interfere with our g od, to secure from others our own 
benefit we are willing to abide by rights in a principled way that protect their ability to 
promote their own good. The derivation of basic rights based upon our own agent-relative 
good was the main task of this thesis. This chapter asks a different but related question: 
How do our rights fit together?  
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This chapter puts forward some reasonable but partial nswers to the following 
questions: How we can specify rights so they are not obviously in conflict? What are the 
thresholds of rights? The idea of compossibility is thi : “All rights are compossible just 
when all rights can be exercised at the same time, hat is, that the action of one person 
exercising a right does not make impossible the exercise of rights by others” (Gorman 
2003, 123). We will examine whether rights can be compossible, or if the various duties 
that rights imply might call for actions that conflict. I argue that while we would like it to 
be the case that rights are non-conflictual, we see that rights often entail duties that cannot 
be carried out at the same time. This means that rights conflict and so we need some way 
external to the system of rights to resolve these di putes.  
Also we will look at whether rights have thresholds—“…possible countervailing 
considerations that, once they reach a certain threshold, overcome the right” (Edmundson 
2004, 147). While rights may hold in everyday circumstances, it seems to be the case that 
when we could prevent a very large number of rights violations by violating one or a few 
rights, it is reasonable to do this. I argue that rights can be violated in some emergency 
situations if that situation poses a serious and grave threat to many rights holders. We can 
say that an emergency situation is when a threshold has been reached because we cannot 
save ourselves by following rights—either because many more people will be killed by 
respecting rights, or because all will be killed by respecting rights. The fact that a threshold 
may exists does not mean we can violate someone’s rights at any time to prevent a greater 
number of rights violations from happening. But thereshold’s existence does mean that 
when a great number of our rights that are in jeopardy, we are warranted in taking action to 
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prevent our rights being violated even if that means we need to violate/ infringe someone 
else’s rights.    
 
§6.2 Specifying Rights and Thresholds. To delve into the question of how we can specify 
compossible rights, first take Benn’s example of the pebble-splitter who sits on the beach 
and splits pebbles until another person comes and tries to stop his actions: 
  
Suppose Betty were to prevent Alan from splitting pebbles by handcuffing him or 
removing all the pebbles within reach. Alan could now quite properly demand a 
justification from Betty, and a tu quoque reply from her that he, on his side had not 
offered her a justification for splitting pebbles, would not meet the case, for Alan’s 
pebble splitting had done nothing to interfere with Betty’s actions. The burden of 
justification falls on the interferer, not on the prson interfered with. So while Alan 
might properly resent Betty’s interference, Betty has no ground for complaint 
against Alan (in Gaus 1999, 118).  
 
Our intuition is that Betty in the wrong since Alan was just minding his own business 
before being accosted. The burden of proof falls upon the person who has cted to interfere 
with another agent. Yet knowing when we are and are not wrongfully interfering with 
others will depend upon us knowing what our rights are. If Alan appeals to his rights as the 
reason why Betty is wrong, then he is appealing to the heavy artillery of moral discourse. If 
Alan has a right to certain treatment, then Betty must comply, as Lomasky says (Lomasky 
1987, 82). An appeal to rights is meant to sort out the situation and tell us why she is 
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wrong. But solving disputes by appealing to rights does not always give us a clear 
answer—for instance, what if Betty claims that Allan is violating her rights because he is 
making noise on his part of the beach? Does Allan’s, or Betty’s right take precedence here? 
This question gets into the problem of seeing how rights are compossible and what 
thresholds rights have.   
Imagine you are out hiking one night on a mountain when a blizzard hits. You 
know that if you stay outside you will surely die. Looking around you see a small cabin 
that has a ‘do not enter sign’ on it. You decide that even though the cabin belongs to 
someone else, you will break down the door and spend the night there weathering the 
storm. You survive the blizzard by eating the food inside the cabin and by using the 
furniture inside to light a small fire to keep warm. Before leaving the next day, you find 
that the cabin’s owner has found out what you’ve ben up to and demands an explanation. 
You believe that your survival was at stake and so you were justified and exercised a right 
to break into the cabin. The owner disagrees and believes that his property rights have been 
violated. Here it seems that we have a conflict of rights—the owner’s property right to 
control the cabin versus your right to take actions to keep yourself alive. 
 One solution is to adopt specificationism: “The spcificationist holds that each 
right is defined by an elaborate set of qualifications that specify when it does and does not 
apply: a set of qualifications that define rights’ ‘space’” (Wenar 2005). So in every case 
where there is a rights dispute, there is only one set of rights—belonging to a person or 
organization—that will take precedence. Russ Shafer-Landau’s argues that we can create 
the following argument from the story (Shafer-Landau 1995, 209): 
1. The cabin owner has an exclusive right to the use of the cabin. 
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2. Therefore all others have a duty not to use the cabin without the owner’s 
permission. 
3. Therefore it is impermissible for anyone else to use the cabin without the 
owner’s permission. 
4. But it is permissible for the hiker to use the cabin without permission. 
On the face of it one cannot hold all of these claims to be true without also holding a 
contradiction. The problem here is that even if we do not think that the hiker has a right to 
break into the cabin, we also think that it is permissible for him to do so. And this means 
that the right one had to one’s property (1) is not as absolute as one thought. This creates a 
problem for specifying the extent of one’s property rights. Shafer-Landau notes that there 
are four ways one might respond to this argument: (a) deny that any rights exist, which is 
the utilitarian position. This is not an option here. Or (b) we might argue that the right is 
merely prima facie, so that the duty in (2) is also merely prima facie. This weakens rights 
unacceptably, it seems. Or (c) we might claim that e right is real but that in certain 
contexts it can be infringed—this is the infringement view, held by Thomson and Feinberg. 
Or (d) we might reject (4), so the hiker’s actions were not morally permissible. Shafer-
Landau argues that the latter claim is often thought to be what specificationism requires, 
since it holds that all moral infringements are really moral violations. But this view seems 
morally odious. He notes that even Nozick holds that our side-constraints may be 
overridden in certain emergency circumstances (Nozick 1974, 29-30).  
Shafer-Landau argues that we do not need to abandon (4) r (1) if we make sure 
that (1) is specified properly. “On this view, there is no right to life simpliciter, but rather a 
right not to be killed except in circumstances A, B, C, etc” (Shafer–Landau 1995, 210). A 
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more concrete example might be the Lockean Proviso which states that one has a right to 
acquire what one wants, so long as one leaves as much and as good for others. This 
specifies a boundary to our right to acquire things. This does not mean that rights are not 
absolute because they are held with some exceptions. But if it is permissible to sometimes 
infringe or violate another’s rights, then it does mean that the owner’s right to the cabin 
exists with some specification of when it can be permissible to infringe it. This means that 
rights have some exceptions that are implicit in them—say, that it is OK to infringe 
another’s right to save a child who is drowning on his property. The need to save oneself or 
another would seem to be reasonable exceptions to ifringe other’s property rights.  
It is not clear to me whether specificationism can remove rights disputes, or 
whether rights disputes will remain. For instance, is the above case a real case of rights 
conflict or is it a case in which the conflict can be removed by more clearly specifying the 
domain of rights? The case might be a real case of intractable conflicting rights if there is 
reason for you to apologize or pay compensation to the cabin owner for the damage you 
caused his cabin. If you really had the right to do what you did to save yourself, then there 
shouldn’t be any reason to say that you owe him an apology or compensation because your 
right trumped, or cancelled out, his. Yet, in such a case your right to save yourself makes it 
permissible to ‘infringe’ the cabin owner’s right, but this does not mean that you violate the 
owner’s right. But infringement doesn’t mean that you do not have to pay him some form 
of compensation for having damaged his cabin. If one can infringe a right, but still owe 
compensation, then it does seem like there are confli ts of rights that cannot be clearly 
specified out of existence. 
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So, it seems that the specificationist has a hard job ahead of him because he must 
somehow show us how rights can be fully specified. Without such a case, it seems that 
rights may still conflict. But since we do not yet know all the ways we can interact with 
each other, this task seems impossible. It seems most plausible to claim that rights can 
sometimes conflict with each other when the actions needed to carry them out are non-
compossible. This would make rights non-compossible in certain cases. This means that we 
will need an arbitrator to settle disputes over rights. The fact that we cannot have a system 
of rights that can be fully specified should not scare us; it just means that in the real world 
we run into many problems that cannot be settled before looking at all the facts of the case.  
 So, what implications does this theory have for the claim that we all have robust 
rights to continue to be self-possessors? It was argued last chapter that we have strong 
rights to take actions that allows us to continue to be self-possessors. It was claimed that 
we all have these rights based on our being the first possessors of ourselves, and that we 
need not appeal to a rule like the Lockean proviso for reason why we have the rights we do. 
Our right to be self-possessors is not based on our having to leave as much and as good of 
our qualities for others. This seems to prescribe pretty strong rights to self-possession.  
 Yet we can see the need for the ability to specify when rights hold and when they 
do not. The right to take actions to continue to be a self-possessor entails others have duties 
not to interfere with us, except in circumstances when our actions will interfere with their 
ability to be self-possessors. My point here is not really to show how rights solve disputes, 
but to show whether the way in which they address di putes is value-based or not.  
 Mack holds that rights must be a dimension of morality separate from agent’s 
interests and values in order for them to settle disputes in a fair and impartial manner. This 
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is not surprising for Mack given his defense of the coordinate view of rights that made 
rights based upon a separate moral obligation agents have. Macks states that an explanation 
of how rights divide up moral space must be as follows: “P’s right that S perform as she 
has promised is not grounded on the value for P or for S or for the World at large of S’s so 
acting or of P’s requiring S to act” (Mack 2001, 92). Reasons for respecting rights must be 
distinct and different from value-based reasons for acting. We have a dispute when more 
than one agent has a reason for wanting an agent to do certain things with himself, or with 
things that he considers his. So, if agent P favours the use of his index finger to scratch his 
nose, Q wants him to use it to flavour the pudding he is cooking, and R wants him to use it 
to help produce medicine for needy people, then we have a dispute over what P should do 
with his finger (Mack 2001, 93). For Mack there is no way to solve this dispute by turning 
to some interpersonally valid ordering of such actions. “There is no privileged impersonal 
measure of value by which the ‘moral quality’ of these competing actions can be compared 
and ranked” (Mack 2001, 94). Mack claims that rights tell us not which action is ranked 
morally higher, but simply who has the authority to dispose of the action in question. So, 
for Mack, P’s use of his finger is always ‘favoured’ by morality because P is the person 
who has the power to decide what happens to his finger.  
 While I certainly agree with the conclusion that P is the one who has jurisdiction 
over the use of his finger, it does not seem plausible to hold that rights are not value-based 
if we have based rights on agent-relative values. Mack was worried that agent-relative 
reasons will not be able to provide a basis for rights as moral side constraints. We have 
seen last chapter why the theory of side constraints based on dual sources of moral 
obligation seems implausible. But we also can see that the argument that rights are not 
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based on some kind of value-based reasons is implausib e too. It might be true that we do 
not check the moral status of what P, Q and R wish to do with P’s finger in order to decide 
who has a right over its use. The reason for this is that once we have derived and specified 
P’s right to his finger as a right that P has, we are also saying that P does not need to 
explain or justify his use of it to others—unless, of course, he intends to interfere with 
others’ rights. Because P’s right to his finger is tied to his needing it for his own life, this 
means that others do not have a say in how he uses it. This holds even though other’s use of 
it might seem to have a higher moral quality.  
 Yet, having based rights on agent-relative reasons, we do not have to claim like 
Mack that rights are not based on any kind of agent-r la ive value consideration. Since 
agents want their rights because it helps them achieve their own good, we can say that they 
have a value-based reason for respecting rights. So, when Mack states that P’s rights that S 
perform as she has promised isn’t grounded on the value for P or for S of S’s having to act 
that way, we must disagree. As we saw in chapter four, S might have the duty to abide by 
P’s right, but he won’t do it because he values what P’s right protects. Rather we saw that 
the motivating reason why S will abide by P’s right is hat doing so will be in S’s best 
interest.  
 This might seem to make rights too dependent upon the duty-holder’s desires as 
Mack thinks. But basing rights upon a characteristic like self-possession gives us pretty 
strong individual rights. The reason is that we all h ve reason to see why we need a right to 
have our being a first possessor protected. We need a protection over the actions required 
to keep ourselves able to promote our good. This kind of right is needed by all of us. It is 
the kind of equal basic right that we will all agree to accept. And, it must be remembered, 
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people have reason to adopt a policy or rule to abide y others rights, and not just abide by 
rights on a case-by-case basis. Given this argument, then everyone needs to change their 
actions so that they abide by others’ rights. The fact that people will act in a principled 
way, then, guarantees the existence of a system of rights. Because people are willing to 
abide by others’ rights in a principled way, the system of rights can be instituted. This 
means the system will take on a life of its own, with enforcement making sure everyone 
abides by rights. But even though enforcement is there to make sure people abide by rights, 
we should not forget the fact that people choose to abide by rights in a principled way. 
 Part of the problem with solving rights disputes is that rights are complicated 
entities. As Waldron argues, there might be many different duties that an interest can 
generate because there are many different ways an interest can be served or disserved 
(Waldron 1998, 212).26  This means that a right might give rise to many different duties. A 
right to free speech might generate a duty not to impose censorship, a duty to protect those 
who speak in public from others who disagree, a duty to establish rules for public speaking 
that eliminate conflict from different speakers, etc. And if this is the case, then we should 
not be surprised that all these different duties that a right might generate could conflict. 
Waldron says that once we see this as being the case then talk about trade offs might seem 
less problematic, more a necessity. Since all of our p ssible duties cannot be compossible, 
we will have to face the fact that rights might notform a compossible system and, so, 
might require some external method of resolving rights disputes when they occur.  
 But how are we to resolve conflicts amongst rights holders by looking at trade offs? 
Waldron argues that we need to be able to establish pr orities amongst rights. Take the 
                                                
26 Waldron talks only about interest-based rights. I would add that this point also seems to hold for choice 
rights. We might have interest rights that are basically choices, and also it might be the case that our choices 
are also interests. So, it’s not clear that we can always separate choices from interests.  
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Nazis who want to make hateful speeches against another group, the communists (Waldron 
1998, 222-3). The Nazis, it seems, want to incite people to invade the communist’s 
meetings and prevent the communists from meeting freely. We seem to have a conflict 
between the Nazi’s right to freedom of speech and the Communist’s right to freedom of 
speech. Waldron says one way to solve this dispute, that does not turn to a utilitarian 
calculation of who receives the most pleasure, is to look “in terms of each person’s interest 
in participating on equal terms in a form of public life in which all may speak their minds” 
(Waldron 1998, 223). Waldron says that on this view, the dispute between rights is more 
easily resolved: 
 
To count as a genuine exercise of free speech, a person’s contribution must be 
related to that of his opponent in a way that makes room for them both. Though 
they claim to be exercising that right, the Nazi’s speeches do not have this 
character. The speeches they claim the right to make are calculated to bring an end 
to the form of life in relation to which the idea of free speech is conceived. We may 
ban their speeches, therefore, not because we can ne essarily safeguard more rights 
by doing so, but because in their content and tendency the Nazis’ speeches are 
incompatible with the very idea of the right they are sserting (Waldron ibid).  
 
This is a way of sometimes establishing which right s to have lexical priority in a situation 
where rights seem to conflict. Waldron says that it may not always work, so we may 
sometimes just have to weight the values in question and act on those duties that are 
correlated with the higher valued right. Then we act on the duties that are most likely to 
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protect the interests we think are most important. Bu  he thinks that the lexical priority 
argument, or qualitative argument, often is better to use than a quantitative approach 
because it helps to show why rights have priorities over lesser moral concerns. The lexical 
priority argument shows why rights are resistant to trade offs while the quantitative 
argument would hold that if the Nazis were greater in number then, because more of their 
rights are affected, their rights should take preced nce over the Communists’.  
 Waldron’s essay neatly emphasizes that we can have two ways of resolving 
disputes. While we cannot fully decide between the lexical priority argument and the 
weighting of values or rights argument, we can see that both have their merits and 
problems. The lexical argument assumes that we can have some way of weighting rights by 
weighting the values that underlie them. But if value is agent-relative then such an 
impersonal standard that would be acceptable to all doesn’t seem feasible. The fact that P 
wants to use his finger to do something that everyone else thinks is trivial doesn’t mean 
that P shouldn’t have the right to do it. We have a right to do what’s ‘wrong’, and so the 
Nazis also have such a right to promote a way of life that others object to. While it’s not 
clear that the Nazis are caught in a performative contradiction by doing something they 
implicitly deny should be done, what they are doing is inciting their followers to cause 
bodily harm to others. This seems to be the real problem here, because it is the 
Communists’ right to promote their own good that is in jeopardy. So, if we need to say that 
there is a ‘lexical priority’ of rights, it is the security and safety of everyone that precedes 
others’ ability to express themselves. It might have seemed like we had a conflict between 
two groups’ rights to freedom of speech; but the actu l conflict is when one group attempts 
to suppress the other group using force.  
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 I think we can often rely on possession to show whose rights should take 
precedence. In the case of the Nazis and the Communists we can see that if we think in 
terms of rights to self-possession that the Communists will have their right to bodily 
protection violated by the Nazis. The appeal to the right to continue to be a self-possessor 
and the duty not to do what will interfere with others’ exercising this right means that the 
Nazi’s right to freedom of speech should be overridden when they use it to violate other’s 
rights. Usually, then, one’s right to continue to be a self-possessor has lexical priority over 
other kinds of rights. Possession has a heavy weighting—maybe 9/10 of the law—because 
of how greatly it is needed by us to live our own good lives. But there are times when 
possession is not the only consideration that matters. 
 There might be times when equal shares is the prefrred moral default position, and 
so this might generate a prima facie right to an equal share. If we were all travelling 
together and found some large resource, we would think it inappropriate if someone tried to 
claim this resource all for himself. Bruce Ackerman uses the thought experiment about a 
spaceship orbiting a newly discovered planet containing the desirable resource manna (in 
Schmidtz 2006, 152). Here we can agree that people should have a right to an equal share 
of the resource because they all arrive at the resou ce at the same time. But even though 
such a right is possible under such circumstances, w  need to emphasize that we come into 
the world all at different times and so the default position we will appeal to is first come 
first served. The reason is that in the real world “there are no unowned goods sitting on a 
table awaiting fair division. The goods have already been claimed by others, and are at 
least partly the products of lifetimes of work” (Schmidtz 2006, 153). The fact that first 
come first served is the moral default position we usually appeal to means that when we are 
 156 
settling rights disputes we need to make sure that we are weighting our decisions in favour 
of this default position. The real world does not usually contain manna, or situations where 
we all come to the table at the same time to divide things up, so we must make sure that 
how we decide rights disputes is reflective of the fact that our past histories matter to us.  
 It seems that law courts often do turn to possession to settle disputes or to lay 
criminal charges. Common law courts recognize actual and constructive possession of 
things. If someone has actual, or factual, possession of an item he does so because he is 
actually in physical contact with the item. If you are wearing a coat then you possess your 
coat because of its physical proximity to you. If your wallet is in your coat, then you 
possess it too. But one need not only be in physical contact with something to possess it. A 
set of facts might clearly indicate that you posses something even though you have no 
physical contact with it. Constructive possession, or possession in law, takes into account 
that when a person has knowledge of something and the ability to control it, then he can be 
said to possess it even though he is not in physical contact with it (United States v. Derose, 
74 F. 3d 1177 [11th Cir. 1996]). For instance, if one puts papers intoa safety deposit box, 
because one has knowledge over them and can exercise control over them, then one can be 
said to be the possessor of them. Courts also recognize this sort of possession in cases of 
criminal possession. Possession of drugs has been made criminal. The law recognizes that 
even though you may give your drugs to someone else to hold, since you have knowledge 
of them and also control over what happens to them, you have possession of them even 
though they are not in your custody.   
Often common law courts decide cases by looking at who has possession of 
something. If someone has actual or constructive possession of an item in dispute, then the 
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case must be made against him that he possesses that item illegally. Usually just saying that 
he ought not to have it because someone else could d  something better with it is not 
sufficient to overcome his right to possess it. There may be some cases where this 
happens—such as in ‘takings’ cases where the government appropriates someone else’s 
property (and compensates him enough) because the prop rty is needed for some public 
use. If the government can do this, then it does not seem that possession is 10/10 of the 
law. For instance, it has been argued that taxation that might be needed to support the 
enforcement of the system of rights. If rights are necessary to our promoting our good, and 
the only way to effectively support a system of rights is via taxation, then people ought to 
be willing to pay taxes. Some may not want to pay taxes, but since they receive the benefits 
of the system of enforcement, they can be forcibly taxed. If this kind of argument works—
and it’s disputable that it does—then forcibly taking away some funds from people would 
be justified. This means that their possessions are liable to be used to support the 
government and the system of rights and so their right to possess what they have is not 
without limits.  
 Also, we need to recognize that what we are looking at here is moral philosophy, 
not legal theory. So, even if courts do not look at possession to solve cases this may not 
matter if what we are arguing over here is the moral basis of rights. We cannot appeal to 
the law itself to justify why we have basic rights, or why violating them is illegal; rather we 
must look to moral theory to show us why we have basic rights and why certain courses of 
action are illegal because they are immoral. This is not to say that looking at why the law 
makes the distinctions it does cannot inform us about why our rights are the way they are. 
Since the law deals with many real world cases, it may have over time developed a much 
 158 
more fine tuned analysis of possession than philosophers have. But this does not mean that 
there is not a moral basis for possession that can only be explained by moral philosophy. 
Moral philosophy can be used to explain how the law does work, but it can also try to 
explain why we ought to have certain rights and why the law ought to recognize those 
rights. Surely the moral basis for rights will tell us what sort of rights we have, and what 
sort of ways of settling disputes is morally justified.  
 
 In terms of thresholds we might wonder how strong ur rights are and if they 
protect us against people being made the means to others’ ends. We have seen that we will 
have principled reasons to abide by rights because of the idea that it is a wise choice to act 
on a principle protecting others’ right to continue to be self-possessors. This guarantees 
people will have their rights protected in most ordinary circumstances. These rights can be 
thought to be robust because of the duty bearers’ willingness to abide by them. Yet, if our 
willingness to abide by rights is based upon their b ng conducive to our own good, 
especially our survival, what happens when our survival is clearly in doubt? Is it reasonable 
to expect that we do not have to abide by the right?  
 One case that is usually brought up as an example of an emergency situation is a 
lifeboat situation. What if you were in a lifeboat and could only survive by making sure the 
lifeboat did not overfill with people. Would it be OK to throw someone overboard, or to 
keep people from coming on board, in order to make sur the lifeboat stayed afloat. We 
should make a distinction here between cases where one does not own the boat but has 
bought a right to sit on one of the lifeboats as part of one’s ticket, and those cases where 
one owns the boat itself. I think in both cases one’s rights to possess either the boat or 
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one’s seat in the boat protect one from being thrown ut by others. Let’s discuss the case 
where the boat is not owned by anyone first. 
We can only violate the rights of those who try to get into the lifeboat because they 
are the ones who are a threat to us. This puts somelimitations on what we can do to people 
in this situation. If others are not trying to get into the lifeboat it seems reasonable to say 
that we still have duties not to harm them. But those who try to get into the lifeboat will 
forfeit their rights because they are trying to do something that will take away our life. 
Usually, we cannot do something that will kill others unless we are defending ourselves 
against them. In this case it is not entirely clear whether we are defending ourselves against 
them because they are trying to harm us, or if we just find that we have no other choice 
open to us but to kill those who are merely trying to survive. Some of them might be trying 
to kill us to take our spot, or some might simply be trying to climb aboard without knowing 
they will cause harm. In either case, the outcome will be the same since they will cause the 
boat to sink. But given that the situation is described as us having absolute knowledge of 
how many people can fit into the boat, the necessity of he situation makes it permissible to 
violate the rights of those who put our lives in peril.  
It is interesting to note that what gives the peopl in the boat moral legitimacy for 
keeping others out is the idea of first come, first served. In the lifeboat case, first come first 
served states that those who find themselves in the boat first may keep others out. Of 
course anyone might jump out and offer his place to a child, but once he finds himself on 
board first come first served says he need not do so. First come first served will also give 
their actions legitimacy if there is a hearing after the incident. I think that someone will not 
be morally responsible for keeping others out of the lifeboat (i.e., allowing them to die) if 
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he is just protecting his place in the boat. He might not be excused if it’s found out that he 
pulled someone else out and allowed him to drown just to take his place. The reason is that 
even though basic rights to life were in dispute, it still seems that first come first served 
holds as a moral default that can be used to assign moral responsibility for what he did in 
such a situation. 
Assuming those left in the water are doomed to die, it s an interesting question here 
whether the people in the boat who keep out late comers are allowing those in the water to 
die, or whether they are directly killing them. Part of the plausibility for why it is OK to 
stop those in the water from boarding is that those in the lifeboat are not really killing them, 
but are just letting them die. Allowing people to die seems morally better than directly 
killing them, it seems, because one is not directly causing their deaths. If a doctor pulls the 
plug on a patient on life support it is said he is not breaking his Hippocratic oath to do no 
harm because he is not directly killing the patient, at most he just letting nature take its 
course. The people in the lifeboat are like the doctor in that when they just prevent people 
from getting into the boat they are not directly killing those in the water—the coldness of 
the water will be what kills them.  
This might make some people feel better about having to let those in the water die, 
but the claim here is stronger—it’s that even when you have to kill someone directly to 
save your seat you are not morally culpable for doing so. The double effect idea holds that 
one is not responsible for the killing if one did not intend it, and the killing cannot be a 
means to the good effect.27 But the stronger claim here is that one is not guilty for 
defending one’s position in the boat even if one int nds the killing. Surely the killing is 
                                                
27 Here I am leaving out the idea that the good effect to be achieved must also outweigh bad effects. Here the 
good effect is not some overall measure of the good, but can only be agent-relative good for the person in 
question. 
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intended and it is a means to one’s good. The reason why this is legitimate in this case is 
because one is acting in self-defense. The person tying to board the boat is attempting to 
kill you, so the only option is to kill him. And what makes legitimate your place in the boat 
in the first place is first come first served. First come first served gives you the right to 
keep your place in the boat and it puts a terrible duty on others to respect this right.  
In general then we can state the following about this kind of case. One can be 
excused for allowing others to die, or having to kill them, if the life or death necessity of 
‘me or them’ is apparent. The necessity gives one the moral authority to defend oneself 
against those who are directly trying to do one harm. Obviously rights have limitations 
when it comes to self-defense—if someone tries to kill you then you have the right to 
defend yourself. But if you have taken a place in the lifeboat then you have the right to 
defend yourself against others and they should havethe corresponding duty not to try to 
take your place. If they do try to take your place, th n they are the ones who are trying to 
violate your claim. If the necessity of the situation is not high—that is, if there is not a ‘me 
or them’ situation—then you might be responsible for harm you cause because others’ 
rights still hold against you.  
Whether the boat is common property or owned by someone will make a difference 
to who can get in the boat. We have seen that if the boat is not owned by anyone is 
particular then whoever gets to it first has a claim to its use. But it seems reasonable to say 
that he can only take up a seat in the boat and does n t get to decide who else can come 
into the boat, except when newcomers threaten the safety of those already there. But if the 
boat is owned by someone who has paid for it before the cruise, then this person would be 
able to decide who can get on board. His ownership rights take precedence over the rights 
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of others to get on board because he has first possession of the boat. He has the right to ask 
people who have taken his seat to leave, even if doing so means that those people may die 
in the water. The fact that others will die is not a countervailing consideration strong 
enough to override one’s rights because of the importance of respecting the system of 
rights, and the fact that he is not directly responsible for the harm that they will suffer. His 
exercising his right does not directly cause people to be in the predicament that they are in, 
so his right ought to hold even though it does not help other get out of their predicament. 
Also, first possession is not a principle that we should give up or break easily—the reason, 
of course, is that it protects our lives and our ability to promote our good. In this situation 
we can see how it protects our lives by stopping others from taking a thing necessary to 
one’s survival. 
Of course we should note that just because one has the right to the boat does not 
mean that one will exclude anyone else from boarding it. In this situation if one did not 
allow people on board, even though it would be in his right to do so, we would think that 
he is lacking something that all decent persons need. As Hegel said in this regard: “To have 
no interest except in one’s formal right may be pure obstinacy, often a fitting 
accompaniment of a cold heart and restricted sympathies. It is uncultured people who insist 
most on their rights, while noble minds look on other aspects of the thing” (in Waldron 
1993, 373). While we may disagree that one is uncultured if one insists upon one’s rights, 
we can agree that people who only care about their rights may be lacking certain human 
sympathies and virtues they ought to cultivate.   
But we might wonder if there are still cases where the consequences of respecting 
rights were so catastrophic that it might be permissible to violate them in order to produce a 
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better state of affairs. Of course the first question might be: better for whom? If I can only 
save a trolley full of people by sacrificing another p rson’s life it is certainly good for the 
people on the trolley but not the person who has died. On the agent relative view of value 
one would not be improving the overall good by sacrificing the one person, one would just 
be making a choice to save a few by killing one. This does not mean that one would be held 
responsible if the necessity were such that one had to steer the trolley either in such a way 
that one would be killed or all on board would be killed. But if you were a doctor who 
chose to sacrifice a patient’s life to harvest his organs in order to save 5 other patient’s 
lives, then there does not seem to be the same kind of ecessity. The consequences of not 
violating the rights of the patients with the healthy organs is that 5 other patient’s will die; 
but the one patient does not lose his right to life because there is no real necessity in this 
situation—one does not have to make a choice like one did in the trolley case.28  
The fact that the trolley case is so odd points to the fact that there may not be many 
real cases where the consequences of respecting rights are so catastrophic that we would do 
better to violate rights than respect them. The doctor-patient case is not really one of moral 
necessity because there is still a reasonable choice open to the doctor that allows him not to 
violate any rights and still be respecting everyone’s rights. There is no way to calculate the 
social good in a utilitarian sense that would allow him to kill one person to save 5 others. 
Rights protect other people against being used as the means to someone else’s end without 
their consent. Unless we truly have a catastrophic event, we do not have good reason to 
                                                
28 It might be argued that the doctor does need to choose—so if he does nothing, he chooses that the one 
patient continues to live and the others die. It istrue of course that not choosing is still a choice. But here 
what matters is the fact that he will not be causing the harm to the five patients if he chooses to no kill the 
one patient and harvest his organs. He would be causing harm and be morally responsible for killing the one 
patient because he has acted to kill this person. But he cannot really be said to have acted to kill the five 
patients because he has not directly caused their deaths (cf. Burke, No Harm).   
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violate anyone’s rights.  Ordinary cases like the doctor and his patients are not cases where 
the doctor should even think about violating anyone’s rights. On the agent-relative theory 
we just don’t have a moral theory that allows us to calculate how much better off we would 
all be if we killed five to save one.  
Some have argued that rights are claims it would be wrong for a government to 
deny any individual even though it would be in the general interest to do so.29 This way of 
making rights sound like permissions to do less than what the overall social good calls on 
us to do gives credence to trolley claims because it gives credence to the idea that there is 
an overall social good. At best we might say that tere are only cases of aggregate interests. 
It is not really possible to rank and compare agent-r lative interests, but it might possible to 
say that interests are similar enough to say that i’s possible to say that most people have an 
interest in X. This was the claim for saying that everyone would have a similar interest in 
having their being a self-possessor protected. But to say that rights are permissions against 
being made to promote some overall good seems to make rights more susceptible to trolley 
claims. For why would we think that we have the right not to do what the overall good calls 
us to do? If it really is what we should do, then why do we have a right not to do it? 
Luckily, we do not have to answer these problems from the agent-relative perspective, 
since they are questions for those who want to holdthat rights are permissions not to have 
to promote the agent neutral overall good. 
I have argued that in general people’s rights survive being overridden by other’s 
welfare. But is it always the case that our rights survive in the face of the numbers of others 
                                                
29 Dworkin says: “Individual rights are…trumps held by individuals. Individuals have rights when, for some 
reason, a collective goal is not sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have 
or to do, or not sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury on them” (Dworkin 1978, xi). 
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who could be affected for the better if our rights could be permissibly overridden?  Take 
the following story: 
 
Imagine that aliens from outer space have forced you to choose between the 
following two outcomes: (a) one innocent person (of your gender) and yourself 
survive, the remainder of the human race perishes, and (b) that one innocent person 
dies, the remainder of the human race survives. You are to indicate your choice by 
manipulating a switch, which is in position (a). If you do not flip the switch from 
(a) to (b), six billion people die; if you do flip the switch, one person dies. It is 
implausible to say that it would be wrong to save th  human race at the cost of a 
single human life. The right of the one not to be killed is not violated but, to borrow 
an expression, ‘infringed’ by sacrificing him (Edmundson 2004, 147-8). 
 
It might seem that in the trolley case we let ourselves off easy—because it seems wrong to 
kill one to save 6. But what about to save 6 thousand? 6 billion? At some point the numbers 
count, so that we must admit that rights have some thresholds, or that “there are possible 
countervailing considerations that, once they are reach a certain threshold, overcome the 
right” (Edmundson 2004, 147).  
 Perhaps it might seem that we will only reach these circumstances in rare cases, like 
the science fiction one above. But Edmundson suggests that we need to see that most of our 
rights have thresholds under certain circumstances. Thi  means that rights are ‘defeasible’ 
because they are open to being defeated under certain conditions. The first amendment of 
the U.S. constitution guarantees that government wo’t make laws that abridge its citizens’ 
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freedom of speech. But this doesn’t mean that governm nt cannot make laws that prohibit 
people from utilizing their right at 3 am to yell poetry from a bullhorn. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has interpreted the amendment so that states c n make sure that free speech happens 
during a reasonable time, manner and place (Edmundson 2004, 149). This suggests that our 
right to free speech has a threshold of time, manner, and place that may act as a 
countervailing consideration to our general right. When the reasons for thinking that our 
speech is not used at an appropriate time, manner, or place, we have reasons that are 
sufficiently weighty enough to curtail our right.  
 This view has the implication that all of our rights are open to being overridden at 
certain times—say when they interfere with someone els ’s interests, say the use and 
enjoyment of his own property to get some sleep. But one wonders whether it might not be 
better to describe one’s right to freedom of speech being curtailed because it conflicts with 
someone else’s right to control what happens to his property. So, it’s not that your right to 
control your property permissibly infringes his right to freedom of speech, but just that he 
does not have a right to freedom of speech that overrides your property rights. Perhaps this 
can still be called a weightier reason that limits, or curtails another’s right to freedom of 
speech. The reason why we might want to say that righ s are limited by another’s rights is 
that if rights are permissibly infringed, then the person whose right is infringed might be 
owed compensation, or owed some form of acknowledgement that he was harmed. But in 
the case of limiting the person’s freedom of speech, it seems that his right is limited 
because if he were to exercise his right, he would be causing harm to another person. 
 Finally, we must turn to the hard question regarding why it might be reasonable to 
override an innocent person’s right to life to benefit a great number of people or preserve 
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the system of rights for the rest of us. Some do not even think that this kind of reasoning 
makes sense. As F.M. Kamm argued, “it would simply be contradictory for it to be morally 
permissible to minimize violations of the constraint itself for the sake of showing concern 
for it”  (Kamm 1992, 384). So, if we are not to kill innocent people, we cannot turn around 
and say that it would be OK to kill one innocent person in order to save a million other 
innocents. This would be contradictory and contradictions are to be avoided. This has a 
certain moral appeal and because it makes one a consiste t rights upholder, it is what we 
should strive for in most cases. But there is something strange about claiming that one will 
abide by others rights even though the heavens may fall. If I could steal your laser and 
blow up an asteroid heading for the Earth, thereby saving myself and everyone else, 
doesn’t it seem more reasonable to say that stealing it, maybe even killing you if necessary, 
is justified. It sounds crazy not to do it because if we don’t then there won’t be any more 
anything for any of us. This might not mean that we ar  contradicting ourselves, because 
this kind of an emergency situation is one that overrid s our regular concern for rights. The 
concern for the constraint has some limitations, beyond which we do not contradict 
ourselves when we violate it in order to better prese ve it.  
In contrast, consequentialists argue that if we do not violate the principle in 
question, we will make it so that there are further violations of it later. The appeal of 
consequentialism lies “in a form of rationality (“maximizing rationality”) that we employ 
ordinarily in many diverse contexts and which in cosequentialism is employed in ethics. 
The core of maximizing rationality is that given a desirable goal and more than one option 
to achieve it, it would be irrational to choose an option which gave us less of the goal” 
(Den Uyl 1991, 47). As argued, under agent-relative value, we do not have an agent neutral 
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way of deciding whether the greater or lesser amounts of violations are more or less 
valuable to any of us. We ought to just abide by rights because doing so is a way of making 
sure that we are better able to promote our own ends. But at some point it does seem 
reasonable to say that if all or most of us were to be severely affected by someone unless 
we violate his rights, that we would have reason to violate his rights. This is not the claim 
that we are doing so because the overall outcome would be better if we violate his rights 
because the value of our rights outweighs his rights. Rather, it is just the claim that at some 
point when the existence of the system of rights depends upon violating it, it might be 
reasonable for us to do so because we will be saving ourselves from great harm, especially 
by making sure that the system of rights continues to function in order to protect our 
futures. 
 What makes it reasonable to do it is not so much that we can somehow calculate 
when many rights outweigh a few rights, so that it becomes permissible to kill the innocent 
one to save millions. But it does seem true that at some point a threshold is reached when it 
is permissible to override someone’s rights, even kill him, in order to prevent the deaths of 
many others. This threshold arises, I argue, becaus of the fact that what is at stake is the 
system of rights itself, or humanity itself. We would be justified in taking the life of an 
innocent if doing so meant that we would be preserving a large number of lives, or even the 
system of rights itself.  
 Some might think that allowing this kind of threshold means that rights can be 
overridden whenever the rights of others will be served by it. But this kind of situation 
must be one of life and death. There have to be a gr t many lives on the line—like in 
Edmundson’s example, it must be almost the whole planet on the line, or the possibility 
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that the system of rights will break down and not be a le to serve our needs—so that we are 
justified in taking someone’s life. Of course if saving the planet means having to kill a 
large portion of its people, then the choice to kill such a large number no longer seems 
reasonable. Part of the problem here is that there is no real way to calculate how to make 
such a decision. Killing one to save a billion seems ore reasonable than killing 300 
million to save a billion. Maybe this is due to the fact that the reason for killing the one is 
to save a great number of us and also to preserve the system of rights. But if you have to 
kill 300 million to save a billion, it may no longer seem as reasonable if the system of 
rights will not survive the killing of hundreds of millions. So, for some the system of rights 
cannot survive in principle if one must violate it occasionally in order to preserve it. But 
the argument here has been that sometimes the numbers ust matter. This means that in a 
time of great crisis it might be reasonable to kill one person to save most others. Luckily 
we do not seem faced with such choices between violating one person’s rights and saving 
the rest of humanity. This means that we have reason to abide by rights not to kill others, 
even though we could gain from it.   
 
§ 6.2 Conclusion. We have seen that rights may not always be compossible and so we may 
need to turn to an adjudicator to settle disputes. We can often rely on possession to see 
whose rights take precedence in situation where rights are in dispute. A person’s right to 
his own bodily protection overrides others’ rights to freedom of speech. So, the Nazi’s right 
to freedom of speech can be override if it threatens he Communist’s right to be free from 
physical harm. The right to continue to be a self-possessor trumps other rights, like rights 
to free expression. Possession is the moral default posi ion that we ought to turn to in order 
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to settle disputes. But possession may not be the only c nsideration that we look at. As 
argued, there may be times when equal shares is thepref rred moral default because it 
recognizes the fact that everyone has arrived on the scene at the same time—and so 
everyone deserves an equal share of the item in dispute. But in most cases first possession 
will be the moral default because it is the recognitio  that everyone does not arrive on the 
scene at the same time. So, when trying to resolve disputes over rights, arbitrators ought to 
solve disputes so that recognition is given to first possession as much as is possible.  
 We have also seen that rights may have thresholds beyond which they do not hold. 
But this is not to say that under most everyday circumstances rights do not hold. Rights are 
principles that ought to hold under normal circumstances because they are principles that 
protect us against others. They are not principles that we would want to do without, nor are 
they principles we can break when it suits us to do so. So it seems reasonable to say that 
when we have a situation where we could do better by overriding someone’s rights, we 
only ought to do so if it’s an emergency situation. Using agent-relative value we cannot 
perform a calculation to find out whether harming one agent can be outweighed by the 
harm that that could prevent to five other agents. If this is true at the level of 1 vs. 5 then 
it’s true at the level of 1 vs. 1 billion. But the fact that so many of us will be affected by a 
catastrophic event gives us reason to act. The reason why we can violate rights in an 
extreme emergency is mainly to keep the system of rights intact—that is, so that there will 
be fewer future violations of people’s rights and safety. This is not to say that we are 
justified and do not violate someone’s right when we take action in such an emergency; but 
it is to recognize that we might have to make a tragic choice to save the majority of our 







§7.1 Rights Issues. 




§7.0 Introduction. Rights were derived from the idea that agents will have agent-relative 
reasons to want their prerogatives protected. Agents will be willing to concede others’ 
rights to promote their own good if doing so will al ow them to promote their own good as 
much as possible. We saw that the kind of rights that would be acceptable would be ones 
that allow for the greatest amount of freedom possible. In the following chapter I will 
examine various problems and implications that affect theories of right such as whether 
children have rights and what sort of state this theory of rights would imply. I do not claim 
to offer a complete solution to problems, nor to fully spell out implications, but only to 
point out a way it could be done. In the final section I will sum up the argument for rights.   
 
§7.1 Rights Issues. One question that arises within the context of rights presented in this 
thesis is what sort of polity would these rights support? The clear answer is a liberal 
 172 
polity.30 But not ‘liberal’ in its common usage, as someone who stands as a foil to 
‘conservatives’, but liberal in its more philosophical sense—“namely that political power is 
not something due anyone by natural right, that progress is possible, that the individual is 
the basic social unit, that people should have the freedom to pursue their own conceptions 
of the good life, and that the state should be limited to protecting people in their pursuit of 
their good life” (Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1997, 1-2). Most mainstream political parties 
would support the above ideals reflecting the importance of individuals to some degree, so 
it is debatable whether we are all philosophical liberals now. The rights and agent-centered 
values advocated here would be suitable to a liberal theorist—at least it gives us something 
extensionally equivalent to a liberal regime.31  
Furthermore, it might make the argument that liberal regimes cannot be made 
coherent because they rely on what they deny irrelevant. Some have made the claim that 
liberalism is a theory that is ultimately incoherent because in arguing for the idea that 
liberalism is the best form of life, it must deny its acceptance of pluralism: “…if liberalism 
is to avoid the charge of vacuity, it must be committed to holding that in cases of conflict 
the particular values liberals favor do take justifiable precedence over other values. How, 
then, could liberalism and pluralism be compatible?” (Kekes 1993, 199). While I cannot 
give a definitive answer here, the short answer would seem to be that if the theory of rights 
that I have defended here is one that liberals would accept because they are based at bottom 
on a norm that is central to liberalism, and these rights constitute a way of solving disputes 
                                                
30 It would be interesting to also assess actual governm nts in terms of how well they reflect the system of 
rights set out here. A continuum of adherence could be created with the United States at the better end and 
regimes like China and North Korea at the end which in ludes violators of rights.  
31 Even were we to enter an era that meant the end of scarcity in which we could produce goods in abundance 
in a Star Trek manner, we would still need the rights t at protected our favoured goods and our ability to do 
with them what we wished.  
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of plural values, then these rights show that liberalism and pluralism are compatible. 
Liberals would need to argue that the system of rights is extensionally equivalent with a 
system that liberals would advocate based upon their pr ferred values; but to say this is not 
necessarily to say that liberals need to advocate a cert in set of values that take precedence 
over the good lives of others because the central value is something that underlies all of our 
good lives (cf. Den Uyl & Rasmussen 1997).  
This theory of rights could be able to help to explain why universal human rights 
are open to all peoples, and are not just the ideology of the West. The idea that rights are 
principles that all ought to accept has been questioned by those who see themselves as 
having different values. So the foreign minister of Singapore claimed that “universal 
recognition of the ideal of human rights can be harmful if universalism is used to deny or 
mask the reality of diversity” (in Sen 1999, 38). But assuming that this is a real worry, and 
not a means of diverting attention from the lack of will to implement rights that could 
diminish state power, we can relieve the force of such criticism by point out that the theory 
of rights rests upon a theory of value that takes into consideration many generic human 
goods; and that these goods are not Western- or Asian-relative but good for any human 
persons. Since rights are derived from recognition of these basic values, we can assert that 
the claim that these rights mask ‘diversity’ is nottrue. These rights take into account much 
more diversity than most other regimes. Yet, these rights do not allow for certain ways of 
life to flourish—such as those regimes that would diminish rights in favour of some form 
of paternalism, like the idea that China likes to attribute to its citizens, that “individuals 
must put the state’s rights before their own” (in Sen 1999, ibid.). But in ruling out certain 
forms of life—like the paternalist one—it actually increases diversity. So, this theory 
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increases the potential for diverse forms of life to flourish and does not have the opposite 
effect of diminishing diversity.    
We might wonder what we are to make of our general rights to freedom—to 
speech, to worship, to happiness, etc. Can we have a general constitutional statement of 
such rights under a specificationist theory of claim-r ghts? It seems that we can accept such 
general, almost liberty/privilege rights if they are helpful in expressing how our domains 
are used by us. But rights to freedom of speech ougt to be recognized for what they are—
the rights of adults to freely trade information with each other that do not impose positive 
duties to make sure that people are provided with chan es to speak freely. So it is useful to 
express a right everyone has to free speech, even though in practice this right needs to be 
specified in terms of who controls the domain where the speech will be expressed. If 
expressing one’s views requires using another’s newspaper, then it will be up to the 
newspaper’s owner to decide what views are expressed in his paper. But if the views are to 
be expressed in a publicly owned forum, then maybe some criteria like equal shares ought 
to be adopted in order that the forum can best accomm date the greatest number of its 
members’ views. But if a right to free speech is left unspecified, as a general right to free 
speech, then we might think that we have a liberty right to freedom of speech which trumps 
someone else’s property right, so that when I want to express myself someone else must 
give me a platform to do it—either a building to give a speech or means of conveyance, 
like a newspaper.  
Regarding religious freedom, it would seem that these freedoms fall under the 
specification of domains too. If a mosque has its daily call to prayers blasted across the 
local neighborhood then those who are affected by this sound may have cause to have it 
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stopped. This might be said to be an interference with religious freedom because it does not 
allow people to exercise their ability to carry out their religion’s dictates. But the rights in 
question are not ones regarding religious freedom s uch as they are about specified 
domains and who has the freedom to limit other’s actions when these domains conflict. If 
there were some vague right to religious freedom, then it might be that people have the 
duty to put up with this sound in order to respect tha right. The theory of rights solves such 
disputes by appealing to domains that arise from first possession that each agent has control 
over. So, the mosque would be able to broadcast its call if no one found it interfered with 
them, it did not interfere with anyone, or people wre reasonably compensated for any 
interference.  
Yet, one might object that the appeal to domains misses the point of such criticisms 
because religious adherent is being made to curb his act ons not on the basis of some 
impartial domain of rights, but because of the substantive basis of rights that prejudices it 
towards a certain kind of good life—one that values the life of tolerance over the life of 
religious virtue. Peter Byrne argues that theories of liberal rights seem to be impartial 
among different conceptions of the worthwhile life but that in order to solve disputes they 
appeal to substantive ideas of the good (Byrne 1999, 4-6). In order to say that we need to 
respect persons is to appeal to some substantive notion of what respect for persons requires. 
He claims: 
 
The critic can surely argue whether this is the right way to measure respect for 
persons, or whether the assertion of the value in liberty to pursue an individual 
preference is correct, cannot be made true by definition. We can imagine moral 
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outlooks which have different ideas of respect for persons and which do not place 
such a high value on liberty as conceived by the [rights-theorist]. Consider the strict 
sabbatarian who argues that disrespect for the Lord’s Day is so serious a harm for 
individuals and society that all should be obliged to refrain from work and public 
pleasure on a Sunday. This person values persons in so far as they are prospective 
candidates for salvation. Securing their liberty to act as they please is of 
comparatively little value if that liberty is exercised in ways that are detrimental to 
their basic good, as he sees it (Byrne 1999, 95). 
 
Firstly, the problem with such an assertion is thatere are constraints on what can count as 
a good life. We should not think that because values ar  agent-relative that there are not 
objective constraints on what can count as good. Is it clear that being a strict sabbatarian 
subsumable under the various things that can be thought to be good? The answer from the 
naturalistic position of ethics is no, not unless being a strict sabbatarian is something that is 
really a way of exercising some naturalized value or virtue. But even if the sabbatarian is 
misguided or if he is pursuing a genuine value, he has the right to do so as long as he 
respects other’s rights. But it seems that as soon as we have admitted this we are also 
saying that he has the right because of some higher value (personal liberty) that the rights 
theorist holds that makes his actions right. Why does respect for persons rest upon such a 
conception of liberty, rather than some other value like respect for the sabbath?  
 The answer to this question requires that we see how valuing rights is not the same 
as valuing what they protect. They may protect our liberty or our ability to pursue our own 
good, but rights themselves are not valued as we value our liberty or good lives. Rights are 
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not based on some general value of liberty or freedom that trumps other values, but are 
based on the idea that there is some feature common to all of our good lives that we all 
must (implicitly) value. So if domains are based on first possession, when we say that the 
agent is not allowed to force others not to work on the Sabbath, we are not putting one 
form of the good over another. The reason is that the form of the good we are protecting is 
one that all agents need to have in order to live a good life. Of course this requires 
accepting a naturalistic account of value, but to accept supernaturalistic accounts of what is 
good, where the good does not supervene upon some natural properties, would allow for 
values that could never be interpersonally understandable (cf. Wielenberg 2005). So the 
acceptance of rights does not necessarily imply that the reason for abiding by them is that 
the general value of liberty that trumps other values.  
The scope of the thesis is limited to showing how a system of negative rights can be 
derived from value pluralism. It might be objected hat this too quickly excludes a theory of 
positive rights; hence the thesis is too ideologically motivated because it seeks to justify a 
certain view of the good—namely, market oriented prope ty rights. But the logic of rights 
is such that if there are any rights that we begin with they will be negative in nature. Only 
on the basis of negative rights can one justify positive rights. But this view has been 
challenged by Henry Shue (1996), who argues that negative rights require the existence of 
positive duties (and rights) in order for them to be implemented. Positive rights are ones 
that hold that duty bearers have a positive duty towards the rights holder. Shue’s argument 
is that a right provides for the actual enjoyment of some good—typically a basic right to 
security, subsistence, and certain other liberties (Shue 1996, 19). The right to physical 
security underlies the right to free assembly since t must obtain in order for the less basic 
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right to assembly to obtain. But Shue claims that mere forebearance is never sufficient to 
make sure that basic rights obtain; in order to make sure that the right obtains, we need to 
make sure that social structures are in place to make sure that positive duties are carried out 
so that agents can will have actually enjoyment of the object of their rights. And these 
social structures are positive duties that fall on others to make sure that social structures 
exist. 
The response to this objection is to ask whether basic rights must entail positive 
duties as a logical necessity, or whether they onlye tail positive duties because such 
assistance is based upon a substantive theory of justice? As Cohen argues, it is not true that 
we need to have a right to subsistence in order to nj y the right to free assembly (Cohen 
2004, 266). A subsistence right includes rights to be provided with all those things one 
needs to have a reasonable healthy life (Shue 23). The reason why one could not enjoy any 
other rights without the right to subsistence is that one could not be secure in his right not 
to be tortured (to physical security) without others fi st making sure that he could subsist—
say by other’s having the duty to make sure that he has food in order to subsist and thereby 
have the chance to free assembly. But this does not mean that the agent could not enjoy his 
right not to be tortured because even if the agent ca not acquire food he can still enjoy his 
right not to be tortured (Cohen 2004, 267). What is required for him to enjoy his freedom 
from torture are rights against being tortured—individuals forebear torturing him, 
individuals protect him from being tortured, and inividuals assist him when he is tortured 
(Cohen 2004, 268). If these considerations hold then one enjoys the right not to be tortured 
even though there is no right and corresponding positive duty to provide him with food for 
subsistence. Shue might object that one cannot have a right simply to physical security 
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because such security “is not normally a demand simply to be left alone, but a demand to 
be protected against harm. It is a demand for positive action…for social guarantees against 
at least the standard threats” (Shue 1996, 38-9; Cohen 2004, 269). But the reason why Shue 
says that this must be so is that a right-to-be protected against assault is something that any 
reasonable person would demand from society. Yet, this is only to say that people would 
demand it as reasonable, not that it is a demand made necessary by the structure of basic 
rights itself. Basic rights need not include within their specification that their purpose is to 
make sure that people are able to enjoy certain goods, or a certain good life. Negative rights 
that do not include this idea that the job of rights is to make sure that people are able to 
enjoy a good life of a certain sort do not entail positive duties on others to make sure those 
goods obtain. 
It might be thought that this claim is not sufficient to rebut Shue’s idea that in order 
to have a right we need to be able to enjoy the right. Is it not true that in order to have the 
right to be free from torture or abuse we need to be a le to enjoy this right? I think at 
bottom that the idea that in order to enjoy the right conflates having the rights as something 
that other’s must respect with the actual enforcement of the right by some third party. It 
only needs to be true, normatively speaking, that one has a right if the argument can be 
made out that you do have this kind of moral right. Others then have the duty to refrain 
from violating it. If they do not refrain from violating the right, then it is factually true that 
you lack the right, but this is not to say that you morally lack the right. The duty not to 
violate your right is one that the person who is violating your right has, not a duty some 
other party has to make sure that your right is not violated. If it is a negative right, then the 
only way that others would have a duty to protect it—make sure you can enjoy it—is if you 
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have some prior agreement that imposes a duty on them o enforce it. It is true that in 
modern societies the government has said that it has a positive duty to protect negative 
rights, so it makes sure that people can enjoy their negative rights by enforcement. But this 
does not prove that others have positive duties to make sure negative rights can be 
enjoyed—all it shows it that that is what is happening. If the government did not promise 
this, we would still have enforceable negative duties against others not to violate negative 
rights. Negative rights and the duties they entail are prior to agreement to enforce them—it 
is only because people violate them that we need to find a way to enforce them. 
    The theory of rights is meant to help show where on person’s life begins and 
another’s ends. Regimes that do not recognize rights typically do not and cannot recognize 
the importance of this distinction. In China for instance, people who are practitioners of 
certain religions are sent to re-education camps. Also, the Internet is censored by the 
government because if “it’s not supposed to be seen, th  it’s not supposed to be seen” 
(Thompson 2006, 69; cf. Dann and Haddow 2007). Even if it is in a person’s best interest 
that he should not belong to such a religion, or that he should not really spend his time 
online looking at political websites (or porn), we ould need a stronger argument for 
paternalism than simply claiming that he should be forced to do what is in his best interest. 
Of course the reason why we think we need a stronge ar ument is that people have rights 
that protect them against paternalist interferences. But by basing rights on a norm of justice 
we need to be careful we are not allowing for paternalism to enter the system, thereby 
muddying the distinction between our good and other’s. Justice tells us why we ought to 
abide by other’s rights in terms of being a just person who recognizes the moral 
separateness of others; but in doing so it does not tell us to make others better off because it 
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is our duty to look after others in order to make th m better people. Justifying rights in the 
context of pluralist values requires that we be sensitive to making sure that the feature that 
justifies them does not rule out other good types of lives. Recognizing first possession as a 
form of being just is about allowing others the choi e to create and implement lives of their 
own. Rights become a domain of their own that demarcates a line that other persons, 
groups, and organizations cannot cross without the agent’s consent. To cross such a 
boundary without the agent’s consent is potentially to harm that person in a way that 
cannot be repaired by simple value substitution—simply giving something in return to try 
to replace that which has been taken. And so, respecting other’s rights is a way of 
recognizing the fact that there are some things we can do to others that cannot be made 
right by offering them something in return. 
 
§7.2 Conclusion. The purpose of this thesis was to show how a theory of ight could be 
reconciled with the plural values we find in the world today. In the ‘real’ world we do not 
find that everyone creates a life based on the categorical imperative, nor do they sum up the 
utilities and disutilities of actions before acting. Part of the reason for this is that people do 
not have a way of making comparisons between their good and someone else’s in order to 
make such utility calculations; and nor do they make rules for themselves that based on 
reasons conforming to pure practical reason. People value things based upon how these 
things further their lives. Yet, while this is perfctly reasonable to do, it seems to make the 
goal of a theory of rights harder to attain because rights seems to require a way of judging 
when someone’s good should be subjugated to another’s—which is the goal of most 
theories of ethics that create a hierarchy of goods in order to solve disputes. Since rights are 
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a way of showing whose good is to take precedence over another’s in conflict situations, 
reconciling rights with plural values will require that we show how values exist and are 
plural, what a theory of rights requires and what sor of arguments can meet these 
requirements, and finally, how rights are coherent. This thesis has attempted to answer 
these questions.  
Chapter Two attempted to explain how values exist and why it is reasonable to 
think that agents’ most pressing concern is to further heir own interests. We saw how 
values are best thought of as agent-relative becaus showing how values are related to 
agents better explains their existence as things that are valuable for agents. Agent-relative 
value also has the implication that reasons for valuing something will be transmissible only 
for those who also share the same value. So, only if I have the goal of protecting the 
environment will I also have the reason to help youfurther your end of protecting the 
environment. This means there are no agent-neutral values that transmit their desirability or 
reasonableness to all no matter what ends you might wis  instead to pursue. From this 
Chapter we derived the first and second theses of practical reason—respectively, that one 
has reason to pursue one’s own good, but not the sam reasons to help another person 
pursue his own good.  
Chapter Three showed how this theory of value can be a form of value pluralism 
when we think of plurality as consisting in the idea that some things may not be valuable 
for everyone in the same degree. This Chapter shows  pluralism need not be thought to 
consist of agent-neutral values, like John Gray and Isaiah Berlin hold. But also how the 
agent-relative theory of pluralism is simpler because it makes plurality dependent upon the 
fact that there are as many plural values as there ar  persons who can be related to values in 
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different degrees. This position does not imply moral relativism because it holds that not 
everything can be of value to persons because some g ods must be had by persons in some 
degree, but can be had in many degrees.  
Chapter Four examined arguments used to justify a system of rights. We noted that 
rights can be based upon the view that they are of b nefit to the recipient of the correlative 
duties or the well being of the agent who must abide y the duties. We examined the 
strengths and weaknesses of these views and found that a full explanation of rights requires 
that harm to the rights holder be explained in terms of harm that is done to him qua rights 
holder, and not the harm done to the person who is duty-bound to abide by his rights; but 
also we found that in order to explain why anyone wishes to have rights, rights must be tied 
to how well they protect his well-being. Since the reasons why I want my rights protected 
and the reasons why I might have to abide by another’s rights diverge, this set up the 
problem that rights might seem to require two separate sources of moral obligation, so that 
one would need a source of moral obligation to fully account for rights that is unavailable 
under the first thesis of practical reason.   
Chapter Five attempts to show that we need not accept a theory like Eric Mack’s 
that gives us two separate reasons for wanting rights that protect our good and also having 
reasons for treating others as moral ends in themselves. We saw that we will want rights for 
ourselves because those rights further our own good. First possession is posited as the 
feature that seems to underlie all good lives because without it no one could live a good 
life. But even though our need for justice is agent-r lative, it is not true that the 
requirements for being just are made agent-relative. Being just requires abiding by rules 
such as first come, first served and finders keepers, not equal shares, because these 
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principles better reflect the fact that we are the first to possess ourselves. Because we are 
beings who are the first possessors of ourselves we think that it is just that others recognize 
this fact by abiding by rights that make it off limits for them to utilize our bodies and 
resources without our consent. We also saw that the reason why we will concede others 
their rights they ours is that doing so will be conducive to each of our well being. It might 
be true that we could do better sometimes by violating someone’s rights, but there are two 
reasons for not making this a general principle: (1) we cannot always know that we will be 
able to get away with violating rights, so the best policy is to abide by rights; and (2) we 
saw that we need to develop a system of social enforcement whereby it pays us to say 
something when someone’s rights have been violated. Making rights violations have a 
social cost in terms of open disapprobation makes it more likely that people will abide by 
rights. The basic rights that we will have are rights to property in ourselves and in things 
we have acquired, which means the right to take certain courses of action to control 
ourselves and acquire things.  
Chapter Six discussed the compossibility of rights. Since rights are rights to control 
ourselves and our property, we need to see if the syst m of rights forms a coherent system, 
or if rights will very often give rise to actions that bring us into conflict. This means 
making sure that our domains over ourselves do not u justly conflict with each other. 
Because in order to see if rights conflict we would need to know all the possible ways that 
we could interact with each other, it might be possible that our rights could give rise to 
actions that conflict. I think that because our rights often just ask others to refrain from 
doing something to us, they do not lead to as much conflict as a theory that told others to 
actively do things to us. But if there is a conflict we ought to appeal to first come first 
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served and first possession to try to show whose rights take precedence. In most cases, we 
should be able to reduce the problem back to a claim about possession, and thereby show 
who had the right to possess the thing or take the action in question. Maybe in some cases 
we would find that no one deserved to possess something first because he and others 
happened upon it at the same time. In this case equal shares would be the moral default 
position and everyone should get an equal share.      
The present Chapter, Seven, attempted to sum up the arguments for rights and also 
to show what sort of implications the theory had for liberalism and positive rights. 
Of course, rights do not give us some answer to the question ‘what is right?’ Often 
what matters most to the living of our lives is what we find good, not right. But we might 
wonder in the last analysis are rights just another way of saying what is right? We each 
need our first possession protected, so it is good or right that it is protected? These 
assertions sound like ways of trying to infer rights from what is right. Yet, if this thesis has 
been correct we need not hold that rights are directly derived from any particular form of 
the good life. Rights can be held at arm’s length from the good by making sure that the 
basis for rights is general. But we must also face the fact that rights-talk is talk about the 
good to some degree. While it is true that my right to smoke need not be derived from 
some claim that smoking is the right thing for me to do, it still makes sense to say that it is 
right that I have a right to smoke. The rightness consists in the fact that it is good for agents 
to have their ability to live their lives protected. Rights then do tell us something about 
what is good. But this does not mean that rights do not have a different function from 
statements about what is good. As I have tried to argue, rights are not principles about how 
one should live one’s life. They do not tell us directly what is really good for us to have. 
 186 
They perform the needed function of setting boundaries for how agents can promote their 
good lives in a social setting.  
This thesis has attempted to show how persons with plural values could come to 
find the same system of rights reasonable. In this attempt it has also touched upon several 
problems regarding the nature of rights—the need to explain how harm to a rights holder is 
explicable in terms of harm to him, not the duty-bearer, and the distinction between ‘right’ 
as a noun and its adjectival form. I think that the reconciliation of a theory of rights with 
value pluralism tells us much about the function of rights because it forces the theorist to 
take the existence of other forms of good life seriously and not simply claim that all forms 
of the good life can be ordered according to some final end of his choosing. If globalization 
and the immigration that results from a smaller world continue, we will need to be able to 
answer criticisms from other parts of the world who do not accept ‘Western’ values and 
think that rights are mere ideology. The meta-normative answer to the question of how 
persons with quite different backgrounds can live toge her and have reason to respect other 
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